


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MARCH 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-89-012

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**Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hopes for 'Serious'
CFE Talks**

*OW0903113189 Beijing XINHUA in English
1105 GMT 9 Mar 89*

[Text] Beijing, March 9 (XINHUA)—China hopes that the Warsaw Pact and NATO will conduct serious negotiations and reach an agreement on the massive reduction of conventional armament, said a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman here today.

The reduction may contribute to peace and security in Europe and the world as a whole and to easing of the international situation, Li Zhaoxing said at the weekly news briefing.

He said the two major military blocs, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, have amassed huge armed forces in Europe, adding that China has noted both sides have put forward proposals for disarmament of conventional weapons in Europe.

INTRABLOC

USSR-Polish-GDR Military Exercise Announced Under CDE Accord

LD0803174789 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1624 GMT 8 Mar 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—A joint troop exercise involving the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany [GSFG], the Polish Army, and the GDR National People's Army, designated "Friendship'89," which centers on defensive operations, is to take place as planned from 15 to 22 March 1989 in the Gardelegen, Haldensleben, Jessen, Dahme, Baruth, and Tangermünde regions. Up to 16,500 members of the three fraternal armies will take part in it.

The aim of the exercise is to perfect the level of training and cooperation among the troops. It will be led by Lieutenant General Mikhail Kalinin, first deputy commander in chief of the GSFG. In line with the final document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the exercise has been announced to all member states.

BULGARIA

Foreign Minister Mladenov Speaks at CFE/CSBM Session in Vienna

AU0803155689 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 7 Mar 89 p 5

[Speech by Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov at the Vienna talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures on 6 March]

[Text] Vienna, 6 Mar (special BTA correspondent)—Bulgarian Foreign Minister Petur Mladenov made a speech at the afternoon session in which he stated:

Mr Chairman, esteemed colleagues: Recently in this hospitable city, we jointly marked the conclusion of an important stage in the all-European dialogue and the global peace process. The Vienna meeting of the countries participating in the CSCE gave all of us food for thought, highlighted the pressing requirements for new approaches in politics, and helped us to find true guidelines in the conditions of the new historical content of international life.

I do not think I will be mistaken if I point out that the profound and intensive changes taking place in many European countries are of increasing importance for making us aware of the present-day realities and imperatives. In Bulgaria, all-embracing restructuring is being carried out in the economic, sociopolitical, and intellectual fields. In the course of this restructuring, we are ever more clearly recognizing the community of interests of

Bulgaria and the other European nations, and the interconnection between our peaceful and independent development and the fate of the common European home.

We are gathered here today to begin a new joint effort along the road to peace and unity. I refer to our attempts to achieve a balanced agreement on a substantial reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, and to draft a new package of security and confidence-building measures. The great, noble goal of this initiative, as Todor Zhivkov, chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, pointed out, is to shift the crucial center of gravity in guaranteeing national security from military to political factors.

Many hopes are being placed in the new talks that are starting. I think that there is no need to prove at length and in detail why this is so. I will limit myself to noting the fact that the Old Continent is literally collapsing under the burden of the greatest concentration of conventional arms in the world, not to mention their qualitative characteristics. This is a military, economic, political, and psychological burden—in short, a burden which is a sword of Damocles.

These negotiations are a necessary and vital element of the quest for the only possible—all-European—solution of the well-known dilemmas that we have been encountering on the continent for decades on end: peace or war, civilized coexistence or confrontation, consolidation or division.

I am saying all this to emphasize that the hopes concerning the two sets of talks are more than justified. From this arise the expectations and demands relating to these talks.

What in essence is expected and demanded from the forthcoming forums by the European, and indeed the world public?

To put it clearly and concisely, it is that they should fulfill their purpose. This means that:

- the talks must have a specific content, in conformity with their given mandates; and
- that they should be constructive and productive, or, in other words, that they should lead to the achievement of practical agreements in the relevant fields.

From this viewpoint, we must clarify our own intentions, and hence the methods by which we will proceed. If we go into action with the intention of seeking to dictate terms and obtain a stronger bargaining position, we will once again start marching in place. We will once again find ourselves at our old starting points, in the impasse of the previous military confrontation.

A possible resumption of the so-called discussion about numbers will lead to the same result. This will mean allowing the traditional military-technical calculations to take preponderance over political thinking. Thus, there is a risk of repeating the most negative elements in the

negotiations on central Europe. Peace cannot be secured if the participants in the dialogue expect "the worst" of one another. If we allow time and moral-political capital to be wasted in such fruitless polemics, we will probably doom to failure the cause of this all-European reconciliation, which is so precious and necessary for all of us.

We deem it especially important that the sides reach a balance between satisfactorily decreasing the military confrontation and the conceptual proximity in the area of more effectively removing the threat of war in the long term. Real conditions and possibilities exist in this sphere.

In May 1987 the Warsaw Pact member states heralded their defensive doctrine based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency. At the beginning of this year, the socialist countries made significant unilateral reductions in their armed forces, arms, and military budgets, thus unambiguously confirming their sincere intentions for peace. These deeds significantly resounded throughout Europe and the world. We expect Western countries to accept our extended hand and for their part to adopt steps aimed at dispersing mutual concerns.

Our partners do not hide the fact that they themselves are actively working on a comprehensive concept in the area of defense and disarmament. However, why can we not make joint efforts in this respect? We think that in a world in which there is a growing consensus on issues of the comprehensive character of security, and a common striving toward glasnost, predictability, and confidence, it is fully possible to work out a collective model of strategic stability in Europe that would be a convincing type of protection against all kinds of armed encroachment.

It is our opinion that this model must be logically based on the presumption that despite the natural ideological differences in Europe, nobody is the potential enemy of anybody else.

Mr Chairman,

Less than 2 months ago here in Vienna, we expressed confidence that the new talks can and must guarantee the further development of the all-European process. Today we are confirming this confidence. Naturally, the question is on what do we base it?

First, we rely on past experience and achievements. I shall mention Helsinki, the spirit of which has had a favorable influence in favorably influencing the continent for 15 years already. I shall invoke Stockholm, which made an important contribution to overcoming the lack of confidence. I shall also remind you of the INF Treaty, which will be inscribed in history as the beginning of nuclear disarmament. I shall also note Vienna, which blessed our talks and became their host.

Second, we rely on the firm foundations that were built here in the Austrian capital. An exceptionally difficult and crucial issue was resolved at the meeting of the

representatives of the CSCE participating countries; namely, the subject and tasks of the new talks were fixed. Thus, even at their initial stage, the talks could focus on essential and substantial matters.

Third, we rely on the serious behavior and the necessary political will of the participants in the talks, and on their mutual readiness to march in one direction and toward a goal that has been fixed a priori. In addition, we are permitting ourselves to expect that along with the specific military and other aspects of the problems, they will also consider the purely humanitarian factor: the willingness of the European nations to live in peace and understanding.

Last but not least, we rely on the common positive tendencies in international relations, which are the result of the new political thinking. Let us hope that the new talks will also be influenced by their favorable influence and that they themselves will not miss the opportunity to make their contribution to strengthening the political climate on the continent and throughout the world.

It is true that we, as all other mortals, the people who work in the sphere of international relations, tend to be tempted by the thought of achieving quick and substantial changes for the better, especially when vitally important issues are involved. However, on the other hand, precisely because of the fact that we deal with international relations, we understand the complexity of matters, and we realize what great efforts are needed to achieve progress. We already know that the new talks will be complex and difficult. This must even further increase our common responsibility for their success.

As for the People's Republic of Bulgaria, it views the documents of the recent Vienna meeting in their entirety and unity. We attach appropriate importance to all the components of peace, security, and cooperation within the framework of the agreements reached. The necessary measures for the comprehensive and effective implementation of the obligations assumed in connection with these agreements have already been adopted in our country.

Bulgaria will actively participate in the current negotiations, with goodwill and in a constructive spirit, in perfect awareness of its own responsibility related to confidence building, to safeguarding stability and security in Europe, and especially in the region in which our country is located.

In accordance with the conceptual plan on the negotiations for the reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe that was published following the Warsaw conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in 1988, we intend, as early as this week, to submit an initiative on the gradual implementation of the goals of the current negotiations from today to the year 2000. Our proposals are specific and were developed on the basis of correct arguments. They are based on a realistic approach that takes into consideration the complexity of the forthcoming tasks, but which also

realizes the necessity of further advancing at the same time, and which maintains confidence in the success of the negotiations. We hope that our ideas will contribute to the consolidation of common understanding, on the basis of which, together with our partners, we will build our future agreements.

We attach great importance to the negotiations of the 35 states on strengthening confidence-building measures and security in Europe. Without in the least underestimating the importance and the positive role of the Stockholm agreements, we are convinced that the task of the new negotiations by far exceeds the framework of improving and perfecting the Stockholm document.

The time has come to switch from separate measures to a comprehensive policy of confidence-building measures encompassing all military activities of the participating countries.

Information, openness, and predictability are required in dealing with all types of armed forces—ground, air, and naval—alike. As we know, they all represent a uniform organism. It is our conviction that we should consider the question of reducing the scope of their activities precisely in this context.

Mr Chairman, a new factor has recently emerged in European policy, a factor of which we are becoming increasingly aware. Along with the clash of interests and their mutual interaction, a unifying trend is developing as a common denominator in the peoples' aspirations, a trend which expresses itself in the awareness of common cultural values and a common historic fate.

The ordinary people, without understanding the complicated details of the negotiations and of the debates conducted among experts, are very clearly aware of the main issue: that Europe should free itself of the burden of super-rearmament and military confrontation, and that it should overcome the "image of the enemy." People would like to be rid of the feeling that danger is threatening them, and that they ought to be afraid of someone's evil intentions. They would like to have confidence in their own and in their children's security, and in a peaceful future.

Such a future is possible only if Europe resolutely overcomes the present policy of balance of forces and direct its efforts toward a policy based on a balance of interests.

The Vienna meeting of the CSCE participating countries has taken an important step forward in this direction and has built a bridge for Helsinki in 1992. In advancing along the path towards this new meeting, we ourselves desire that even more of our present hopes will be fulfilled.

Thank you for your attention.

Army CSBM Chief Assesses Prospects for CFE Talks

AU0903123989 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 7 Mar 89 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Major General Kamen Petrov, "chief of the Group on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in the General Staff of the Bulgarian People's Army," by Major Vladi Vladkov: "From Overarmament to Reasonable Sufficiency"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Vladkov] What, in your view, may be the outcome of the negotiations starting in Vienna?

[Petrov] It is quite clear that the talks will cover armed forces and armaments that are immense in their scale and variety, as well as varied in their roles, combat capabilities, quality characteristics, and so on. It will be necessary to work out mutually acceptable objective criteria and indicators by which to compare the various organizational structures, armaments, and combat equipment. This makes me think that the negotiations will be intense and far from easy. However, given goodwill, an absence of bias, a constructive approach, and mutual respect between the partners taking part in the talks, they can be given a dynamic stimulus with the aim of speedily achieving practical results. [passage omitted]

However, at the same time we must be realists and clearly recognize that the talks will not be easy. Even given the presence of goodwill, it will be objectively difficult to reach agreements because of the complex nature of the problems under examination. In addition, we are not convinced that our Western partners will always proceed from the standpoints of the new political thinking. Grounds for these thoughts are provided by the aggressive orientation of NATO's military-technical efforts, as well as the striving of the NATO leadership to modernize their armaments.

As the talks proceed, it is expected that a trend will be established for the Western countries to seek to derive unilateral benefits, and for them to display a selective approach toward the problems of disarmament and toward the security-building measures. It is no accident that the declaration of the NATO Council issued during the bloc's December session [in 1988] stated that, in eliminating the imbalances and asymmetries, priority should be given to tanks and artillery, in which the Warsaw Pact has superiority.

It is well known that the final document of the Vienna meeting was adopted by consensus (by universal agreement). However, with regard to many of the unanimously adopted formulations, a difference is apparent in the interpretation of their content. For example, the negotiations on confidence measures will be conducted "with the aim of drafting and adopting a new generation of mutually complementary measures... aimed at reducing the risk of military confrontation in Europe." In this text, the socialist countries see a necessity to extend the

confidence measures to the independent activity of navies and air forces, to seek ways to extend the measures to the territories of the United States and Canada as well, and to create zones of enhanced confidence with a reduced concentration of troops in the vicinity of the line of contact between the two military alliances. However, the Western countries do not want to include these problems in the agenda of the talks, and are directing their efforts toward reducing the level for notification of military activities.

[Vladkov] Comrade Major General, what will be our country's role and position at the Vienna talks?

[Petrov] As a strong link in the Warsaw Pact, the People's Republic of Bulgaria will approach the forthcoming negotiations from positions of principle, guided by the common interests of the socialist countries. Our country will utilize the possibilities provided by the talks to further improve relations with the European countries, especially with the Balkan states. Bulgaria will strive to implement its numerous peace initiatives in the field of disarmament and strengthening of confidence in our region.

The special geographical position of Bulgaria, which shares borders with two states of the North Atlantic Alliance, requires a high level of activity and flexibility on the part of our delegation during the talks. For example, a tendency is appearing in NATO that the elimination of the imbalances and asymmetries should start with the central Europe region. This would affect Bulgaria's national interests, since NATO's great superiority in southeast Europe is a well-known fact. If this situation is permitted, this will violate the principle of the identical security of all participants in the talks at all stages of the negotiations.

It is well known that, according to the mandate, part of southeast Turkey is outside the scope of the talks. Our country must keep a specially close watch to ensure that the future agreements on reducing armed forces do not permit a possibility of an increase in Turkey's Armed Forces in this region or an increased foreign presence there.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria totally supports the idea of convening an all-European conference at the level of leaders of state—"an all-European Reykjavik," which would provide a powerful impetus to the negotiations.

Army Political Chief on Army's Role in 'New International Situation'

AU0703192189 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 6 Mar 89 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Colonel General Mitko Mitkov, chief of Main Political Administration of the Bulgarian People's Army, by Colonel Rangel Zlatkov: "The Bulgarian People's Army and the Demands of the New Times"; uppercase passages as published; date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Zlatkov] Comrade Colonel General, in the last few years, as a result of the peace offensive by the

Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, favorable conditions have been created for an improvement in the international climate, for greater security, and for an intensification of mutually beneficial cooperation in international relations. How do you assess the Army's role in the new situation?

[Mitkov] Today, even in the West, no one disputes the truth that the positive changes in international life are the fruit of the new political thinking, the initiators and agents of which are the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states. This is proved by the fact that the latest initiatives of the socialist countries, specifically the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee "On the Correlation of Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Alliance Force Strengths and Armaments in Europe and Adjoining Waters" and their unilateral steps to reduce their Armed Forces and military budgets were highly praised by the widest cross section of the world public.

The talks on conventional arms reduction and new confidence and security measures that are starting in Vienna undoubtedly provide hopes for a further reduction in the level of military confrontation on the old continent.

The states of the socialist community are guided by the understanding that the new historical content of our times demands that we give political factors priority over military ones in international affairs. HOWEVER, THIS DOES NOT MEAN NEGLECTING THE ROLE OF THE ARMY AND DEPERSONALIZING ITS FUNCTIONS. The reasonable compromises that we are making are dictated by the love of peace and humanism of socialism as a social order, and by a precise, objective analysis of the new world realities. They also reflect our sincere aspirations in the struggle to free mankind from the burden of armaments and wars.

We have no doubt that military-strategic parity will continue to be a crucial factor in preventing war in the future. In the final analysis, this means that THE POLITICAL APPROACHES WILL BE GUARANTEED BY MEASURES OF A DEFENSIVE NATURE AND BY CONSTANT READINESS TO DEFEND SOCIALIST ACHIEVEMENTS. A concise expression of the viewpoint of the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states was embodied in the warning given by Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev in his speech at the 43d session of the UN General Assembly: "We will maintain a defense capability at the level of reasonable and reliable sufficiency in order to prevent anyone from being tempted to encroach upon the security of the Soviet Union and its allies."

[Zlatkov] Within the kaleidoscope of different assessments, one finds some that make a biased interpretation of the new processes in international relations, and extreme viewpoints are even voiced about the present and future of the Army....

[Mitkov] SUCH VIEWPOINTS CAN ONLY BE CHARACTERIZED AS A MANIFESTATION OF POLITICAL IMMATURITY, A FAILURE TO GRASP

THE ACTUAL FACTS OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, AND, IN SOME CASES, EVEN DEMOGOGY. Can anything shed doubt on the reality of the military threat from imperialism? We value the West's contribution to the processes for normalizing the international situation that have begun, but, despite this, we cannot neglect the fact that the United States and NATO do not want to give up the arms race or stop conducting politics from a "position of strength." They have not abandoned the latter, nor, as everything shows, have they any intention of giving up a single one of their military programs. What is more, intense work is in progress on updating, first and foremost, their offensive nuclear and conventional armaments, and "compensation programs" are being developed, as well as new so-called competitive strategies, intended for the 21st century. Also, the military budgets are still at quite a high level.

This is why the prospects in the development of the international situation and the West's military policy give us grounds for reaching the conclusion that THE ARMY WILL PRESERVE ITS IMAGE AND PURPOSE EVEN UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF DISARMAMENT, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, AND COOPERATION BETWEEN STATES WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL SYSTEMS. However, the development of the Army will be based on the principle of reasonable and reliable sufficiency, which occupies a leading place in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states. In other words, OUR EFFORTS IN THE DEFENSE FIELD WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH AND DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE LEVEL OF THE THREAT FACING US.

[Zlatkov] Comrade Colonel General, it is no secret that the restructuring in the Bulgarian People's Army has led to positive changes in the state of combat readiness, the training process, everyday army life, and political and educational work. What are the main features that characterize the restructuring in the Bulgarian People's Army at the present stage, in light of the new elements in the international situation and the decisions of the December 1988 Plenum of the BCP Central Committee?

[Mitkov] The December 1988 Plenum of the BCP Central Committee was a remarkable event in the life of the party and country. Its importance is determined by the fact that it not only made a comprehensive assessment of the progress of restructuring so far, but also pointed out effective tactics and the main approaches for further putting into practice the July Concept in restructuring our society.

In accordance with the plenum's decisions, the Bulgarian People's Army is also developing an offensive over the entire front in order to put the aims and tasks of restructuring into practice and to achieve real, positive changes in all spheres of army life. THE MAIN THING AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF RESTRUCTURING IS TO DIRECT THE SUBJECTIVE FACTOR TOWARD QUALITATIVE PARAMETERS IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION. This is determined both by

the exhaustion of the possibilities of quantitative approaches in developing the Army and by the requirements of our defensive doctrine.

I would like to stress that giving priority to qualitative parameters is also a prominent feature of restructuring in the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies.

Therefore, our main efforts are now being directed toward comprehensively mobilizing the human factor, further improving organizational-staff structure, more widely introducing the achievements of scientific and technical progress, intensifying the teaching process and troop training, as well as strengthening discipline and the one-man-command principle, combined with the further expansion of democracy, and so forth. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, I would like to state that our people may be sure that, IN COMBINED FORMATION WITH THE FRATERNAL ARMIES OF THE WARSAW PACT STATES, THE BULGARIAN PEOPLE'S ARMY IS ABLE AND WILL ALWAYS BE READY TO DEFEND THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS AND MEET IN A WORTHY MANNER THE CHALLENGE OF THE TIMES OF RADICAL CHANGE IN WHICH WE ARE LIVING.

[Zlatkov] Thank you, Comrade Colonel General.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Foreign Minister Johannes Addresses Vienna CFE, CSBM Session

AU1003105689 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
8 Mar 89 p 5

["From the speech" by CSSR Foreign Minister Jaromir Johannes at the Vienna talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and on confidence- and security-building measures, on 7 March]

[Text] Vienna (CTK correspondent)—Yesterday [7 March] CSSR Foreign Minister Jaromir Johannes addressed the Vienna talks on disarmament and military detente. He noted that the foreign ministers are meeting in Vienna for the second time in a short period, and continued:

Only a few weeks ago here we successfully concluded the CSCE follow-up meeting, which created prerequisites for the all-European cooperation reaching a qualitatively new level. Today we are together beginning to implement the conclusions we adopted in the military-political and security spheres. To put it graphically—we are cutting the ribbon to inaugurate two main negotiating lines at the same time.

One of them aims at disarmament, and the other at greater trust. The two lanes of traffic on a one-way street, along which the all-European process proceeds, lead to the same common goal: to security and cooperation in

Europe. We have a chance to reach agreements that may fundamentally influence the situation both in Europe and throughout the world.

Czechoslovakia has a literally vital interest in seeing this particular opportunity used. Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, said a few days ago that we, for our part, "will do everything we can for the talks to yield positive results, which would bring about the strengthening of Europe's stability and security." In this we proceed from the dearly paid for experience of our modern history connected with the tragic events of 50 years ago, when our country—following the Munich betrayal—became one of the first victims of fascist despotism and violence. There must not be another war on our continent, and all the more so because under the present conditions this would lead to the end of civilization.

We all, without exception, are coresponsible for the further fate of Europe. It should forever remain the continent of peaceful cooperation, the mainstay of global stability, the source of positive changes in the international spectrum, and the place where a new quality of relations among states and nations is born.

Therefore, we are in favor of not burdening our dialogue with ideological differences, of no one foisting his convictions, his weltanschauung, upon others. That is why we are also working to eliminate the material means for waging war.

Further detente in the military sphere would contribute to solving the fundamental issue of the present: mankind's survival. This detente would open a new platform for cooperation among the European states. It would help us progress in building the common European home on firm foundations. However, this will only be possible when we achieve a balance of interests and respect the right of every nation to freely choose its own path of development.

Czechoslovakia contributed its share to the successful conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting and is paying exceptional attention to the elaboration and implementation of its conclusions. This applies to all spheres, including the humanitarian dimension of the all-European process. We are convinced that it is necessary to conduct a serious and unbiased dialogue on issues linked to these problems, and to avoid one-sided, ungrounded accusations. Only this approach corresponds with the principles of the Helsinki process. Issues that may arise in connection with the implementation of the final document of the Vienna meeting in all participant countries must be resolved responsibly and in harmony with its provisions.

The favorable developments in international life—especially the improvement of relations between the USSR and the United States, between East and West, and the improvement of the international situation—presage constructive and successful work. Progress has been achieved in resolving some regional conflicts, and the danger of war has undoubtedly lessened.

The new political thinking, which is increasingly asserting itself in the contemporary world, yields genuine results in the effort for a peaceful restructuring of international relations. This is significantly assisted by the ongoing restructuring and democratization of all spheres of the life of society in the USSR and the other socialist countries, including the CSSR.

The treaty on the scrapping of two classes of nuclear weapons, in the realization of which—together with the signatories and other states—our country is also taking part, has initiated the process of genuine disarmament. Further fundamental steps are on the day's agenda, especially concluding as quickly as possible a treaty on a 50-percent reduction in the number of strategic offensive weapons; winding up the work on an agreement banning and scrapping chemical weapons which this year's Paris conference culled for; and halting nuclear tests. The disarmament process must be developed to such an extent as to include all mass-destruction weapons, as well as conventional weapons and armaments. The gradual removal of weapons, and not their stockpiling, leads to greater security.

The peace initiatives elaborated by M. Gorbachev from the rostrum of the UN General Assembly last year also point out the path toward new quality in international relations.

The important thing now is to make these positive trends irreversible; to overcome the stereotypes of the old thinking; and to not compensate for the scrapped weapons by other means and by upgrading weapons systems.

Therefore, we consider the demilitarization of international relations to be one of the most urgent tasks of the present. Today solutions seem to be closer at hand and more realistic than was the case not so long ago. The talks that are beginning provide a unique opportunity to make progress along this path.

We are in favor of the talks of the 23 states being dynamic right from the start, of steering them along the shortest possible course toward a stable and secure parity of conventional armed forces and armaments on a substantially lower level in the broad stretches from the Atlantic to the Urals, from Spitsbergen to the Mediterranean.

Our endeavor is aimed at the reasonable defensive sufficiency of all participating states. In our opinion, the basis for this rests in gradual disarmament, in attaining predictability and openness in military issues, and in further extending and deepening the measures to strengthen trust. We should now transform these principles into concrete steps.

Proceeding in stages will make our task easier. We identify with the idea of reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe in three stages, as USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze explained in his speech yesterday.

We also believe that attention must first focus on eliminating historically created asymmetries in the conventional potentials of the participant states. In this it will be

necessary to take into consideration both quantitative and qualitative viewpoints. We attach special significance to reaching an agreement on equal joint ceilings in the strength of armed forces and armaments, particularly those types which the participants in the talks consider to be the most destabilizing. However, their enumeration cannot be narrowed down only to those in which one side has superiority. One must take into consideration not only tanks, artillery, or armored personnel carriers, but also tactical air forces, combat helicopters, as well as other means possessing great striking power. We consider ensuring parity in all stages of reduction and full mutuality to be the prerequisite for achieving a balanced agreement.

It is understandable that we will need figures from which to proceed. However, let us always keep in mind the lesson from the 15 years of fruitless talks on reducing the number of armed forces and armaments in central Europe: mathematics must never prevail over politics.

The Warsaw Pact member states have been displaying adequate openness, a matter which is attested to by the recent publication of details of their armed forces and armaments.

I also would like to recall the publication of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states in May 1987. We are convinced that a comparison and constructive assessment of the political doctrines of the two military-political groupings would help to eliminate mutual mistrust. It would make it easier to comprehend the intentions of the other side and would become a useful contribution to the successful course of the Vienna talks.

The mandate of the Vienna talks envisages the possibility of taking into consideration the specific nature of individual subregions. Our opinion is that the line of contact between the two military-political groupings deserves particular attention. It is here, above all, that it is especially necessary to reduce the amassed arsenals of conventional weapons—in other words, to build trust, not a potential for offensive actions.

We consider the ensuring of clearly defensive conventional armed forces, including respective changes in their structure and deployment, to be a highly urgent task. Changes in military structures will make it possible to markedly reduce and eliminate the danger of a surprise attack.

We are prepared to discuss establishing a comprehensive and effective system of verifying adherence to the adopted agreements, without the right to refuse to do so.

The seriousness of the Warsaw Pact member states' approach to the talks and the attempt to create a favorable atmosphere for them are attested to by the far-reaching steps toward the unilateral reduction of armed forces and armaments, and especially by the magnanimous measures of the USSR.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, we will reduce the number of combat troops by 12,000, tanks by 850, armored

personnel carriers by 165, and warplanes by 51. Twenty-thousand troops are being transferred to construction units, and we are reducing defense spending by 15 percent. For our country, these are not just symbolic figures. Other measures also stress the defensive orientation of our Armed Forces. There is no doubt that similar constructive steps on behalf of the NATO member states would also contribute to the success of our talks.

We can only achieve momentous results if all participants in the talks demonstrate political will. The meeting of the highest representatives of the signatory states of the CSCE Final Act, the convocation of which the CSSR fully supports, could provide an important impetus. We also consider the idea of convening foreign ministerial meetings every 6 months to be a useful one. Turning the means of war into the means of peace and finding a practical way of transforming military production into peacetime production should become the subject of our joint efforts. We in Czechoslovakia are intensively addressing this issue. An international exchange of experience resulting from the scrapping of weapons could also be useful.

Our country also approaches the other talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe by attempting to achieve significant progress.

We associate the expansion of the flow of information, openness, and predictability in the military sphere with the need to change the "hostile image" to a "partner image"—that is, by strengthening trust among states. The successful implementation of the Stockholm document convinces us that agreement is possible. We should further improve the measures adopted earlier and, above all, formulate a new generation of measures that would encompass the activity of all types of armed forces. It is understandable that in this context it is not possible to disregard important components of military potential in Europe, such as naval and air forces. We believe that in the future, no type of military activity by a state should remain outside the framework of agreed-upon measures. General stability and security demand that we apply new approaches, and that we move from partial steps in individual spheres to a broadly conceived policy of trust.

The establishment of a European center for reducing the danger of war and avoiding an unexpected attack could become an important step toward setting up the necessary structure of security and trust.

It is understandable that when strengthening stability in Europe, we cannot avoid the issue of tactical nuclear systems and plans to modernize them. They do not and never will make Europe a safer place. With the reduction of the level of armaments in the conventional sphere, the importance of these systems in the general European armament potential will increase considerably. We welcome the USSR's readiness to remove a part of its tactical nuclear systems from central Europe and hope that all NATO member states will realize what a serious step backward the modernization of this type of weapon

would be for our continent. We in Czechoslovakia could not remain indifferent were there to be a substantial strengthening of the nuclear potential west of our border. We support the proposal to start separate talks as soon as possible on the reduction and complete scrapping of tactical weapons in Europe.

A concrete contribution of Czechoslovakia's to conventional disarmament and strengthening trust and security in Europe is its initiative aimed at establishing a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states. We would like our proposal to become the subject of not only bilateral dialogue, but also of multilateral talks. The ideas of the initiative concerning the military sphere are directly connected with the content of the two new negotiation forums and are in full harmony with their agreed-upon objectives.

Thus, for example, a "dilution" of the contingents of troops in the proposed zone could be a part of the solutions to be adopted in Vienna. On the line of contact there should remain only the armed forces and armaments that would suffice for defense but which would make it impossible to launch a sudden attack or wage offensive operations.

We are also prepared to agree on qualitatively new measures to strengthen trust and security, including stricter limitations and a ban on some types of military activities, such as along the line of contact, especially in central Europe. We also propose a broader exchange of information, stricter controls, and the development of contacts between military representatives.

The security of our continent must be based on close cooperation among states in all spheres of the Helsinki process. We are convinced that productive talks and results will be favorably projected into the further development of all-European cooperation. Thus, let us begin to breathe life into the hope of all preceding generations and ensure firm and lasting peace for ourselves and our children. This is a goal worthy of all our efforts, all our skills and diplomatic talent.

In conclusion, I would like to thank our Austrian hosts for creating good conditions for the work of the two important negotiating forums, and I wish us all much success in our common task.

**Foreign Minister Johanes Evaluates CSCE
Foreign Ministers' Talks**
LD0803151689 Prague Domestic Service in Czech
1300 GMT 8 Mar 89

[Text] At the conclusion of the 3-day meeting of the foreign ministers of 33 European countries, the United States, and Canada, CSSR Minister Jaromir Johanes granted an interview to our journalists accredited in Vienna. Our special correspondent Bohumil Horak will acquaint you with it now:

[Horak] Minister Johanes termed the results of the meeting positive. We see the exceptional significance of this meeting, he said, in that for the first time in the history of our continent, the foreign ministers of all the European countries, the United States, and Canada met to discuss exclusively the theme of conventional disarmament and strengthening trust among nations on the basis of the decision of the Vienna follow-up meeting. The meeting prepared the ground for the further development of a serious multilateral dialogue on doing away with the high level of military confrontation and mutual suspicion and mistrust.

Predominating in the ministers' addresses, Jaromir Johanes went on to say, were constructive attempts to seek possibilities for building a common European home under conditions of peace and military relaxation. They reflected the spirit of the new political thinking, to whose development the USSR and the other socialist countries are contributing so significantly.

All the participants confirmed with special emphasis the identical points of view on the need to do away with the potential to carry out sudden attacks and to launch large offensive operations. However, views differed on how to achieve this goal. The clarification of these complex questions is the task of the delegations to the Vienna consultative forums that will begin their work tomorrow.

In his interview with Czechoslovak journalists, Jaromir Johanes went on to say: We used this meeting to express support for the joint proposals of the Warsaw Pact member states to hold two new rounds of talks, in whose setting-up we actively participated. We also explained our ideas on how to contribute to security in Europe as efficiently as possible by using and implementing the proposals of Comrade Milos Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, for setting up a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO member states.

Baker's Speech at CFE Opening Session Criticized

AU0803153189 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
7 Mar 89 pp 1, 7

[Report by Jozef Janto and Marek Dobrovolny, Bratislava PRAVDA correspondents in Vienna: "Three-Stage Plan for Reduction of Conventional Forces"]

[Excerpts] Vienna (our correspondents)—Attended by Franz Vranitzky, chancellor of the Republic of Austria, and ministers of foreign affairs of the 35 signatory states of the Helsinki Final Act, two disarmament forums began in Vienna's Hofburg Palace on Monday [6 March]: the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures and Security and Disarmament (also known as the Talks of the 35), and the talks on conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals, attended by 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. [passage omitted]

The speech by Geoffrey Howe, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, can be described as fairly realistic. He immediately reacted to Eduard Shevardnadze's speech. He rejected the prospect of the denuclearization of Europe. However, he submitted NATO's first official proposal for the upcoming talks. According to him, the limit for both sides should be set at 40,000 tanks, 33,000 artillery systems, and 56,000 armored personnel carriers. At the same time, one state could have, at most, 12 percent of the total number. This NATO proposal actually counts on the disarmament of the Warsaw Pact countries, while the NATO countries would maintain intact arsenals of their numerically strongest arms of the services such as the Air Force and the Navy. However, the most important thing is that despite the considerable differences in the two sides' views on the subject, the participants agree that successful talks are the only realistic path into the future.

The speech by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker did not fulfill the expectations of journalists and, obviously, not those of the other participants in the Vienna talks either. Not only did he not submit a proposal, but in his speech he took the position of lecturing and in some cases almost arrogance. For example, he spoke about the necessity to scrap chemical weapons, and in this the United States is one of the greatest obstacles; or when he stressed that the Soviet Union has, allegedly, divided Europe against the will of its inhabitants; or his remark about a "scientist in Prague who has difficulties getting hold of books he needs." Although he expressed appreciation for the new thinking, he clearly revealed that he thinks in the old manner. He called for words being transformed into deeds, but this sounded strange in connection with his assessment of the disarmament steps undertaken by the Warsaw Pact member states in the conventional sphere. At the same time, the NATO member states not only did not undertake any similar steps but, on the contrary, they are striving to modernize tactical nuclear weapons. At variance with facts, he stressed that the Warsaw Pact should reduce its numbers of conventional weapons to the level that NATO has, which would mean, according to him, that in terms of weapons in which NATO has superiority, the Warsaw Pact would have to actually increase the number of its weapons. A considerable part of his speech was devoted to phrases about freedom and human rights. However, Baker, at least with a few words, identified himself with the idea that the Vienna talks must be successful. [passage omitted]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Foreign Minister Fischer Attends CFE, CSCE Opening Session

Statement on Arrival in Vienna
LD0503205189 East Berlin ADN International Service
in German 1749 GMT 5 Mar 89

[Excerpts] Vienna (ADN)—GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer arrived in the Austrian capital today to take part in the Vienna meeting of the foreign ministers

of the CSCE countries. He was welcomed by Alois Mock, vice chancellor and foreign minister of the host country. [passage omitted]

Oskar Fischer will be the first foreign speaker at the meeting held in Vienna's Hofburg Place on Monday.

Immediately after his arrival, Oskar Fischer met with Alois Mock.

The GDR foreign minister made a statement upon his arrival. The foreign ministers' meeting, he said, marks the start of talks which should lead to considerable conventional disarmament and the strengthening of mutual trust. This will undoubtedly strengthen security and peace from the Atlantic to the Urals. The result of the negotiations must be a clear reduction in forces and arms of all kinds. The forces remaining, which would then no longer possess the capacity for surprise attacks, should be verifiable. This is an enormous challenge for everyone.

Oskar Fischer underscored the fact that the GDR will do its part to advance disarmament in a purposeful way. It has already proven this with a significant unilateral advance concession. This step, in addition to the unilateral concessions of the USSR and other member states of the Warsaw Pact, have created a good climate for negotiations, in which early new specific results should be possible. In conclusion, the foreign minister expressed the hope that the actions of the socialist states would encourage their partners in Vienna to act similarly.

Addresses CSCE Foreign Ministers' Session
AU0803105689 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 7 Mar 89 p 3

[Speech by GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer at the Vienna CSCE foreign ministers' meeting on 6 March: "The Path Toward Detente Only Leads Through Arms Limitation and Disarmament"]

[Text] Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen:

The negotiations on conventional armed forces and further confidence- and security-building measures, which are beginning here today in the Vienna Hofburg—which is rich in tradition—are truly significant. If a forceful impulse was given to the CSCE process with the final document from the Vienna follow-up meeting, this process of disarmament, which began so full of hope, is now due to be carried further, taking into account the justified expectations of people not only on the European continent. Permit me to cordially thank you, Mr. chairman, for your invitation to this new meeting of the foreign ministers of the 35 CSCE states. Our thanks go to the Republic of Austria for its readiness to host these very important negotiations. Europe, the starting point and main arena for two world wars in the first half of this century, wars which emanated from German soil, is receiving at the end of this century the historic opportunity to create, step by step, a new structure for joint security.

The path to lasting peace requires political cooperation on all sides, which enables drastic reductions to be made in conventional armed forces. To reach an agreement on the necessary steps along this path, the task of the forthcoming negotiations is a unifying obligation and at the same time a challenge.

The Socialist German state is also taking part in the negotiations, now aware of its responsibility to do everything to ensure that never again will war emanate from German soil, but only peace. Not only Europe, but the entire world, is standing at a turning point, because even the maintenance of the available military potentials and practices is endangering the survival of mankind....

The continued stockpiling of more and more dangerous arms renders their control more and more difficult for mankind. But war, regardless of why it began, would be today, in the nuclear age, no longer the continuation of politics, it would be its end. The European peoples would neither survive a nuclear war nor a conflict fought with conventional weapons. For this reason, the European states have opted for peaceful, rational cooperation, for more trust; they have thereby established the path to be taken through the CSCE process. At the end of such developments, a consolidated, peaceful "European home" can arise. The foundation stone for this is being laid with the end of the arms race.

Only together can we, must we, answer the question concerning what is to be done in order to guarantee stability in Europe, with an ever lower military expenditure and in a reasonable manner.

Certainly, it is not easy to find an acceptable and practical answer to this. But the conditions for it have never before been so favorable:

—Favorable, because the Soviet-American INF treaty, to whose creation the GDR has contributed and for whose implementation it continues to work, proves that even complex security problems are soluble if the interests of the involved parties are respected. For the first time, an entire category of the most modern arms systems is being eliminated under strictest monitoring.

—Favorable, because the announcement of considerable unilateral reductions in armed forces and armaments by Warsaw Pact states is having an exemplary, trust-promoting effect. These reductions are being implemented independently of the negotiations which are to be conducted here, but are in the deepest harmony with their aims. Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee and chairman of the GDR's Council of State, stated that it is the aim of the unilateral measures "to show the readiness of the GDR to reduce armed forces and conventional weapons by deeds, in the hope of providing a stimulus worthy of consideration to other European states...." Thus, by the end of 1990, the National People's Army will be reduced by 10,000 soldiers, and at the same time 600 tanks will be scrapped or reequipped for

civilian purposes. An air squadron will be dissolved and national defense expenditures will be reduced by ten percent.

—Favorable, because there is agreement that armed forces and conventional weapons must be included in disarmament. The mandate agreed for this in Vienna encompasses aims which can be achieved. It is aimed at the essential—the transition to an exclusively defensive capability of the states. In this way, peace intentions would be linked at last to a real inability to attack, which would allow mutual trust and beneficial partnership to grow, instead of mistrust and confrontation.

Favorable, because controversial questions, for example the supervision of disarmament and trust-building measures, have been eliminated.

Such an approach is proving itself, as the realization of the Stockholm document and the INF agreement shows. This is already setting proven yardsticks for other areas of disarmament. Finally, it can also be seen as being useful that data on the relative strength of the armed forces in Europe are now already available.

All this taken together allows the hopeful and encouraging conclusion to be drawn: arms limitation and disarmament have commenced. The starting conditions for the negotiations are good. The socialist countries have done their share.

Now the other side is being called upon to show something similar, because in the end, effective disarmament can only be realized if both sides want it and carry it out.

Along with its allies, the GDR affirms that it will singlemindedly use and expand the opportunities provided by the new developments. For this reason, it will work to bring about:

First, the elimination of existing conventional asymmetries on both sides;

Second, the reduction in armed forces and arms in Europe: to below those upper limits which are achieved by eliminating the asymmetries;

Third, a situation in which the military alliances possess only the military forces and means which are sufficient for defensive action but which are inadequate for launching surprise attacks and offensive operations, regardless of weapon type and whether with conventional or nuclear arms.

Fourth, agreement on confidence- and security-building measures which supplement the Stockholm document sensibly and effectively and which restrict military activities in Europe according to size, number, character, and the area of implementation;

Fifth, the promotion of mutual information and control as elements of trust, predictability, and supervision, as the obligations entered into are fulfilled.

The uncovering and exposing of intellectual aggression—as, for example, occurred in the GDR after 1945, where antifascism became the determining social and finally state doctrine. Neo-Nazi philosophies must be eradicated everywhere. "Defend against the beginnings" can and should be valid here.

The GDR will set out on the basis of these principles, together with its allies, precise and concrete proposals which are from the 1st day directed toward conducting the negotiations dynamically and effectively with the objective of achieving initial results even before the next follow-up meeting in Helsinki. Over and above this, the GDR is prepared to support all initiatives and proposals corresponding to these principles, regardless of their source.

On this basis, and taking its truly exposed position into account, the GDR devotes particular attention to the central European region.

For this reason, it above all emphatically supports a divergence of the military potentials capable of offensive action on point of contact where the two alliances meet, because the danger of a military confrontation would thereby be lessened and greater stability for the whole of Europe would thus be achieved.

The negotiations that opened today increase the hope for speedy, effective results. One should all the more so notice with concern those things which run contrary to success, which is so dearly wished for and so urgently necessary.

It cannot be permitted, for example:

- that disarmament achieved with effort in one area is rendered worthless by quantitatively and qualitatively new arming in other areas;
- that while knowing better, a "threat from the East" is again and again conjured to justify the outmoded and, in addition, dangerous concept of deterrence;
- that people continue to strive for military superiority and that deeds and changes are only demanded from the other side.

Apart from all the easily verifiable steps by the Warsaw Pact states, the Soviet Union recently and emphatically stated that it would undertake no modernization of its tactical nuclear missiles if the other side also did not do so.

Does it serve stability in Europe, does it serve a continuous disarmament process and the building of confidence:

- if the almost 700 Lance missiles to date with a range up to 125 km are due to be replaced by almost 1,100 new missiles with a range of 480 km?
- if a "complementary air attack system" (KOLAS), which is deployable either with nuclear or conventional weapons and which has a range of almost 500 km, is adopted and further new air-to-ground missiles

(SRAM 2) with roughly the same range are in reality due to replace the missiles destroyed by the INF Treaty?

- if the introduction of a long-range missile launcher is planned, for which the warheads of the Pershing II's to be eliminated by the INF Treaty are due to be used?
- if Star Wars projects are to be advanced with great energy?
- or if large-scale maneuvers, which create a great deal of anxiety, continue to be carried out directly on the dividing line between both military blocs during a period oriented toward disarmament and detente?

It would better serve stability in all parts of the world if the proposals of the socialist states were followed and if:

- the number of strategic offensive weapons of the USSR and the United States were halved, while adhering to the ABM Treaty;
- efforts were under way for establishing a comprehensive nuclear test ban;
- a convention for the elimination of chemical weapons were concluded;
- conventional armed forces were drastically reduced and confidence- and security-building measures were further developed; and
- negotiations on the reduction and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons were commenced.

New thinking and action must not remain one-sided. I repeat: Disarmament only has a chance if all sides are prepared for it and carry it out on the basis of equal security. There will be no trust, no disarmament, if one side strives for superiority over the other.

If military stability on our continent is to be lasting, then there should be no isolated consideration of some weapons categories.

It is also necessary to include those areas which are not actually part of these negotiations, but which count toward the balance of power in Europe. This is why it remains of utmost urgency to banish chemical weapons from military arsenals, to create agreements on marine forces, and above all, to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, and finally to eliminate them. Lying directly on the contact line between the two military coalitions and under special threat from these weapons, the GDR proposed to the FRG in December 1987 that negotiations be started on the reduction of these weapons and that nuclear medium-range missiles, which were to be abolished, should not be replaced by new weapons.

In the future as well, the GDR will support and promote everything which improves the security situation in this very sensitive zone. This also includes the formation of a nuclear weapon-free corridor and a chemical weapons

free zone. Anyone who rejects possible solutions on this, for whatever reason, is making themselves hostage to these weapons.

The citizens of socialist Germany place great hopes in the forthcoming negotiations. They expect that all participant states will take into account the experiences of past negotiations, and will be guided by objectivity, perceptiveness, and readiness, for compromise. Anything which is opposed to the aim of achieving significantly fewer troops and arms on all sides must be halted. They hope that concerns will be taken seriously and will be removed from the world by joint efforts.

They demand that the security needs of all participants be respected and guaranteed by sole political means. The path toward the age of long-term detente and prosperous cooperation leads via arms limitation and disarmament. If this is complex, it nevertheless remains the only viable way.

There is no responsible alternative. What is required is the willingness, in words and deeds, of all states. The GDR will do what it can. It will always be an accountable and constructive partner, in matters of peace, international security, and cooperation to ensure the well-being and peaceful future of the nations.

Thank you for your attention.

Central Committee Urges 'Intense Efforts' by Army To Guard Peace
AU0303172289 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 1 Mar 89 p 1

[Message from the SED Central Committee to the National People's Army: "The Party's Class Assignment Is Always Honorably Fulfilled; Congratulations From the SED Central Committee on the Day of the National People's Army"]

[Text] Comrade soldiers, seamen, noncommissioned officers, petty officers, warrant officers, officers, generals, and admirals,

Comrade civilian employees and reservists of the National People's Army,

On the occasion of the 33d anniversary of the National People's Army, the SED Central Committee conveys to you cordial greetings and congratulations.

In political and battlefield training, in the ready-alert system, and in combat service, the members of the National People's Army, under the party's leadership, are implementing with great commitment the supreme principles of the socialist military doctrine and the humanist purpose of soldiers in socialism, that is, to preserve peace and to prevent the arms from deciding. In this way, they are carrying out active peace work.

In close comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies, they always reliably protect

the socialist achievements, at the side of the working people. They themselves make a considerable contribution to economically strengthening our socialist homeland, and they protect our people's lives in happiness and peace.

The SED Central Committee conveys thanks and pays tribute to all National People's Army members, civilian employees, and reservists.

The shift from confrontation to detente in international relations is, above all, due to the offensive peace policy of socialism. The most reactionary NATO forces, which continue to advocate the strategy of nuclear deterrence and the modernization of their offensive weapons against their peoples' will, are increasingly opposing this development.

Intense efforts by all peace forces are required to make international development irreversible and to increasingly advance it. The socialist armed forces' great watchfulness, adequate preparedness, and defense capability prove to be an unrenouncable factor to preserve peace, as long as socialism and peace continue to be threatened militarily.

We are convinced that the Communists and all members, civilian employees, and reservists of the National People's Army will join in the people's broad mass movement with new initiatives and in a dignified manner, and will always honorably fulfill the party's class assignment in the year of the 40th anniversary of the GDR and in preparation for the 12th SED Congress. They will face the new tasks and challenges resulting from the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states and contribute with great achievements to further strengthening socialism and securing peace.

The SED Central Committee wishes you, dear comrades, and your families much success, health, and creative vigor.

With socialist greetings,
SED Central Committee
E. Honecker, general secretary

The GDR Council of Ministers also conveyed greetings.

Spokesman Notes U.S. Plan To Remove Chemical Weapons from FRG

LD0703181389 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1637 GMT 7 Mar 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The announcement made by U.S. Secretary of State Baker that President Bush will have examined the possibilities of removing chemical weapons stored in the FRG earlier than 1992 was noted with attention in the GDR. Ambassador Wolfgang Meyer, the GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman, declared this in Berlin today. The GDR always expressed its grave concern that the supplies of the most dangerous means of mass destruction stored in its immediate vicinity presents a very serious threat not only to the two German states, but also to Europe and to the whole world. The step now hinted at by Washington can, the

speaker continued, have a favorable influence on the course of the negotiations to draft a convention on the worldwide ban on chemical weapons at the Geneva disarmament conference.

Accusations from Bonn that, in view of this advance concession on the part of the United States, the Soviet Union should now withdraw its chemical weapons from GDR territory, are of little help. Even the federal government was aware that no such weapons belonging to other countries are stationed on GDR territory. The GDR, which itself possesses no chemical weapons, neither pursues their development nor does it have at its disposal installations for their production.

The spokesman stressed that the GDR maintains its offer to enter negotiations with the FRG and Czechoslovakia immediately on rendering or keeping these three countries free of chemical weapons. It considers this to be a genuine confidence- and security-building measure in central Europe, which will promote a global solution.

HUNGARY

Defense Minister Karpati Views Army, Warsaw Pact Relations

LD0703074589 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1815 GMT 6 Mar 89

["Conversation" between Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, and Laszlo Juszti, in Karpati's office: "The Soldier Must Be a Thinking Man"—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Juszti] There is no position in the Army that is more responsible than the one that you fill—I imagine that this is indicated somewhat by this room and by the number of telephones here. There are three separate telephones here. (One) has a lot of buttons. One of the sets does not even have a dial; instead, it bears a coat-of-arms, that of the Hungarian People's Republic. Who can you telephone with it?

[Karpati] Here at home important national leaders have such telephones, but with this one, it is also possible to maintain contact with other countries' leaders.

[Juszti] So, if you lift up the phone...

[Karpati, interrupting] Then I get the operator and say with whom I want to speak, and the operator makes the connection.

[Juszti] So, if you want to reach Army General Yazov, your Soviet counterpart, that is all there is to it?

[Karpati] Then I call him on this set...

[Juszti, interrupting] And is the reverse also true? Do you usually receive commands from there on this set?

[Karpati] Not commands—We are an independent, sovereign country with its own government. The defense

minister cannot receive a command from anywhere other than his own government.

[Juszti] And as a Warsaw Pact member state?

[Karpati] We are allies. This means that we sit at the table as identical partners. By identical I mean that we are equal, as far as our rights are concerned; of course, our importance cannot be identical. Otherwise, no matter how essential the issue is, we discuss it, we consult over it, and thus, we reach, or do not reach, a joint stand. [passage omitted]

[Juszti] Here is another telephone without many pushbuttons, an independent telephone set, one that is grey. It is not a Hungarian telephone—it is foreign. What is it for?

[Karpati] It is a set which has been systematized for Warsaw Pact military leaders. It is an expressly military set.

[Juszti] When did it last ring?

[Karpati] This morning.

[Juszti] Is who telephoned you a secret?

[Karpati] Not at all. It is known that the armed command and staff of the joint armed forces have their headquarters in Moscow. There are numerous Hungarian generals and officers in high positions there. One of the generals reported to me on certain matters.

[Juszti] And this third telephone?

[Karpati] Certain Hungarian political and state leaders have such a telephone with which it is possible to contact each other directly. [passage omitted]

[Juszti] In a situation when the country is in ferment, when the mood is not rosy, when the responsibility of the man who has the weapons in his hand increases, that of the No 1 leader of the Army, of the person who, if you please, can give the command to fire or who can stop anything, in such a situation, what directs a person? What directs the minister's way of thinking, not his instructions?

[Karpati] Allow me, first, to clarify things a bit. The defense minister in Hungary is not a dictator. He does not perversely issue commands, especially not for using weapons or other things. I am a member of the government. Thus, I must implement the decisions of the legal order in this country—the government, the legislature, the President Council. I have to see that these are implemented. I can make proposals and initiatives, but I cannot make decisions arbitrarily; I could not even imagine such a thing or personally undertake such a thing. [passage omitted]

[Juszti] You have said that you are a member of the government, but in the final analysis you carry out instructions. In a given situation, whose instructions are these?

[Karpati] There is a leading political force: the MSZMP. Thus, the main determiner of the political trend prevailing in the country is this political leadership. And this policy must at present be enforced in the government as well. The government passes resolutions, issues decrees, and makes decisions. This also pertains to the minister of defense. We are racking our brains quite a bit now and debating how this will be in the future. There always has to be a legal order, and the defense minister is a member of the government which must work according to the law, on the basis of laws created by the highest legislative body, the legislature, and the legal provisions issued by the Presidential Council. Thus, this is what obligates me and what demarcates my activity.

[Juszt] And the Army carries out orders as they should be carried out, as the minister's command says they should be carried out.

[Karpati] Obviously, that is our purpose.

[Juszt] Let us imagine: In a given situation, it is necessary to deploy the Army somewhere. You, in some manner, give a command. You say: Commander X, open up envelope K-54 and implement its orders. And you receive this answer over the telephone: I have opened it and I will not implement them. [words indistinct]

[Karpati] Look, there are very strict laws in this regard, and military statutes contain specific stipulations. Apart from that, there is the military penal code. Thus, refusing a command is an extremely serious thing. For this, it is necessary to send the person concerned before a court with a military prosecutor and a military tribunal. This court holds proceedings and passes its judgement on such matters.

[Juszt] And if the officer is 200 km away from Budapest?

[Karpati] It is not distance which determines this. In all circumstances military leadership must see that orders which have been issued are implemented. Distance perhaps can make things a bit difficult, but there can be no building upon someone who does not implement things due to distance, thus bringing us to a halt. We cannot come to a halt—that is a basic rule, a requirement of military life. [passage omitted]

[Juszt] The past weeks have brought, in part, your announcement that certain formations of the Soviet Southern Army Group are to leave Hungary. Then, you announced that the size of the Hungarian People's Army is to be reduced. You will enter Hungarian history, Hungarian military history, as the person in whose time of service withdrawals took place and the size of the forces was reduced.

[Karpati] I think that this issue cannot be so simplified. It is a given government, in a given world situation. A military leader has to be precisely aware what it means, after over 4 decades following the horrors of a second world war; of how weapons and means of destruction have developed; and what kinds of military force now

exist in Europe, and in the world. I lived through a world war, through all of its horrors, or through many of these; and the young people are now growing up in this kind of atmosphere. So one's main purpose is to avert this. If a person can do this—and obviously it does not just depend on me, although how I can satisfy this purpose at my post has something to do with it—then he must seize every opportunity to do so.

If we can now speak about being witnesses, participants in detente, I believe that every sober person can be pleased. If this also entails our people having to spend less on defense and weapons, then this also will be good. And only from this angle can such a thing be viewed.

[Juszt] What is the Hungarian People's Army like?

[Karpati] There is no simple answer, but a summary is unavoidable if I have to reply briefly: Our Army has developed very much in every regard—and I would put in first place the development of its intellect. This is thanks to the current officer corps being well-trained. They have reached officer grade after serious training; they are schooled and prepared. The decisive majority is made up of such people. This is the determining factor in the Army.

On the other hand, the enormous sacrifices which the country and the people have made over the past decades for their Army have modernized this army. It also is very important that it is perceived as being unified, well-grounded, and that it can be built upon. [passage omitted]

POLAND

Foreign Minister Olechowski Attends CFE, CSBM Talks Opening

Statement on Prospects for Talks
LD0503181789 Warsaw PAP in English
1557 GMT 5 Mar 89

[Text] Warsaw, Mar 5—Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski has made the following statement for the POLISH PRESS AGENCY:

Foreign ministers from 35 states taking part in the CSCE are meeting in Vienna on Monday at the invitation from Austrian Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Alois Mock.

The meeting precedes a formal start of two negotiations: on conventional armed forces in Europe to be held by 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states and on confidence-building measures and security to be held by 35 CSCE states.

The presence of ministers testifies to the unprecedented character and high rank of these talks which concern the most vital interests of security on our continent. They will certainly attract the attention of the public in the

coming years. I think that this ministerial Vienna summit will provide the negotiations with a strong impulse and will not let them drown in technical disputes.

I am going to Vienna to present the Polish point of view on disarmament and security.

We are interested in a quick arrival at agreements which would considerably decrease the level of conventional armaments, would contribute to diminishing the threat of a sudden attack and strengthen mutual confidence. While covering the whole of Europe, the process of reductions should acquire a clear dimension especially with regard to Central Europe. Poland from the start is ready to submit its forces to such negotiated mutual reductions.

Our intentions have been confirmed by unilateral decisions to cut the manpower and arms potential of Polish Armed Forces.

We want to be an active participant in Vienna talks. With their start we link the opening of the stage of negotiating elements of the Jaruzelski Plan.

Arrives in Vienna

LD0503213489 Warsaw PAP in English
1900 GMT 5 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna, Mar 5—Poland's Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski arrived here today.

Starting Monday he will participate in the "Vienna Meeting of Foreign Ministers 1989" organized by the Austrian Government to stress the importance of and give momentum to the conference of 35 states on Security and Confidence-Building Measures in Europe and the negotiations of 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

Olechowski is expected to address the meeting on Tuesday.

Today Olechowski met with the new U.S. secretary of state, James Baker, for over 45 minutes. The Polish foreign minister is also to meet with FRG's Foreign Minister Genscher, Austria's Mock and Spain's Fernandez-Ordenez.

Meets With James Baker

LD0503234589 Warsaw PAP in English
2134 GMT 5 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna, Mar 5—Poland's Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski who had arrived in Vienna for a meeting of foreign ministers from 35 CSCE countries, held a talk with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker here today.

The talk focussed mainly on bilateral relations. Olechowski and Baker assessed the process of their normalization and deemed it necessary to invigorate cooperation in various fields and particularly in economy.

James Baker showed a well-disposed interest in the course of the roundtable talks and reforms under way in Poland and stressed their broad international dimension. He pointed to vivid interest in Poland displayed by President George Bush since his visit to this country in 1987.

Both sides deemed it purposeful to further develop dialogue, contacts and cooperation. Jozef Czyrek's visit to the United States later this month will provide another occasion for the in depth exchange of views.

Addresses Foreign Ministers' Session

LD0703180289 Warsaw PAP in English
1725 GMT 7 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna, Mar. 7—Poland's Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski addressed a meeting opening negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and negotiations on confidence and security building measures here today. Excerpts:

The negotiations that we inaugurate today can open up a new chapter in building a stable and secure Europe. This chance must not be wasted.

We expect that the existing bloc and national structures will be subordinated to a joint structure of European security that we should work out jointly here.

This is Poland's sincere desire. In our country, we adopt a principle of defensive sufficiency and we are ready to descend to this level along with our partners. We expressed our will by resolving to unilaterally reduce the Polish Armed Forces and military expenditures and to re-organize the Army's structures.

As a result of these decisions, the Polish Armed Forces will be reduced over the next two years by 40,000 soldiers, 850 tanks, 900 cannons and mortars, 700 armoured personnel carriers and 80 combat planes.

There is no such a type of weapon that we would not like to talk about and submit to jointly agreed reductions. We are ready to include our forces in the first reductions envisaged by an agreement reached at the just starting negotiations. Poland's stand at these negotiations will be marked primarily by openness that is an emanation of our openness in domestic and foreign matters.

We entered the postulate of living up to society's expectations in the mandate of the Polish delegation. We want the agreement to entail the "cheapening" of security.

Poland's security interests will be a plane of reference for our actions. Remaining a credible ally, we want at the same time the negotiations to be able to overcome old stereotypes and the dualistic way of viewing European problems in terms of opposing two political and military groupings, the East and the West.

Poland sets itself the goal to implement the idea of common security based on partnership.

We actively sought a new formula of conventional disarmament in Europe together with our allies. We worked on a vision of a new generation of confidence building measures and listened carefully to responses. We tried to take them into account and to enrich and specify our platform through this. The platform's political framework is reflected by the declaration of the Warsaw conference of the Political Consultative Committee of July 1988 and the declaration of the Budapest meeting of the Committee of the Foreign Ministers of the States-Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of October 1988. An outline of the negotiation proposals, presented yesterday in this forum by Eduard Shevardnadze, is based on a joint platform reflecting also the Polish point of view.

We wanted to make the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in central Europe, forwarded by Wojciech Jaruzelski, a Polish contribution to the intensive search of new disarmament thought. We wanted to contribute to a better exchange of ideas and views between future participants in the talks.

We did not envisage for the plan to be discussed at some separate central-European forum. We associated its outcome with European negotiation planes from the very start. We think that each of its elements can be negotiated and put into effect separately. We noted with satisfaction that (the content of the plan) has been reflected in a common platform of states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty and met with the interest of our partners in the West.

We wish for the negotiations beginning now to signify that the content of the plan and the matter associated with it, enter a stage of negotiations. We believe that there will be room for them at the negotiating table, in line with their mandates.

The negotiations of the 23 nations face a special challenge. This stems both from the military rank of the problems, the degree of their complexity as well as the failed experience of past attempts at their solution in somewhat narrower groups. That is why it is important to set them on a constructive, dynamic course from the very start. We have no doubts that this is fully feasible. There is a sufficient number of convergent elements to expand the common denominator on this basis. The Polish delegation will act in this spirit.

In the name of Poland I would like to advance several political concepts which in our understanding could be conducive to the positive course of negotiations.

First: We propose to jointly accept that we will be ready to bring about the first militarily significant agreement no later than the beginning of the next main meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki.

Second: Let us place in the forefront the criteria of a desired state of the military situation, particularly those regulations which are indispensable and possible in the nearest future. Let us not assess today's state of affairs,

let us not make the casuses which led to it the subject of debate in itself. Let us, on the other hand, focus on the future.

Let us approach data, its scope, ways of determination and verification not so much from the perspective of what is but above all from the perspective of verifying what will remain following the reductions.

Third: Let us steer the negotiations in the direction of determining target ceilings which would satisfy criteria of a mandate. Let these ceilings above all cover such kinds of arms as would be conducive to the elimination of capability to launch a surprise attack. Let them remove the hitherto asymmetries and disproportions. Let them ensure balance on lowered levels, significantly lower the lumpsum balance of potentials and the potential of each of the sides.

Let us also try to determine such parameters of balance which would take account of the specific character of the military situation in respective regions. Let the general lowering of potentials at the same time envisage a considerable rarifying and lowering of the offensive character of potentials in those territories where its concentration and threat of use are the greatest.

Fourth: Let us seek simple and clear solutions. Let us not artificially narrow down the margin of security. Let it be broad enough to release the debate from the complex of "counting bead by bead."

Fifth: Let us politically support our negotiators. Let us seek a political key to problems in which a technical-expertise approach might give no result. [sentence as received] Let us use every opportunity for meetings on a political level to analyze the situation at negotiations and deliver a supporting impetus for them. Let us refrain from activities which could hamper the negotiations' success.

In the group of 35 states we will work on a new set of security and confidence building measures. The work in this respect has a good springboard, namely the Stockholm document.

The negotiations should enrich the process of building confidence in the military field, adjust it to the requirements of the current situation, use progress in military detente. This is an important, autonomous task. Its significance can in no way be overcast by the efforts for conventional disarmament.

The new generation of measures should also help reduce the threat of a surprise attack. What matters first of all is to adhere to the requirement of a restrained military activity in times of peace, to remove a serious source of distrust posed by the dimension of military activity of the opponent. What also matters is to expand the sphere of military activity connected with confidence-building measures, to complement them with independent activity of air and navy forces. We also perceive a

possibility to increase military information, to expand contacts, possibilities of operative consultations.

The experience in the implementation of the Stockholm document should be taken into account. However, this should not be tantamount to re-negotiating the document. For the CSCE process should only aim at increasing the common denominator of agreements.

We would be glad to see the discussion reflect questions of military doctrines. We come out for CSCE participants starting a constructive discussion parallelly to negotiations on military doctrines. To this end we undertake, together with the Federal Republic of Germany, an initiative to hold a representative seminar on military doctrines, strategies and concepts which would take place in June this year.

On the two forums of negotiations, the Polish delegation will advocate a quick progress towards the essential negotiations, towards drafting agreements. We want to actively search for convergent points.

We want to contribute to maintaining a favourable climate around the negotiations. We are of the opinion that their success would be given impetus by a summit meeting of the countries of Europe, the United States and Canada on the key problems of security and disarmament on this continent.

Foreign Minister Olechowski's Statement on Return from CSCE Talks

*LD0803213989 Warsaw PAP in English
2047 GMT 8 Mar 89*

[Text] Warsaw, March 8—Poland's Foreign Affairs Minister Tadeusz Olechowski made a statement for PAP which reads in part: I am returning from Vienna where the foreign affairs ministers of European and North American states held debates for the last three days. We jointly initiated a new mechanism of disarmament dialogue in Europe, of great significance for the security and stability of the continent.

The ministerial debate confirmed that the negotiations of 23 Warsaw Treaty and NATO states on conventional armed forces and of 35 states on confidence building measures should be accompanied by a favourable climate.

The outlines of future stances of the negotiating sides surfaced in the speeches. Both the East and the West presented different programs of reducing armed forces and strengthening security. The differences are significant but not as divergent as to rule out a rapprochement of stances. We noticed with satisfaction, for instance, that our ideas contained in the Jaruzelski Plan and concerning the reduction of the capacity of a sudden attack and removal of the most destructive and dangerous weapons from the centre of the continent were generally accepted.

The initiative of Poland and the FRG to convene a representative seminar of diplomats, politicians, scientists and military men on military doctrines and endowing them with an unequivocally defensive character met with interest.

All in all we have made a good start. We have given the negotiations political impetus. We are interested in their effective course and in bringing about the first agreements soon.

Poland, while actively participating in the realization of a joint disarmament platform of our alliance will present military-political thinking contained in the Jaruzelski Plan, will make sure the military characteristics of Central Europe is taken into account, aim to engulf both whole alliances and all its members with disarmament undertakings, Olechowski said.

Referring to his talks with the foreign ministers of Austria, Finland, Spain, the FRG and the U.S. in Vienna, Olechowski stated that they discussed the future of the all-European process and disarmament.

We agreed that these processes bear a positive impact on the development of the international situation, on the deepening of confidence and cooperation in Europe, and on overcoming the divisions of our continent. All the discussants took keen interest in the transformations taking place in Poland, particularly the roundtable debates.

They expressed respect for the reforms being implemented by us and for the efforts to overcome the crisis. They stressed their broader, international scope. I did not conceal before my interlocutors that we expect active engagement on the part of our partners into economic, financial and technical cooperation with Poland. Only such a stand on their part can boost our exports and payments capacities which all our creditors should be interested in. The stance of the West on precisely this issue is at present a test of the credibility of their assurances about sympathy for our country, the Polish foreign minister pointed out.

Document Collection on CSCE Process, Polish Role Published

*LD0203220889 Warsaw PAP in English
2034 GMT 2 Mar 89*

[Text] Warsaw, Mar 2—A two-volume collection "Poland and the Implementation of the CSCE Resolutions," prepared by the Polish Institute of International Affairs, appeared in Poland. Apart from a report on implementing the CSCE resolutions, the collection brings the interpretation of principles and recommendations adopted in the process of security and cooperation in Europe started in Helsinki.

The first part "Between Helsinki and Vienna" carries a number of documents and data on Polish foreign policy, offered to Polish reader for the first time.

The second part is entirely devoted to the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states-participants in the CSCE that ended last January. The volume carries the full text of the final document of the Vienna meeting together with all annexes, including the mandates of the two new negotiating planes starting March 6: on conventional armed forces in Europe (with the participation of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty states) and on military measures of building confidence and security with the participation of the 35 CSCE states.

General Staff Meeting for Military Attaches
AU0203143489 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 23 Feb 89 p 5

[Report signed "W.Ch.": "Changes in the PPR Armed Forces: Meeting With Military Attaches"]

[Text] On 22 February, there was a meeting at the Conference Center of the Ministry of National Defense in Warsaw between representatives of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and the military attaches of diplomatic representation accredited in Poland. The meeting dealt with Poland's place in the disarmament dialogue and the realization of the Jaruzelski Plan, as well as selected issues pertaining to defense doctrine and changes in the PPR Armed Forces.

These issues were set out by General of Brigades Tadeusz Cepak and General of Brigades Franciszek Puchala. It was stressed that positive developments are taking place in the international situation. They include the extension of detente from the political to the military sphere and—this represents a breakthrough—a further mandate for two forums for negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, as well as the continuation of the conference on security and confidence-building measures on our continent.

The importance of preventing an unexpected attack was pointed to, and lowering the level of military confrontation was considered a way of achieving this end. One step in this direction is the announcement of the elimination of arms imbalances. This will aid the realization of the Polish initiative concerning a reduction in weapons in Europe and benefits the fostering of conditions for East-West dialogue. Further action aimed at producing another generation of confidence-building measures in the military and other fields—like those that have been produce so far—would serve to remove mistrust in international relations.

The detailed provisions of national military doctrine were also set out. Currently, they include a set of views on the character of war and decisions by the authorities concerning the prevention of war, and the preparation of the capabilities and resources of the state and all society for preparations made jointly with allied states in order to repulse aggression and counter warfare. It was stressed that the prevention of war is one of the key elements in Polish defense doctrine. The implementation of the

undertakings concerning the Polish Armed Forces, including the process of shaping their development, was explained.

Answers were provided to questions from the military attaches concerning, among other things, the disbanding of military units, weapons reductions, the merging of military academies and colleges, and the transformation of Territorial Defense units into civil defense units. The meeting, which was organized by the military foreign affairs department of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, was attended by General of Brigades Marian Daniluk and Colonel Ryszard Dziedzic, chief of the department.

'Scientific Conference' on Conventional Stability Meets in Warsaw
LD2602014689 Warsaw PAP in English
2004 GMT 25 Feb 89

[Text] Warsaw, Feb 25—Intellectuals from NATO, Warsaw Treaty, and neutral states took part in a scientific conference on "conventional stability and the Polish plan to reduce armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe," organized here February 24-25.

The conference was attended by about 50 scholars and experts from the main research centres in Austria, the FRG, France, Italy, Sweden, Poland, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Romania, and Hungary.

The conference analysed the planned new military confidence-building measures, and pointed to reciprocal links between nuclear and conventional disarmament. Much time was devoted to the necessity to reshape military doctrines by giving them a defensive character. A point of reference for many speakers was the Jaruzelski Plan, and the discussion helped to enrich its essence.

The conference is a creative part of the preparations for new negotiations on military aspects of European Security which start in Vienna on March 6, this year, with participating representatives of CSCE states.

Participants in the conference met with Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski. The conference was organised by the Polish Institute of International Affairs.

Colonel Surveys Writings on Defense Doctrine, National Security Strategy
AU0903135689 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 27 Feb 89 p 4

[Article by Colonel Julian Kaczmarek: "State Defense Strategy—National Security"]

[Excerpts] In no other country has the problem of military doctrine or, more appropriately for us, defense doctrine been so widely publicized as in Poland, starting with the press and finishing with books.

The Ministry of National Defense publishing house has published many books on doctrine since 1979. Let me list a few of the titles of which I am author or co-author: "War and Military Doctrine" (1979), "Military Science and Doctrine—National and International Problems" (1980), "Military Doctrine" (1982), "The Defense System of the Socialist State" (1983), "Military Science and Doctrine" (1985), "The Armed Forces" (1986), "Military Service" (1986), and "The Battle to Survive" (1988).

The outcome of scientific conferences in which doctrine was a major item on the agenda has also been published in book form and made available to the public. Such titles include "Poland and the FRG" (published by "Pomoru" publishers, Bydgoszcz, 1986) which earned second prize from the Polish minister of national defense in 1988, or "From the Idea of Nuclear-Free Zones to a World Free of Mass-Destruction Weapons" (published by the Patriotic Movement of National Rebirth, Warsaw, 1987).

Doctrine is still frequently presented in such monthlies or bimonthlies as *MYSL WOJSKOWA* [MILITARY THOUGHT], *WOJSKO LUDOWE* [PEOPLE'S ARMY], or *WIEDZA OBRONNA* [DEFENSE KNOWLEDGE]. It should be noted that since 1986 every issue of this latter freely-available periodical has contained articles on various aspects of military doctrine. [passage omitted]

One may say that it is essential to create in Poland a center of studies dealing with state defense. I believe this center should be situated within the forthcoming National Defense Academy. However, one should realize that this center should consist of high-class specialists of many different scientific fields who are able to conduct research all these fields. [passage omitted]

Scientific research into state defense strategy should be speeded up. Nevertheless, thanks to regular and long-standing work on the methodological, theoretical, and substantive aspects of military doctrine which scientific workers and practitioners have carried out, we may not only establish new doctrinal decisions, but also initiate international talks on this subject.

Defense Minister Interviewed on Military Force Reductions

AU0103190589 Warsaw *ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI*
in Polish 27 Feb 89 p 3

[Interview with Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of national defense, by an unidentified television reporter on Warsaw Television on 26 February: "We Intend That the Changes to our Army Comply With the Requirements of the Real Situation"]

[Text] Immediately after the main newscast on 26 February, Polish Television broadcast on its first program an

interview with Army General Florian Siwicki, minister of National Defense. Here is a record [zapis] of this interview:

[Journalist] General, in an interview for PAP at the beginning of January, you described an extensive program of changes in the Polish Army stemming from the implementation of the defense doctrine and from the aim to reduce defense expenditures considerably. That is why, taking advantage of the promise you made about fuller and more frequent information to society about the life of the Army, we have invited you to appear before the television cameras. Please, could you tell our viewers about the foreseen paths of changes to the structure of our Armed Forces?

[Siwicki] As is generally known, the Armed Forces are an organization set up to perform strictly defined tasks connected with safeguarding the state's security. By and large, their structure always has, always does, and always will depend on the degree of threat to the state and on its defense needs on the one hand, and on the country's economic possibilities and the provisions of the military doctrine in force on the other hand.

These factors have meant and still mean that the Polish Army never has been and never will be a permanent organization. We have always tried to see to it that changes suit the requirements of the real situation, according to changing conditions.

Right now, taking into consideration the favorable developments in the international situation, especially in the sphere of danger to state security and the growth of peaceful trends in Europe, we have once again undertaken the process of restructuring our Armed Forces. I need not stress that Poland, just like the remaining Warsaw Pact countries, is keenly interested in perpetuating the peaceful trends. Publishing data on our Armed Forces and reducing the level of our military potential and expenditures, about which we have reported at length, is our specific contribution to the continuing disarmament dialogue, especially to the process of increasing the trust between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Pact. This is also a practical confirmation of the proposals contained in the Jaruzelski Plan.

As I said in the January interview, the favorable international conditions and economic situation permit and inspire us to highlight our doctrinal defense principles. It is on this basis that the National Defense Committee reached its well-known decision on the defense problems and the Armed Forces that lies at the roots of the current intensive work inside Ministry of National Defense institutions. This work has resulted in a concrete plan of changes to the Armed Forces, the purpose of which can be expressed in the following blunt manner: to possess only as much as is really required, but at the same time to deploy it more effectively. In any case, that is a principle that has governed our actions for many years.

[Journalist] One can conclude that the Polish Army is entering an intensive stage of restructuring. What will it generally bring? What concrete changes can we expect?

[Siwicki] Before I answer, I would like to remind you that we are not reducing the size of the Army as of today. Over the past 2 years, we have reduced the Armed Forces by 15,000 soldiers and many hundreds of pieces of armaments and technical equipment. Thanks to this, and thanks to sharper austerity measures, we have been steadily reducing defense spending since 1987.

Returning to your question, right now we are commencing a complex and highly responsible 2-year stage of army reorganization.

Another two divisions will be disbanded [rozformowane]—the 2d and 15th Mechanized Divisions. The complement of the 10th and 16th Armored Divisions will be reduced considerably. Gradually, a new universal structure will be introduced to all divisions, whose organization and weaponry will suit the needs of modern defense tasks. We are also disbanding over a dozen regiments in all branches of the Armed Forces, including armored, artillery, and air force regiments.

At the same time, over 30 territorial defense, engineering-construction, and road-railroad units will be transformed into civil defense formations. Here I wish to explain that these new civil defense formations will perform production and service functions, including hospital services mainly for the sake of the national economy.

There will also be changes to the organization of military training. For example, we intend to merge the Polish Army General Staff Academy and the Military Political Academy into a national defense academy.

It is also intended to merge some higher officer training schools with similar training profiles. The same applies to warrant officer schools and specialist military training centers; the total number of schools and centers will be reduced by one-third.

[Journalist] You have mentioned changes at lower levels, but what about the top? What about the army command and programming centers? Will they also be subject to such far-reaching changes?

[Siwicki] It is difficult to imagine carrying out the transformations only as far as the city limits of Warsaw.

In the process of changing the army command system and adapting its bodies to the new structures and numerical status of the forces, central Ministry of National Defense institutions and operational commands will also be reduced. A clear example of this is the intention to combine the National Air Defense Forces with the Air Force.

However, restructuring is not just a mechanical reduction or elimination of certain bodies. Restructuring is also far-reaching changes to the systems and forms of

commanding and leading armed forces. In particular, it involves computerization, and a major reduction in reporting, recordkeeping, and other bureaucratic customs of which an army is not free.

[Journalist] All these changes are to take place within the next 2 years. Why now? May I ask for a schedule of implementing them?

[Siwicki] Questions are very justified. When deciding to disband military units, we considered all the circumstances and their possible consequences. Please notice that a regiment is not just an assortment of weapons, military materiel, barracks, and other material assets. It is most of all people, especially a highly qualified professional staff. Therefore it takes time to relocate them, in order to make the best possible use of their professional qualities and resolve various family problems brought about by changes to one's place of service or nature of service. In this way, we are also permitting a harmonious use of technology both in the Army and in the national economy, and the best possible use of vacated premises.

As far as a schedule of activity is concerned, two armored regiments, the Operational-Tactics Missile Brigade, a road vehicle training regiment, and several other units will be disbanded in the nearest future, on 3 and 4 March. We are inviting representatives of the mass media and military attaches accredited in Poland to convince themselves of the credibility of our actions on the spot.

[Journalist] What effects will the reorganization of the Army have during the next 2 years?

[Siwicki] During that time, our Armed Forces will be reduced by 40,000 soldiers. About 850 tanks, 900 cannons and mortars, 700 armored transporters, 80 combat aircraft, and many different varieties of military materiel will be withdrawn.

[Journalist] In other words, a considerable quantity of military materiel. What are the possibilities of using it in the national economy, or, to put it more broadly, outside the Armed Forces?

[Siwicki] We will employ one principle only: nothing must be wasted. Some of the materiel of the disbanded and reorganized units will be given to other units and sub-units. Most of the materiel that is the most worn out will be broken up and, after usable parts have been salvaged, handed over to metal works. The national economy will receive a considerable proportion. One can imagine many possibilities. We are examining them, and I think our military and civilian experts will find the best solutions for the national economy. This applies to the most specialized equipment. However, there is no problem as far as various types of vehicles and mobile workshops are concerned. These will be made available mainly to farmers by means of restricted auctions.

As a matter of interest, I can tell you that last year, several dozen older-generation vehicles were sold to

countries in the second area of payments for civilian purposes, after their armor had been removed. In this way, the Army strengthened the state budget with convertible currency.

[Journalist] The changes in the Armed Forces also present the possibility of putting the vacant industrial potential to good use. What are these possibilities?

[Siwicki] I would like to remind you once again that the Polish defense industry is not in the hands of the minister of national defense, but in the hands of the minister of industry. All I can say is that we are cutting down on orders for military materiel, which will indeed enable some of the potential of defense industry plants to be used to manufacture commodities for the needs of the market and national economy.

The defense industry has good, I would even say excellent, technical staff. Naturally, it also possesses many modern technologies and is marked by an exemplary scientific discipline. In a word, it personifies high quality production.

I think these factors permit a proper use of vacant production potential for the sake of the national economy and to improve market supplies. However, this is not straightforward. It will require time-consuming scientific and organizational operations. All in all, this will be an operation that well serves the needs of our economy.

[Journalist] After so much tragic experience, we Poles are very sensitive to our security. That is why such a far-reaching reorganization of our Army—in fact, a major reduction in its size—is also giving rise to questions of a more fundamental nature. Will the activity presented by you not cause an excessive weakening of the country's defenses?

[Siwicki] Such fears may arise. We know well that although the danger to peace is diminishing, it still exists. I said in the beginning that defense potential depends on the actual and envisaged international situation. We bear this in mind when making any decisions to make structural changes in our Armed Forces. Therefore we will maintain our Armed Forces at the numerical level that is really necessary in order to guarantee Poland's security within the framework of the Warsaw Pact allied defense system, and we will guarantee our Armed Forces the necessary equipment. Apart from that, less need not mean worse or weaker. Today and tomorrow, in service and in combat readiness, less means more effectively and more economically.

PRAVDA Interviews Defense Minister Siwicki on Disarmament Process

LD0103213489 Warsaw PAP in English
2012 GMT 1 Mar 89

[For full text of interview, see item headlined 'Polish Defense Minister on Bloc Posture' published in the 1 March Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, pp 38-40]

[Text] Moscow, March 1—The Soviet daily PRAVDA today carried an extensive interview with PUWP CC

Political Bureau member, Minister of National Defense Gen Florian Siwicki, in which he discussed the newest, unilateral disarmament initiatives of states-parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

Asked for an assessment of the recent statement of the Committee of Ministers of Defense of States-Parties to the Warsaw Treaty presenting the balance of forces between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, the minister pointed out—clearly and unequivocally—that it presents "both facts and phenomena which suit us and which do not suit us, and the disproportions and asymmetries which occur."

Siwicki went on to recall the newest disarmament initiatives of socialist countries, Poland inclusive, aimed at reducing armed forces and arms as well as reducing military budgets. These steps are united by an authentically defensive meaning of the military doctrine, he said.

Commenting on the decision on reorganization of the Polish Armed Forces, Gen Siwicki stressed that Poland thus met halfway the advantageous trends which are taking shape in the international situation.

The minister added that at issue were not some routine operations. "We are striving to carry out a deep restructuring of our Armed Forces, using all the reserves while maintaining the army's capacity for effective defense depending on the degree of the threat to our security," he said.

Assessing the prospects of the disarmament process on the European continent, Siwicki stated: "One can undoubtedly expect that new thinking on the political and military problems of modern times will pave an increasingly broader way for itself and bear fruit in advantageous changes."

In this context, Gen Siwicki stated that the Polish side, being guided by the provisions of the Jaruzelski Plan, would sit down to the debate table (in Vienna) with an awareness of the need to sign agreements, with a readiness to do away with all disproportions and asymmetries, significant reduction of armed forces and conventional weaponry in Europe as well as deepening confidence-building measures.

Asked whether the unilateral reductions in armed forces and arms as well as in military budgets being carried out by socialist countries did not weaken their defense potential and that of the Warsaw Treaty in general, the minister said that these matters were approached very carefully in Poland. Following a lot of very tragic experience, today we live in secure borders, surrounded by allies. These are our historic achievements which we safeguard with utmost care. Our perception of security is boosted by Poland's participation in the socialist defense community, particularly the alliance with the Soviet Union, Siwicki told PRAVDA.

In taking decisions on structural changes in the Polish Armed Forces, we strive to maintain such a number of

troops, such a level of their armament, which is indispensable to ensure the security of the country within the defense system of the Warsaw Treaty. This means that all the tasks resting with us should be, as has been the case thus far, completed to the end, the Polish defense minister said.

Colonel Compares Terms of Military Service in Polish, NATO Armies

*LD0103205989 Warsaw PAP in English
1918 GMT 1 Mar 89*

[Text] Warsaw, March 1—A PAP reporter talked to Col Jan Stachurski from the general headquarters of the Polish Army on the duration of military service. Here are excerpts of the colonel's comments:

"Comparisons of periods of serving in the Polish Army and in the armies of West European countries are frequently biased and simplified. For example, the alleged statement that the time of military service in all NATO countries does not exceed a year is not true. In fact, privates in Holland serve for 14 months and noncommissioned officers for 17 months. The service in Norway's Air Force and Navy lasts 15 months, in Italy 18 months. In the FRG the service lasted 15 months to-date but it was prolonged to 18 months this year.

"In NATO Armies the posts requiring high qualifications are manned with professional soldiers in the rank of a private while in Poland for example a tank, an armoured personnel carrier, or a rocket are commanded and driven by soldiers drafted to the Army. The same job in NATO Armies is done by professionals. 53 per cent of both the FRG's and Holland's Armies are professional soldiers, the same figure in France being 55 per cent, in Belgium 65 per cent, in Denmark 67 per cent, while in Poland only 33 per cent.

"In NATO armies the conscripts, drafted under legal regulations, perform only simple service activities on which combat readiness is scarcely dependent. Such armies naturally need by far fewer conscripts.

"Although military service lasts shorter in NATO armies, the burden shouldered by reserve soldiers participating in military exercises is larger as a rule. The time of being kept in reserves, for example, in the FRG, Norway, Denmark is longer than in Poland. In the FRG also the total time of maneuvers held within the reserves is longer.

"In the armies of the allied socialist countries the military service lasts 24 months like in Poland but in Romanian land and air forces it lasts 16 months, in the GDR.

"Yet, it is not the duration of military services that is evidence of certain particularly Polish characteristics. The scale of postponements of military service is, in fact, unprecedented in other socialist countries. For example, postponements due to running a farm are applied neither in Romania, nor the GDR, nor in other countries."

"Postponements of farmer-conscripts and those due to performing a profession in important branches of industry, in transport and housing are aimed at giving assistance in this way to priority branches of national economy, also including ones from outside the state-run sector. As of this year, also other conscripts, namely bakers, employed in state-run and cooperative bakeries as well as in private ones, will be allowed to postpone their military service.

"Humanitarian considerations have also dictated the need to grant postponements to conscripts directly looking after a juvenile member of their family or an invalid.

"Naturally, learners of secondary schools and colleges of further education, and students of higher schools are not drafted to the army, as well as conscripts who are granted the status of sole bread-earners of families.

"But this entails specific consequences. If one adds to the number of those granted all the enumerated kinds of postponements, which amounts to 100,000 persons annually, the number of those unable to join the army because of health condition, then it turns out that some 50 per cent of the whole annual conscription population are drafted. This is also not a favourable factor adding to the possibility of reducing military service.

"The service in units of aiding type, such as protection sub-units, has already been shortened by two months. At the moment the service on ships of Polish military fleet is being shortened from three to two years.

"A restructuring of the Armed Forces is being carried out, which has been widely announced by the minister of national defence, Gen Florian Siwicki, in interviews for PAP and TV. If the restructuring keeps being implemented in favourable circumstances of international detente, then the armed forces will need fewer conscripts. The nearest prospects for the demographic situation concerning the next yearly age-groups are also auguring improvement, a clear one already in 1990. One should also think that the youth of these ever more numerous age-groups will be better prepared with respect to the level of education, professional qualifications, and such circumstances will create premises for further shortening the duration of the military service."

Motorized Training Regiment Begins Disbanding

*LD0303183189 Warsaw Television Service
in Polish 1615 GMT 3 Mar 89*

[Text] In accordance with a televised announcement made by General Florian Siwicki, the disbanding of the 1st Motorized Training Regiment began today in Olesnica.

Two Tank Regiments Dissolved, Ceremonies Held

*LD0403171289 Warsaw PAP in English
1640 GMT 4 Mar 89*

[Text] Warsaw, Mar 4—Following last week's television announcement by Poland's minister of national defense,

General Florian Siwicki, two armoured regiments: the 13th Warsaw Regiment of medium-size tanks in Opole and the 60th Kartuzki Regiment of medium-size tanks in Elblag were dissolved today. Military attaches accredited to Poland attended the ceremonies.

Most of the soldiers serving their mandatory military service in these regiments were earlier put on the reserve list.

General Staff Academy To Undergo Restructuring Under New Defensive Doctrine

LD0803232289 Warsaw PAP in English
2210 GMT 8 Mar 89

[Text] Warsaw, March 8—Participants in the PUWP report conference held today at the Academy of the General Staff of the Polish Army here expressed their support for the socialist renewal and implementation of tasks set by the 10th PUWP CC Plenum.

Chief of General Staff General Jozef Uzycki emphasized the commitment of the scientific staff of the academy to the work on Polish national military doctrine. He stressed that the defensive character of this doctrine allows for reduction of the military potential only to the reasonably sufficient level. The restructuring will embrace also the Academy of the General Staff which is to be transformed into the Academy of National Defense.

ROMANIA

Foreign Minister Totu Addresses CSCE Foreign Ministers' Session

AU0703195789 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1820 GMT 7 Mar 89

["The Considerations and Proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the Issues of Disarmament, Confidence- and Security-Building in Europe, Presented by the Romanian Foreign Minister at the Vienna Meeting"—AGERPRES headline; date not given]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES 7/3/1989—Taking the floor at the Vienna meeting of foreign ministers of the European states, the U.S. and Canada marking the beginning of negotiations on the conventional armed forces in Europe and the endorsement of new measures of confidence-building and security in the continent, the Romanian Foreign Minister Ioan Totu assessed that the opening of the two new forums of negotiations was an event of major importance in the life of Europe.

Recalling his country's stands and actions related to the objective necessity to halt the arms race, pass on to actual disarmament, that should extend to all types of weapons, based on a unitary approach to the issue of eliminating the mass destruction weapons /nuclear, chemical and other kinds/ [slantlines as received] and

welcoming the development that allowed for the beginning of the current negotiations, the Romanian foreign minister presented the following considerations and proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu:

1. In connection with the negotiations on armed forces and conventional weapons:

Actions should be taken for the ensurance of a military balance at ever lower levels of arming so that such a situation be created in Europe in which the states have only a bare necessity of armed forces and armament for defense.

As for the specific ways of attaining such a goal, Romania suggests the following:

—The two military alliances should pass on to reducing weapons and troops so that till the year 2000 they should account for 50 percent of the current level. The cuts should be applied to the whole area which makes the object of negotiations and not only to certain geographical zones.

In a first phase, the arms and troops reduction should account for 25-30 percent. In this framework, considering the quantitative and qualitative factors of troops, weapons and military techniques as well as other factors—geographical and strategic, the existing imbalances should be eliminated, and balanced, (?rational) ceilings be agreed upon.

We hold the view that the cuts should not be made automatically for all countries but proportionally, function of the arming degree. The states with a stronger military potential should apply a higher percentage of cuts.

The troops to be reduced be demobilized, while the weapons destroyed or transferred to be used in various ways for peaceful purposes. The reductions should be made under an efficient control of both the measures and the pledges regarding the armed forces and armaments left.

—The cuts in weapons and troops should be paralleled by those in military spending—50 percent till 2000, of which 25-30 percent in a first phase.

The participating states should undertake, under unilateral pledges, not to use the financial means released for other military purposes. In this respect, they should voluntarily mention the economic and social domains to which they will streamline the sums saved and, in a next phase, include the military spending cuts in the specific accords to be concluded, making them the object of control measures.

—The limits should be set with regard to the total number of troops and weapons a state can emplace outside its national territory.

—The accords to be negotiated should include limited ceilings for each alliance and for each state, especially

for the states with a greater military share or for those lying at the contact line between the two alliances.

If the distribution of cuts were made between the states affiliated to a military alliance, the criteria should be established according to which limited ceilings should be distributed by countries within the respective alliance. They should consider the qualitative factors of the troops and weapons, the size of the territory which should be defended and the geo-strategic position.

—Attention should be paid with priority to the reduction of armaments having a big offensive capacity, such as tanks, large-caliber artillery, armours, certain types of military aircraft, as well as of the landing forces and airborne troops, of the amphibious assault units.

—Moreover, in parallel with measures to reduce armaments, troops and military expenditures, a passage should also be made to reducing the production of armaments, and certain military enterprises should be converted to peaceful production.

—Given the complexity of the task of defining a balance of forces as realistic as possible and of establishing a balance by categories of weapons, the states should resort, in order to spur the negotiations, to unilateral (not negotiated) measures applying both to the armed forces and armaments that are the object of negotiations and to other military forces which do not make the object of negotiations but are taken into account in the overall reckoning of the balance of forces. Such measures may take the form of reductions, re-dislocations, transfers, etc.

2. As far as the negotiations on adoption of new confidence- and security-building measures are concerned, Romania starts from the results obtained at the Stockholm conference.

We consider that the provisions of the document of the Stockholm conference constitute a good building block for the attainment of the goals of the new negotiations. At the same time, we notice that the measures adopted at Stockholm have not led to a diminution in the intensity and scope of military activities on the continent, or to the reduction of the capacity of launching an armed attack.

In the view of Romania, the "negotiations of the 35" will have to mark a new stage through transition from the statement of the goal of greater confidence and previsibility to the actual limitation of conditions that can enable the launching of a surprise attack or of wide-scale offensive actions.

In this respect, we propose the following:

—The new generation of confidence- and security-building measures should cover the diminution of the intensity and scope of military activities; renunciation of certain activities which may generate distrust and

tension; limitation of the possibility of wide-scale offensive actions; establishment of measures to prevent nuclear mishaps.

—Moreover, given the organic integration between various categories of weapons, the new generation of confidence- and security-building measures will have to cover also the activities of the marine military forces and the air forces which will be an object of negotiation.

—During the negotiations, measures should be agreed upon in connection with: Establishment of security zones and corridors along the borders between states and on the line of contact between the two military blocs; limitation and reduction of military activities to the levels established; prevention of the growth of tension, by prohibiting the dislocation of new troops, the development and emplacement of new bases, in the territory of other states; limitation of the transfer of troops and armaments from outside into the zone where the measures apply.

—Of great importance for building confidence and security is the adoption of measures on: Freezing military expenditures at the current level and starting negotiations on their subsequent reduction; creating zones of peace, cooperation and good neighbourliness free from nuclear and chemical weapons, in the Balkans, central and northern Europe and in other regions.

—Romania also proposes prohibition of maneuvers and movements involving ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons nearby the land and maritime frontiers of other states; refraining from organizing military activities in the vicinity of peaceful nuclear facilities and chiefly of nuclear power plants.

—Measures should be taken to enhance the communication and cooperation between states, which would contribute to building confidence in such areas as: Exchange of military information, notification of military activities and acceptance of observers; development of European contacts, consultations and systems of communication on security matters.

Minister Ioan Totu further said:

Presenting these considerations and proposals on conventional disarmament, Romania underlines the necessity that the negotiations in this field be organically in line with the broader goal of general and total disarmament, the centerpiece of which is nuclear disarmament.

In this sense, we think that defence should not be conceived through the so-called "nuclear deterrence." Achievement of general and total disarmament, of nuclear one first and foremost, should start from the concept of ensuring a necessary minimum for defence. This calls for renunciation of the production of nuclear and chemical weapons, of any other arms of mass destruction.

Measures should be adopted for halting the modernization and improvement of nuclear weaponry, for renouncing the emplacement of new nuclear weapons in the European continent. Therefore, Romania proposes that in parallel with the negotiations on conventional disarmament efforts should be made for freeing Europe from nuclear arms so that the European peoples should be spared the danger of a devastating war.

To this end, Romania proposes the setting up of a special negotiating forum for questions regarding nuclear weapons in Europe.

Romania has always maintained that the major international problems, particularly those regarding peace and security, are of direct concern for all states which should, therefore, have the opportunity of participating directly in their examination and resolution.

The fact that in this stage the negotiations on conventional armed forces are conducted only among the 23 states participant in military alliances should in no way affect this principle.

We think that the major goal of the negotiations and of the measures that will be agreed upon should be the creation of conditions conducive to the simultaneous dismantlement of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO.

We wish also to affirm most clearly that in Romania's opinion the "negotiations of the 23" are not negotiations between two military blocs but among 23 independent and sovereign states, conducted on the basis of full equality. They are carried on within the CSCE and shall have to be governed by its principles and rules of procedure. We consider this as only a temporary arrangement, and the neutral and nonaligned states have the possibility to join the talks later, so that the negotiations on conventional disarmament be conducted in the natural framework of the 35 states participant in the CSCE.

Europe can fulfil its mission in problems regarding peace and disarmament only if it is a Europe united in its diversity of social system, philosophical and political conceptions, of free and independent nations which should work for peace, disarmament and understanding, for collaboration and economic and social progress.

In his address, the Romanian foreign minister stressed that Romania, which has always and steadily pursued in every circumstance a principled policy on all international matters, in harmony with the fundamental interests of the Romanian people, of international peace, understanding and collaboration, would not divert from that policy.

We think, the speaker said, the Warsaw Treaty states' proposals and actions with regard to the object of these negotiations prove their determination to substantially cut back on conventional weapons and military spending. The NATO countries, he pointed out, also advanced

proposals apt to help a realistic and constructive approach to conventional disarmament-related problems.

The opening of the two negotiating fora, the Romanian foreign minister said in conclusion represents one of the concrete, positive results of the Vienna meeting. That was possible through a constructive, sustained collaboration of all the states signatories to the Final Act, and by taking into consideration their legitimate interests and the position of all of them on the basis of mutual respect. The responsible way in which the negotiations on establishing the mandates of the two fora developed is auspicious for the forthcoming negotiations.

SCINTEIA Lays Out Romanian Position on Confidence-Building Measures

*AU2202161589 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1414 GMT 22 Feb 89*

["SCINTEIA: Building Up Interstate Confidence—an Essential Component of the Process of Achieving European Security and Disarmament"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 22/2/1989—Including disarmament as a primordial target of its entire foreign policy, Romania tabled a comprehensive programme pursuing the cessation of the arms race, and an effective passage to disarmament which gives pride of place to negotiations and the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures.

The confidence-building measures are political acts unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally assumed by states as an integral part of the general efforts towards lessening tension and suspicion in interstate relations, diminishing the danger of an armed conflict following misunderstanding or erroneous interpretation of military activities. In a nutshell, without affecting the defence capacity of states such measures are apt to put conditions in place—from a political and psychological point of view—for real measures of control over armaments and disarmament. They can thus make an effective contribution to the promotion of normal relations among nations, to the maintenance and consolidation of peace.

A consistent promoter of the cause of understanding, security and peace in Europe, Romania constantly declares against shows of force, permanently underlining the need to adopt measures favouring lesser tension and built-up confidence among states. It was among the promoters of the idea that the Helsinki Final Act should include a distinct chapter on interstate confidence-building measures as an essential component of the achievement of European security. Thus, a number of measures were set at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe such as: the notification in advance of wide-scope military manoeuvres and movements, exchange of observers for manoeuvres, visits by military delegations etc. In consideration of the fact that the confidence-building measures set under the final act

were only a beginning. Romania made sustained efforts for the continuation of the process initiated in the Finnish capital, for the deepening, extension and amendment of the measures set to attain the main goal—general and complete disarmament under a strict and efficient international control. In this spirit, Romania has consistently and perseveringly worked for a consensus at the all-European meeting in Madrid on the convening of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures and on disarmament in Europe which took part in a first stage in Stockholm over 1984-1986.

Through the proposals it advanced as well as through its entire activity during the conference, Romania made an important contribution to the success of the first confidence-building and disarmament forum in the history of the continent. The fact is significant that alongside the stands of other states, the Romanian proposals and ideas were almost permanently the object of the dialogue among the participating delegations. They often served as starting points in the efforts to identify common or converging elements, to seek generally acceptable solutions. Moreover, during the negotiations, in the more difficult moments or at deadlocks, Romania advanced numerous suggestions, proposals or ideas with a view to overcoming obstacles, drawing stands closer and creating a fruitful climate of cooperation, achieving the final consensus.

The document of the Stockholm conference, which accounts for a substantial progress from the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, stipulates a number of tangible, rigorously defined measures, compulsory and applicable throughout Europe.

The accord achieved in Stockholm was justifiably assessed as the first stage of a vast process, the participating states unanimously agreeing on the need to continue the efforts towards building up confidence and achieving a real security on the continent. Of particular importance is in this respect the decision made at the Vienna all-European meeting on further negotiations on the development and extension of the measures already covenanted in Stockholm and the adoption of a package of new, more committing measures of building up confidence and security.

The progress made in implementing the measures for the building-up of confidence and security will facilitate the obtaining of results in the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons on the continent, in the resolution of other disarmament problems, which would create, in turn, favourable prerequisites for the further building-up of confidence among states on the continent.

In Romania's opinion the new stage of the conference on confidence- and security-building measures will have to eventually contribute to including the measures to be elaborated on the activity of all categories of armed forces (army, navy and air forces) of the states participating in the CSCE with a view to lessening the danger of another armed conflict in Europe, eliminating the peril

of a surprise attack, building up mutual security and facilitating the implementation of disarmament measures.

Consistently acting for the furtherance of the efforts begun at Stockholm, for the calling of a conventional disarmament conference, Romania tabled a number of realistic and constructive proposals at the all-European meeting in Vienna such as the banning of the shows of force and of the vanguard military manoeuvres, especially the multinational ones and those that take place at the frontier of other states, the limitation of military activities of the two military alliances, the dismantlement of foreign military bases, and the withdrawal of troops from the territory of other states, the creation of an ever wider corridor, free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the creation along the frontiers between states of 100-150 km wide areas where the employment of armed forces and armament should be strictly forbidden. These proposals, to which of course the other participating states' add, provide a constructive basis for the future Vienna negotiations.

Undoubtedly, the building-up of confidence is not an aim in itself. The "problem of problems" of the international life, of the establishment of security on the continent and in the whole world is the achievement of disarmament. This is the reason for which, in the spirit of a high sense of responsibility for the destinies of the Romanian people, of peace and security worldwide, Romania is determined, as President Nicolae Ceausescu has again underlined, to act with all its forces for the achievement of disarmament, nuclear disarmament first and foremost, for the building of a united Europe of peace, collaboration and understanding among all peoples.

Commentary Previews Vienna CFE Talks

*AU0903103689 Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian
7 Mar 89 p 4*

[Dumitru Tinu 'Correspondence from Vienna': "Under the Sign of Responsibility for Security and Peace in Europe"]

[Text] It has always been difficult for great truths to work their way through the international situation. This is what happened in the case of Europe. Almost 15 years had to pass following the 1975 Helsinki Conference for peoples to unanimously recognize that European security cannot be truly built while tremendous weapons and troops are still concentrated on this continent, and that European peoples will feel genuinely secure only if effective disarmament measures are adopted.

For Romania, the negotiations that are to begin in Vienna will be an unquestionable confirmation of the correctness of the principled position it has held from the very beginning, that is, as early as the preparations for the first all-European conference. Romania has played a well-known role in affirming the desire to see that the

decisions adopted with a view to establishing new principles of relations and developing cooperation in the most varied areas are coupled with the states' pledge to work to create conditions for moving to disarmament in Europe. It was due to our country's efforts and perseverance that the Helsinki Final Act included a specific chapter on "the military dimension of European security," even if at the beginning the measures and commitments stipulated aimed only at increasing trust among states. The important thing was that, in the final analysis, disarmament was accepted as a major aim of the process of building security on the continent.

The road up to the actual beginning of the Vienna negotiations was not simple by any means. It was necessary to overcome serious reticence and even overt opposition by some countries toward the idea of tackling disarmament in Europe within a multilateral framework—as Romania constantly held—with the participation of all states on this continent. By virtue of an anachronistic way of thinking, it was believed and held that the problems of disarmament belong to the exclusive sphere of competence of the big powers, while ignoring the fact that all these kinds of troops amassed on our continent concern all states and peoples in this geographical area, because they constitute a frightful threat for all of Europe, and no one has the right to decide over the life and death of whole nations.

This is why the current meeting of foreign ministers of European states, the United States, and Canada, and the negotiations that will follow afterward are undoubtedly going down as an important event in Europe's political activity. For the first time, all member states of the two military alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—will be rallied here in the heart of Europe around the same table, as independent and sovereign states, to discuss troops and conventional arms reduction on the continent.

In a hall adjacent to the Hofburg Palace, the representatives of all 35 states signatories to the Helsinki Final Act will discuss, in a parallel manner, new measures aimed at strengthening confidence and security in Europe, thus completing and developing the measures adopted in this sense at the Stockholm conference. The hallway that links the two halls of negotiations now has a political significance. Although conceived of as distinct negotiations, an exchange of views and information will take place on their progress, and the participants in the discussions on the conventional forces reduction will take into consideration the viewpoints expressed by all the other European states.

Assessing the complex process of disarmament as a united process, Romania has advocated and consistently advocates that the measures to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe—which pose the main danger for the security of peoples on this continent—be coupled with

measures to substantially reduce troops and conventional weapons. Such actions are all the more pressing since such types of weapons are going through a process of intensive improvement and they incorporate one of the most modern scientific-technical achievements, thus bringing them close to nuclear weapons in terms of destructive potential. At the same time, it is known that in the wake of the conclusion of the Soviet-American treaty on the elimination of intermediate-range missiles, NATO circles are persistently discussing the need for so-called "compensation" measures by modernizing intermediate-range nuclear missiles. In other words, by taking a roundabout way, they want to return to the situation before the signing of the treaty. "Modernization" also incorporates conventional weapons by invoking existing "asymmetries" within the two military blocs, NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The problem of asymmetries in one field or another, tilting toward one side or the other, will actually be the focus of the current negotiations in Vienna. The aim pursued is to eliminate existing disparities and achieve a secure balance for all states at the lowest possible level.

Romania's position in this respect, a position that was clearly defined by President Nicolae Ceausescu, is well known. In the past years, our country formulated a number of constructive proposals for conventional disarmament by specifying that the member states of the two military alliances should agree on successive cuts in their troops and weapons—entailing an appropriate cut in military expenditure—so that current levels will be reduced by at least 50 percent by the end of the century. As is well known, this stance of ours was followed by actual measures to the effect that, for several years in a row, measures were adopted to cut and then freeze military expenditure. The decision adopted in November 1986 at Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu's initiative, namely to move to a 5-10 percent unilateral cut in weapons, troops, and military expenditure, enjoyed a broad response. In the same spirit, our country also advocates the deepening of confidence among European states, in the belief that progress in this direction will facilitate the achievement of results in the area of reducing troops and conventional weapons, and solve other disarmament problems which, in turn, would create conditions for strengthening confidence and security.

The willingness toward dialogue shown through the decision to begin the current Vienna negotiations on conventional forces and new measures for strengthening confidence and security, and the constructive atmosphere in which the foreign ministers' meeting has begun are assessed here as favorable preconditions to progress toward the achievement of substantial agreements that will reduce the risks of confrontation and lead to disarmament in Europe. This would undoubtedly match the expectations of the peoples on this continent and meet the interest in peace and the security of all peoples.

Commentary on Romanian Proposal for Mutual Defense Budget Cuts

AU0903200189 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1726 GMT 9 Mar 89

["Romania's Realistic and Constructive Proposals for Disarmament and Security in Europe"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 09/03/1989—Convinced that real security in Europe and the world over cannot be built up by increasing military arsenals but by providing an equilibrium at an ever lower level of arming, the only way that complies with the interests of peace and peoples, Romania advanced further realistic and constructive proposals in Vienna, showing inter alia: the Romanian state proposes the two military alliances to cut 25-30 per cent armaments and troops in a first stage and 50 per cent in the year 2000 from the current level. In Romania's opinion such cuts must not be made automatically in all countries but proportionally to their level of arming, by covenanting balanced, approximately equal ceilings conducive to eliminating imbalances and asymmetries. It considers it would be of special importance to demobilize the troops submitted to reduction and destroy or transfer armaments to be used for peaceful purposes. Likewise, the cuts should be made under efficient control, with effects both on reduction measures and on the pledges assumed with regard to the armed forces and the armaments resulted after the cuts.

Romania proposed that troops and arms reduction be paralleled by big cuts in military spending—25-30 per cent in a first stage and 50 per cent till the year 2000, while the tremendous financial means thus saved be not used for other than peaceful purposes. In this respect it would be important for the participating states to take bilateral pledges and present the economic and social domains toward which the saved sums will be streamlined and, in a subsequent stage, the military spending cuts be included in specific accords and make the object of control measures. The measures for the troops, weapons and military spending reduction should also be paralleled by a limited manufacture of armaments, while military enterprises should be re-oriented toward the peaceful industry.

As for the framework in which disarmament negotiations should proceed, Romania has suggested ever since December 1982 the initiation of direct negotiations between the two military alliances the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, given the fact that they are responsible for the military situation created in Europe. Assessing the positive evolutions which allowed for the beginning of the current negotiations in Vienna, Romania thinks that the proposals and actions of the Warsaw Treaty countries prove their will and determination to work for a substantial cut in conventional weapons and military expenditure. The NATO countries also advanced proposals apt to help a realistic and constructive approach to conventional disarmament questions. In relation to the negotiations on the adoption of confidence- and security-building measures, Romania thinks that they must

mark a new stage by passing from the declaration of the goal of achieving growing confidence and foresight to effectively limiting the conditions which might allow for a surprise attack or wide-scale offensive actions. For the attainment of such goals it advanced a number of proposals according to which the new generation of confidence- and security-building measures should include: the limitation of the intensity and sphere of military activities, renunciation of certain activities which can generate mistrust and tension, limited possibilities for wide-scale offensive actions, the establishment of measures which should prevent nuclear accidents, and others. Considering the organic integration between various categories of weapons, Romania also proposes that the new generation of confidence- and security-building measures should extend over the activity of the Navy and the Air Force which is to make an object of negotiations.

Tabling such considerations and proposals with regard to conventional disarmament, Romania underlined the need for the Vienna negotiations to be an organic part of general and complete disarmament, whose centrepiece is nuclear disarmament. In the context, it proposes that the negotiations on conventional disarmament be paralleled by further efforts toward freeing the European continent of nuclear weapons and safeguarding European peoples from the threat of a nuclear war, suggesting to this effect the setting up of a special negotiation forum for nuclear weapons in Europe.

The safeguarding of peace, the halting of the arms race and the passage to real, effective disarmament measures are major aims of the Romanian foreign policy, the newspaper notes underscoring that such international issues are of direct concern to all the states, which calls for their direct participation in analyzing and solving them. The fact that the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe will be held only between the 23 states members of the two military blocs must in no way lead to a violation of such a principle. That is why Romania clearly reiterated that these negotiations are not held by two military blocs but by 23 independent and sovereign states on the basis of full equality.

The opening of the two negotiation fora is one of the positive results of the all-European meeting in Vienna that takes place within the CSCE and, hence, it should observe its principles and rules. Their major objective should be the creation of conditions allowing for the simultaneous dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and, after that, the joining of neutral and non-aligned states into negotiations so that the negotiations on conventional disarmament should be held within the natural framework of the 35 states participating in the all-European process. It is obvious that Europe cannot fulfill its mission otherwise but as a Europe united in the diversity of social systems, of the philosophical and political conceptions, a Europe which should become a champion of the fight for peace, disarmament and understanding, for collaboration and socioeconomic progress.

SCINTEIA Commentaries on Outlook for Vienna CFE, CSBM Talks

'Dynamism' of CSCE Process

AU1003174489 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1655 GMT 10 Mar 89

["For a Europe of Confidence, For a Europe Free of Weapons"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 10/03/1989—The fact that only one and a half months after the conclusion of the all-European meeting in Vienna two negotiating fora concomitantly hold proceedings on disarmament and on confidence-building is a proof of the dynamism imprinted by the CSCE—a Vienna dispatch signed by D. Tinu and published by SCINTEIA on 10 March shows, pointing out that the foreign ministers' presence at the opening session bespeaks the attention and importance the participating states attach to the event.

The addresses made during the ministerial meeting had not only a common assessment on the significance of the event but also a specific working character shown in the proposals advanced. In this respect, the position and considerations of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu set forth from the meeting's rostrum, and Romania's concrete proposals that added to the other countries' are contributions apt to provide the framework for constructive negotiations conducive to defining effective disarmament measures in Europe.

Noting that Romania's appeal to start from realities can also be found in the positions expressed by other participating states, SCINTEIA shows among other things: The military realities in Europe are of great concern to the peoples on the continent. Though some steps have been taken lately, the arms race continues especially through the measures adopted for the modernization and improvement of the nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. It is the reason for which Romania has stressed that the world's cardinal problem, "the problem of problems" in Europe is the halting of the arms race and a passage to effective disarmament which should include all types of weapons. It is true that, in accordance with the mandate agreed upon, the Vienna negotiations concentrate on conventional armed forces. Equally true is the fact that nuclear weapons are part and parcel of European and world realities, the most threatening one.

Of the wide range of assessments on the immediate and future targets of disarmament, the negotiations brought to the fore the common remark that Europe is at crossroads, and the states signatory to the Helsinki Final Act are confronted with a tremendously high responsibility: to stop the "apocalyptic race of arming."

The answers given during the meeting are convergent toward achieving stability and security by lowering the level of arming. The Vienna debates did not outline a significant consensus on such an objective. Yet it is encouraging that the concrete proposals advanced by

highly different countries—Warsaw Treaty, neutral, non-aligned and NATO countries—foreshadow very drastic cuts in conventional armed forces and armaments being close to what Romania has proposed since long and reiterated, in Vienna, namely their 50 per cent reduction till the year 2000.

In reference to the existing asymmetries which favour one or another of the Warsaw Treaty or NATO countries, the newspaper shows that they should be corrected and eliminated through the measures to be taken during the negotiations. Romania's position, which is similar to that of a greater number of participating states, underlines that action should be taken so as to ensure a military equilibrium at ever lower levels of arming, and the states should have but the bare necessity of armed forces and armaments for defence. Certainly, as pointed out in several addresses, this calls for the cuts to be made proportionally to the states' arming degree, that is the ones having a stronger potential should apply a higher percentage of reduction.

A sign of political will to advance toward real disarmament is also the similitude of positions regarding the priority which should be given to reducing the armaments with a greater offensive capacity like tanks, large-calibre artillery, armoured cars. Along this line Romania just like other countries underscores the demand that the participating states should undertake through unilateral pledges not to use the financial means released after the cuts for other military purposes and to channel them toward economic and social sectors.

In connection with the first negotiating forum on conventional disarmament which, in this phase, gathers representatives of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Treaty member states, Romania pointed out that they are not negotiations between two military blocs but between "independent and sovereign states, on the basis of full equality". Romania, like other participating countries, considers this only a temporary arrangement, with the remaining possibility that, subsequently, the neutral and non-aligned countries join the negotiations.

Assessing that the negotiations to be attended by the 35 states on confidence and security building in Europe benefit by a good experience, SCINTEIA writes: The proposals Romania and the other participating states advanced to the Vienna meeting refer precisely to the building-up of growing confidence, to greater foreseeability and effective limitation of the conditions which would allow for a surprise attack or widescale offensive actions.

Underscoring the great responsibility incumbent on the two negotiating fora in Vienna, SCINTEIA shows in conclusion: on the understanding of such a responsibility and on all the participating states' political will to reach such agreements as to meet the European peoples' interests and aspirations depends Europe's ability to remove the armour which straitjacketed collaboration, understanding and detente on this continent.

'Vital Importance' of Talks

AU1103174089 Bucharest AGERPRES in English
1128 GMT 11 Mar 89

["To Ensure Peace and Security on Europe"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 11/03/1989—In a commentary devoted to the Vienna negotiations on the conventional armed forces in Europe and on the endorsement of new confidence-building and security measures in the continent, daily SCINTEIA stresses that the issues approached are of vital importance for the destiny of the peoples in this part of the world. The commentary shows:

Romania, that has made of general and complete disarmament an essential target of its foreign policy, has made this time too, its full contribution, along with other participant states, to the advancement of stands and proposals of concrete measures to ensure the success of the negotiations. The participants in the meeting, public opinion as well, have received with great interest the considerations and proposals of Romania, of President Nicolae Ceausescu on the issues of disarmament, confidence-building and security in Europe. They attest once more to the steadiness in which Romania works for ensuring in Europe an atmosphere congenial for peaceful work and collaboration among all peoples in the continent.

International developments have justified the warning of the Romanian president that the shy steps taken lately toward detente are far from entitling euphoria, considering that the arms race has not slowed down, showing instead signs of a new escalation, marked by the modernization and sophistication of the nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons.

In consideration of these realities that cannot be shunned, Romania, its president regard disarmament as a unitary process, steadily campaigning for the issues of eliminating the mass destruction weapons—nuclear, chemical and other kinds—to be regarded as closely associated, in order to avoid the concentration of the military power in several centres that should impose their domination.

The measures of conventional disarmament too, have an important place within the unitary process of disarmament promoted by Romania. As shown also in the considerations and proposals advanced to the meeting in Vienna, the substantive cut in such weapons, especially in Europe, is necessary both because through the improvement they have went through in recent years they near mass destruction weapons, and especially because it is in this continent that is to be found the biggest concentration of weapons.

The issues of conventional disarmament in Europe has been since long the subject-matter of Romanian preoccupations. Romania has maintained the necessity that

the states in the two military alliances agree on successive measures of reduction of their arms and troops—with a corresponding cut in the military expenditures. This stand has found, as is known, practical materialization: For years on end Romania endorsed measures of reduction and then freezing of military expenditures. Widely reverberated was the decision endorsed in November 1986 to unilaterally cut by 5-10 per cent the conventional weapons, troops and military expenditures which was an initiative standing also for an example to be taken by other countries as well.

As for the negotiations on the conventional armed forces, worth mentioning are the proposals that the two military alliances reduce their effectives by 50 per cent by the end of the century, the reductions having to be made in two stages and commensurate with the countries' degree of arming, meaning that the states with bigger military force have to make bigger cuts. An essential facet of the reductions is the covenanting of well-balanced, roughly equal ceilings, so as to remove the existing imbalances and asymmetries. The reductions are expected to proceed under efficient control.

Romania, proposes that the military expenditures too, be halved, and the financial resources thus released by used for peaceful purposes only, while in a subsequent period, the channelling of the respective means to various economic sectors should be stipulated in specific accords that should be subject to control measures. Parallel to the reduction of the weapons in existence, of the troops and military expenditures, the narrowing down should be started also of the weapon production, with the dismantlement of some military enterprises or their streamlining to civil production.

As regards the negotiations for adopting new confidence- and security-building measures, Romania appreciates that the document of the Stockholm Conference is a good base to start from in attaining the targets of the new negotiations, in spite of the fact that the measures covenanted in Stockholm did not contribute to lessening the intensity and expansion of the military actions on the continent or to reducing the capacity of launching an armed attack. That is why, in Romania's and President Nicolae Ceausescu's opinion, the negotiations in Vienna should mark a new stage, by passing from declaring the goal of building a greater confidence to narrowing the possibilities of an attack by surprise or of large-scale offensive actions.

Romania presented a series of specific proposals, considering that the new confidence- and security-building measures should include, among other things, the narrowing of the intensity and area of military actions, the renunciation of those activities leading to tension and lack of confidence, the limitation of the possibilities of broad offensive actions, the establishment of measures able to prevent nuclear accidents, etc.

Presenting the two sets of proposals, Romania emphasized the necessity that the negotiations in the domain organically fit in the broad target of general and total disarmament, the centrepiece of which is nuclear disarmament. This requires the renunciation of the production of nuclear and chemical weapons, of any mass destruction weapons, the cessation of the modernization and improvement of atomic armaments, the intensification of the efforts for freeing European continent of such weapons, which calls—in Romania's opinion, for the creation of a special forum of negotiations for nuclear armaments in Europe.

The finality of the negotiations, of the measures to be covenanted should be—as socialist countries underscored several times—the creation of the conditions to pass to the simultaneous dismantlement of the Warsaw Treaty and of the NATO.

Alongside of concrete proposals, Romania also presented in Vienna some principled reasons regarding the framework of the negotiations and their significance. So, Romania emphasized that, although the current stage of the negotiations on conventional armed forces are attended only by the states member of the two political-military alliances, the negotiations are not held between the aforementioned military blocs, but among independent and sovereign states—and the possibility exists that, in the future, the negotiations be attended by neutral and non-aligned states so that all the participants in the CSCE process can have a say.

In this way Romania's consistent stand was restated according to which the major international questions, especially those regarding peace and security, are of vital interest for all states, therefore all of them have the right to directly participate in the analysis and settlement of the questions.

The presentation of the Romanian stands at the Vienna meeting occasioned the reassertion of the great truth President Nicolae Ceausescu emphasized many times: In the peace- and disarmament-related questions, in all the great contemporary questions, Europe cannot fulfil its mission if it is not united in the diversity of its social systems, philosophical and political conceptions, of the free and independent nations which should act for security, disarmament and understanding, for collaboration, for economic and social progress.

Romania's proposals at Vienna represent a new and telling expression of the wish to contribute to the efforts for attaining those noble desiderata, with the firm conviction that such a course corresponds to the vital interests and aspirations of the peoples on our continent, of the whole mankind.

YUGOSLAVIA

Foreign Secretary Loncar Arrives in Vienna for CFE, CSCE Talks

LD0503213589 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1831 GMT 5 Mar 89

[Text] Vienna, March 5 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar arrived in Vienna this evening to attend a meeting of foreign ministers representing signatories to the final document of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The meeting opens tomorrow and will last until March 9.

The ministerial meeting precedes the start on March 9 of the first broad negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe and of new negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures.

Loncar will address the gathering on Wednesday, March 8.

During the Vienna visit, Loncar is also expected to meet several ministers taking part in the meeting.

Colonel Rebuts Critique of Military Spending Policy

AU2302185789 Belgrade NARODNA ARMIIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 89 pp 4, 5

[Colonel Radovan Matijasevic commentary: "Tendentious 'Pondering'"]

[Excerpts] The last issue of NASA OBRAMBA carries an article by Teodor Gersak entitled "Are Our Allocations for the Army Really the Smallest in Europe, and Are Our Soldiers the Least Expensive?" In this fairly long article, the continuation of which has already been announced will be in the next issue of NASA OBRAMBA, the author is trying in a confused, contradictory, and incorrect way to refute the claim that we have one of the least expensive armies, an army with the shortest conscript service, and the lowest per soldier expenditure in Europe. In doing so, he stresses that the data used during the discussion on constitutional amendments and the financing of the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] was "stretched" and "clumsily" interpreted, and that it therefore, gives a completely "distorted" picture.

"Intending" to analyze the data on the size of armies and military expenditure "from several aspects, and to classify them according to certain parameters," the author states at the very beginning that he will not go into the "assessment of the geostrategic positions of some regions and states, nor will he try to assess their real or imagined imperilment or their mutual relations." By saying this, Gersak is making a big mistake at the very beginning because a well-argued discussion on the size of an army and military expenditure cannot be conducted without taking into account the basic determinants, above all, the countries' military-political and geostrategic positions and the actual threat to their security. This rule is

respected by all authors in our country and throughout the world who want to carry out an objective analysis, in theory and practice, and to make politically relevant conclusions.

In his analysis of the size of armies and military expenditure, the author attaches the greatest importance to the following: the size of the country, the number of citizens, population density, and the GNP. Unfortunately, not only are these parameters not sufficient for a serious analysis, because they do not take into account the aforementioned determinants, but they directly distort the picture of the subject that is examined, something the author is allegedly fighting against.

Considering the relation between the size of a country and the size of its "permanent" army, Gersak, in order to prove the validity of his theses, always compares us with the neighboring and European neutral and nonaligned countries (Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Cyprus, and Malta). Drawing the conclusion that in relation to our neighbors, and in view of the size of our territory, we have the second largest peacetime military force, and that in relation to European neutral and nonaligned countries we have the largest army, the author makes new errors of principle because he ignores several important factors.

Comparing us with the neighboring countries, Gersak fails to observe the fact that five of them (five out of six) are members of military-political groupings and that on their territory there are foreign military bases, units, and facilities for bloc armed forces. [passage omitted]

One-Sided Interpretation of Military Expenditure

Under the subtitle "Our Army Is Not the Most Expensive in Europe," the author comments on the relationship between military expenditure and GNP. It is obvious from the data presented by Gersak that our expenditure for defense is well below the world average (4.85 percent of the GNP as compared with the world average of 6.13 percent). Gersak himself points out that all neighboring countries and non-bloc European countries allocate more for defense per member of the population. However, since these facts do not suit him, he introduces into his argument another factor, the size of the realized GNP, and claims that our expenditure, seen from this point of view is higher, in comparison, with all the countries in question except Greece. [passage omitted]

An article with this kind of ambition should have elaborated and analyzed the time series of this data rather than concentrate on only 1 single year. This would reveal a completely reversed trend of military expenditure in Yugoslavia compared with that in the neighboring and other European countries. This would show that military expenditure has been rising throughout the world while in Yugoslavia it has been falling continuously.

For the sake of illustration let us recall that in the 1976-1980 period the social plan envisaged that 6.17

percent of the national income would be needed for army; between 1981 and 1985 the military expenditure would be 5.8 percent of the national income; and for the current period the social plan envisages that 5.2 percent of the national income will be needed for the Army. In fact, the real expenditure was always different: In the first above mentioned period the real expenditure was 5.59 percent of the national income and in the second it was 4.5 percent. In the current medium-term period, under the pressure of economic difficulties, the Army's needs will be at a considerably lower level than that envisaged (in 1987, 4.94 percent; in 1988, 4.94 percent; in 1989, 4.90 percent). However, even this corrected planned expenditure has not been followed and in the last 3 years the YPA received considerably less money. In 1988, the funds for the Army were less than 4 percent of the national income in real terms.

Imaginary Increase of Army Budget

In the part of the article which refers to the export of arms, military equipment, and engineering, the author demonstrates a complete lack of knowledge about the real situation and interprets things in a completely wrong way. Let us look at some known facts:

First, our armaments and military equipment industry represents an integral part of the whole of the Yugoslav industry and carries out all its business affairs as the "civilian" part of the industry. That also applies to its export side. The status of every organization of associated labor in the armaments and military equipment industry is identical to the status of all other organizations in the domestic industry. Regulating the rights and obligations of the associated labor organizations in the special purpose industry (on the basis of the law on the production of armaments and military equipment adopted by the SFRY Assembly in June of 1979) does not question the basic self-managing rights of the producers of armaments and military equipment.

Second, the Federal Directorate for Sale and Reserves of Special Purpose Products is the only body involved in the export of armaments and military equipment, including military engineering. It has the same status as similar organizations at the federal level. Everything that concerns the export of armaments, military equipment, and military engineering is regulated through joint agreements between this directorate and the exporting associated labor organizations.

Third, the participation of the army institutions in the export of armaments, military equipment, and military engineering boils down to providing expert help to the Federal Directorate and the exporting associated labor organizations, and does not involve any financial compensation.

Proceeding from the above-mentioned facts, the real situation is as follows: Not a single dollar, or dinar, that is earned through the export of arms, military equipment, and military engineering enters into the YPA's budget. Therefore, the author's assumption that "at least

a part" of the proceeds from exports represents a "part of the YPA's budget" is absolutely incorrect and extremely tendentious, especially because a sum of \$300 million and even \$2 billion was mentioned. This also applies to the claim that the Federation's non-budgetary expenditure is "partly used for the YPA." The SFRY Assembly delegates and our public are fully aware that the only source of the YPA's financing consists of the funds that are approved within the federal budget.

Solutions From the Well-Known Arsenal

If he wanted to be objective, the author could have easily established the real state of affairs by approaching any director of any associated labor organization on the territory of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia which export armaments, military equipment, and military engineering, such as Iskra-CEO, Iskra-Electroveze, SMELT, SCT, and so forth. By not doing this, the author has come up with an imagined increase in the army budget and the "cost of the SFRY's defense," something that can only confuse uninformed readers.

In the conclusion of his article, the author states that by "realizing the planned 12-percent cut in the Army's combat section, which would correspond to the size of our territory, we would become the smallest permanent army in the southern European military arena and in Europe." However, he immediately stresses that by doing this we would not have any significant savings, although he had previously persistently tried to prove that we have a big Army and that the Army is too big a burden for the population, and we therefore, ought to follow the practice and experience of Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta. [passage omitted]

It is known that the author, Teodor Gersak, is a lecturer at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Sociology, and Journalism in Ljubljana. It is for this reason that we ask ourselves how he interprets to his students our defense and self-protection policy and practice. We would also like to know how NASA OBRAMBA, a very respectable paper, could publish this poorly argued, theoretically unfounded, ideopolitically controversial, and tendentious text.

INDIA

Benefits of Continued Missile Development Seen; U.S. Attitude Hit

52500024 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA* in English
31 Jan 89 p 14

[Article by K. Subrahmanyam]

[Text] Along with the campaign to disarm the unarmed nations in respect of chemical weapons, another has been launched to prevent developing nations from acquiring a ballistic missile capability. The seven industrialised nations—the U.S., the U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan—have already reached an understanding on halting the transfer of missile technologies to developing nations. Efforts are under way to bring the USSR and China into this arrangement.

The U.S. treats Israel in this case too as a favourite son. The latter has developed a Jericho II intermediate range missile, and has launched a satellite into orbit, to demonstrate to the rest of the world its missile prowess. This is a development to which the U.S. has raised no objections. In fact, the U.S. and Israel are to cooperate on some missile technologies in the context of the Star Wars programme.

Missile Club

The U.S. has also acquiesced in the Saudi Arabian acquisition of CSS-2 intermediate range missiles from China since it does not want to offend either Saudi Arabia or China. The campaign against missile proliferation is, therefore, likely to be directed particularly against India, and to a lesser extent against Pakistan and Brazil. As in the case of nuclear capability, India has the most advanced technology among the developing nations other than China.

The U.S. arms controllers put forward an argument of dubious validity that since the U.S. and the USSR have agreed to eliminate the intermediate range nuclear weapons, other nations should reciprocate by not expanding the missile club. This argument has already been rejected by two American allies, the U.K. and France, and also by China.

India is now reported to be on the point of testing its intermediate range missile *Agni*. As happened in the case of our nuclear test, there are pro-western lobbies in the government and outside who are pressing India not to conduct the test. At least some dimensions of the agitation against the national test range in Orissa may be attributed to the western inspiration via Uncle Toms amongst us. India should not again find herself in respect of missile capability in the kind of situation in which she did on the nuclear issue, after the 1974 test. Before the proposals for an exclusive missile club shutting out others go further, India should carry out its series of missile tests.

If only India had carried out the missile test before the Prime Minister's visit to China—this was quite possible—the Chinese leadership would not have treated India as unworthy of holding a dialogue with on international security and disarmament issues. Once again the unwarranted fears of people suffering from a small nation syndrome denied India its due place in the international community.

The recent Paris conference on chemical weapons highlighted that while developing nations as a whole would welcome chemical, nuclear and general disarmament measures, they are getting increasingly tired of the hypocrisy, preachiness and double standards of the western industrial nations.

India has already tabled before the U.N. a comprehensive three-stage plan for nuclear and general disarmament. This plan has the broad support of the Soviet Union while it has been received coolly by the U.S. and its allies. Their apologists argue that the Indian plan asks for too many things in too short a period. This is another way of saying that they would continue to pursue the double standards of going ahead with the arms race even while attempting to disarm the rest of the world. This will ensure their continued hegemony in military terms even though they have lost it in technological and financial spheres.

While India is for elimination of chemical and nuclear weapons, we shall not be contributing to international peace and stability by accepting unequal treaties and discriminatory regimes perpetuating the hegemony of certain powers over the rest of the world. In today's world there is much greater sensitivity and awareness of the double standards of treaties like the NPT, as was highlighted in the Paris conference. India should now attempt to mobilise support of the developing nations for its three-stage comprehensive disarmament plan.

NPT Review

An opportunity to offer our plan as a meaningful strategy towards a world full of nuclear and chemical weapons will arise when the non-proliferation treaty review conference convenes in 1990. While India will not be attending the conference as it has not acceded to the NPT, we should mobilise the support of other developing nations behind our plan. The diplomatic efforts towards that should start right now.

While there is a lot of talk about arms reduction between the East and West, what should not be overlooked is that such reductions have been made possible only because of the increased lethality and accuracy of weaponry in the hands of both blocs. More than that, they have the ability to keep the adversary under constant surveillance. In this approach the missile and the satellite technologies play a crucial role.

In future interventions in the developing world, which U.S. defence planners see as the most likely contingencies, the industrialised nations are not likely to commit

their manpower to combat in the developing world but use their accurate standoff weapons from a distance without fear of retaliation. They may also allow the selective spread of such weapons to their co-operative allies, as has been done in the case of Israel and Saudi Arabia. In the latest annual report the U.S. defence secretary has referred to both the possibility of India acquiring missile capability in the nineties and the need to strengthen Pakistani deterrent capability in the regional context. It does not necessarily mean that if India did not press on with its missile technologies, Pakistan and other co-operative allies will not be enabled to go ahead with nuclear and missile capabilities.

Since 1974 India has shown remarkable and even imprudent, restraint in not building up a nuclear arsenal following the Pokharan test. But that example neither earned India any kudos nor was followed by others. On the contrary, nuclear armed naval forces have been deployed in the Arabian Sea, Pakistan has gone ahead with its nuclear weapons programme with tacit support of China and acquiescence of the U.S. and the Chinese are not prepared to discuss international security issues with India on a basis of equality.

With satellite imagery technologies improving towards finer resolutions and even becoming commercially available, very few of our military secrets are safe. The prudent assumption has to be that there will be intelligence-sharing arrangements between the U.S. and its cooperative allies, and Pakistan will be making all-out efforts to acquire wide-ranging satellite imagery information. In future it will be difficult to enter into meaningful force reduction agreements with China or Pakistan unless India is able to match the missile capabilities of China as well as information acquisition capabilities of both China and Pakistan through satellites and intelligence sharing.

The outgoing U.S. defence secretary's annual statement reveals that the U.S. defence planners are reconciled to India acquiring missile capabilities and Pakistan a regional deterrent capability, or in other words nuclear weaponry, in the nineties.

American Stance

But if the U.S. sees any hesitation on the part of the Indian leadership to go ahead with a series of missile tests, and a lack of will to power as seen in the years following the Pokharan test, Washington and its allies will intensify their pressures through various means. Instead of wailing helplessly about Pakistani efforts to acquire more F-16 aircraft, and making ourselves a ridiculous spectacle, the better course will be to go ahead with our missile tests and adopt a more relaxed attitude towards the inevitable modernisation of the Pakistani air force.

Missile capabilities will in due course enable India to make significant force reductions in future. If we hesitate, our sense of insecurity will lead to unaffordable and

unplanned defence expenditures. This is what happened when we developed cold feet under the Pokharan explosion.

Even while attempting to participate effectively in the international trend towards a reduction of the armed forces and devising conference-building measures with our neighbours, the country can ill-afford to overlook the modernisation of equipment taking place all over the world for both increasing lethality and for real time intelligence acquisition.

The success of statesmanship depends upon optimisation of competing demands of security, peace promotion and development. All the three compel this country to press ahead with missile testing, especially since our civilian space technology appears to be limping.

Concern Expressed Over Pakistani Missile Tests BK0803103189 Delhi THE HINDUSTAN TIMES in English 28 Feb 89 p 13

[R.R. Subramanian article: "Pak Missiles: What They Mean"]

[Text] The Director of Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), Dr Salim Mehmud, had said in May 1980 that an indigenously built satellite named BADR [expansion unknown] would be launched. The carrier rocket that was to launch this satellite was never mentioned until news reports appeared in fits and starts in January this year to suggest that Pakistan had developed indignously or was developing the Remuna and Shapar rockets.

General Mirza Aslam Beg, the Pakistani Army Chief of Staff, had announced while speaking to the officers of the National Defence College, Islamabad, that two missiles, one of range 80 km and the other with range of 300 km, had been successfully testfired from the McVian coast of Baluchistan. These missiles have been appropriately named HATF-1 and HATF-2 after the deadly sword of the Holy Prophet. General Beg is believed to have witnessed the testfirings of the missile which has two stages.

Pakistan's SUPARCO, which is the equivalent of India's ISRO, [Indian Space Research Organization] had General Ziaul Haq as its chairman. After General Ziaul Haq's demise it remains unclear whether it is Ms Benazir Bhutto or General Aslam Beg who occupies that position. Pakistan's military is calling the shots on nuclear weapons. Not for nothing has it been that it is General Aslam Beg and not Ms Benazir Bhutto who also announced that a rocket carrying the payload weighing 150 kg had attained an altitude of 640 km and it had also been recovered on Pakistani territory. It is believed that this rocket was launched from the Sonmiani test range near Karachi as early as May 1988.

It was in May 1988, that U.S. Vice-President Daniel Quayle as Senator had published an up-date on ballistic

missile proliferation in the Third World. It was in this update that he had pointed out to the US Congress that a surface-to-surface rocket capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg was about to be launched. It has also been pointed out in this report that this missile may be similar to some Chinese missiles. One feels that it could be the M-11, which is yet to be exported.

India has little reason to be concerned about the HATF-2 before it is deployed in large enough numbers. Similarly, India's ISRO and DRDO [Defense Research and Development Organization] must move in tandem towards the development of ballistic missiles. The West German private company OTRAG which had set up a testing range in Zaire in 1978 and then moved to Brazil and then Libya is believed to have helped Pakistan develop rockets which have been christened Shapur and Renuka. According to Gen. Aslam Beg one of the rockets that launched the payload weighing 150 kg and was recovered attained an altitude of 640 km had an injection velocity of 9.6 kg per second, not enough to put a satellite into an orbit around the earth. This will in all probability be the next step, and for this reason, India too must keep in step by launching the AGNI, ASLV [Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle] and PSLV [Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle] through successful test firings and then move into their conversion into ballistic missiles that can deliver payloads onto a target.

Pakistan's strategic relationship with China could well extend to the production of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) as the next step. China has already transferred IRBM's to Saudi Arabia, the desert kingdom with which Benazir's predecessor had strong ties. There can be no doubt that the metallurgist Dr A.Q. Khan and Dr Salim Mehmud are working towards a very definitive goal, namely of matching if not overtaking India in the missile era.

In short, then, India must not take Pakistan's posturing for peace at face value since the missile age has come to the sub-continent and for this reason adequate deterrence must prevail. Benazir in Beijing had expressed concern over India's nuclear submarine in the Indian Ocean. What about Chinese nuclear submarines?

Are they to be considered by Pakistan's military for procurement through lease initially? It is conceivable that the competition between the two countries—India and Pakistan—could reach the stage wherein each of them may eventually contemplate purchase in several numbers or attempt to develop them indigenously.

Looking into the 1990s, this seems likely, as the competition between these two countries has already reached the stage where each country visualises that any move by one is detrimental to the other's security.

Pakistan's missile programme has graduated to the stage where a second test firing has occurred and Prime Minister Bhutto was shown watching it on television. What is significant is the "blow hot", "blow cold" strategy that she is adopting towards India, be it the Siachen Glacier, Kashmir or the nuclear issue. Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, the brilliant metallurgist who heads Project 706 at Kahuta, is actively involved in the missile project.

Benazir's father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto brought A.Q. Khan to Pakistan in 1975 and there is reason to believe therefore that Benazir will eventually reward him with the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) presently headed by Mr Munir Ahmed Khan, for whom Qadeer Khan has made no secret of his dislike. What will be of significance for India's security in the 1990's would be the extent of Chinese collaboration with Pakistan on missile development. There have been reports in the Western Press that tend to suggest that Qadeer is to visit China very soon. This should come as no surprise largely because of Chinese interest in the gaseous centrifuge technique. There is, however, another aspect and that relates to ballistic missiles of longer range, say beyond 1,000 kms.

China is presently readying for export another missile in the M series—the M-9 which has a range of 600 kms. It is conceivable that A.Q. Khan may have already obtained an access to the designs of this missile, Mr Quayle in his update to the US Congress in May 1988 had already made references to such a development. There is another development and that is in regard to the procurement of the CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missile by Saudi Arabia, around the time the first test firing of the Pakistani rocket took place, namely, April 25, 1988. India does not face as yet a "missile gap" in the arena of ballistic missiles but the time is not far off when such a gap may well become a reality. To avoid such a reality one must have several test firings, say as many as six of the "AGNI" and other in the SLV [Satellite Launch Vehicle] series. Even through demonstration deterrence must be made to prevail.

India's defence modernisation cannot slacken in the wake of Pakistan's thrust into the missile arena. One cannot remain content with the mere knowledge that the scientists of the ISRO and DRDO can develop missiles, one must deploy them for demonstrative deterrence of both Pakistan and China.

Karpov Interviewed on Strategy for CFE Talks

52000033 Moscow NEW TIMES in English

No 7, Feb 89 pp 7-9

[Dmitriy Pogorzelsky interview with Viktor Karpov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs: "Vienna: After and Before"]

[Text] [Pogorzelsky] Several days have passed since the Soviet Union and its allies published the statement of the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty states on the relative strength of the Armed Forces and Armaments of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in Europe. What is the West's reaction to this statement?

[Karpov] I would say that serious politicians, experts and statesmen have reacted very positively. And this is understandable because the figures released by the Warsaw Treaty are completely objective. We do not conceal, for instance, that the Warsaw Treaty states have considerable superiority in tactical missiles, a fact not mentioned before.

Stinging remarks have been made by those who try to represent the statement as another propaganda move designed to portray the situation in a light advantageous to the Soviet Union. I am not surprised about that.

[Pogorzelsky] Who took the lead in drawing up the statement? Or was it a collective effort?

[Karpov] Such a decision was in the air, so to say. Talk of it began early in 1988. It was not that one person advanced the idea and others accepted it enthusiastically. All parties discussed the idea, weighed the pros and cons, and took collective decisions.

[Pogorzelsky] It is no secret that military thinking is far more conservative than political thinking, and that conservatism is not peculiar to the West. Were there any difficulties before the statement could be published?

[Karpov] Of course, conservatives are to be found everywhere. But recently the processes of perestroika and new political thinking have brought about considerable shifts in the total alignment of forces. They are strengthening the positions of the champions of glasnost in affairs that had previously been kept secret from the public.

Frankly speaking, we had difficulties, of course, because the people in charge of statistics were unable to accept the idea that data that only yesterday was top secret could be discussed openly and, moreover, made public. But a political decision had been taken. After that, I think, we cooperated very well. It took about a year to work out the statement.

[Pogorzelsky] Why has the statement only now been published?

[Karpov] The releasing of figures on the military potentials of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty is not a new problem. For many years the West reproached us with

keeping secret data on the armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty as a whole and the armies of its member states, particularly the Soviet army.

Generally speaking, the reproaches were not groundless. Our mania for secrecy since the war is well known. But the situation is now changing radically.

We had to take a new look at facts and figures relating to our armed forces and discuss with our allies the possibility of releasing data on their armies and armaments. It took quite a long time, as it was necessary to hold consultations between the chiefs of staff of the allied armies and meetings of experts, categorize the arms of the service and types of armament, and prepare data and check it thoroughly.

It was also necessary to find the criteria on which to calculate—what unit to take as the basic one. For instance, in its statistics published last November, the North Atlantic Alliance uses the term "main battle tank." No one knows what that means. NATO has not yet given an intelligible answer to our questions. All the figures released last November are tendentious, and advantageous to NATO. We examined the NATO data to find anything similar for comparison, but could not find any such unit. That is why we have included in our tables all the tanks available in the two alliances.

As you see, a great deal of work has been done and I can assure you that all the figures relating to the Warsaw Treaty states are absolutely correct. Our General Staff and the Committee of the Ministers of Defence of the Warsaw Treaty Member States bear full responsibility for the accuracy of these figures.

We also had to give thorough scrutiny to the data supplied by NATO. Incidentally, despite all its professions of openness, NATO has not released exhaustive figures. That is why I have to confess that we used our own intelligence information, analyzed their official data, compared both, and made estimates which, in our opinion, correspond to the facts.

This work had been completed by the end of last year and the Defence Ministers' Committee decided to release our estimates. The publication was timed to coincide with the beginning of the Vienna talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments so that the general picture of the correlation of forces would be clear. The mandate for these talks was recently adopted at the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Conference and they will open on March 6.

I want to make a reservation straight away. These data are not intended for the Vienna talks. It is not our purpose to anticipate the volume of armaments that will be discussed at the talks. What has been included in the tables is essential for appraising the overall balance of forces. These data could be used when the parties come to grips with the direct subjects of the talks.

[Pogorzelsky] As far as I know, there is an agreement with NATO not to make public the figures to be produced by the negotiating parties in Vienna.

[Karpov] Frankly speaking, there are still many ambiguities here—to what extent and how the initial data will be used at the talks. A comparative analysis will have to be made to determine the asymmetries and imbalances. What should be taken as the basis for such an analysis? We shall certainly have to use the data produced by the negotiation sides. But, first of all, we shall have to define the types of armament on which data will be required. Here is a concrete example. In the NATO data released last November guns with a calibre of 100 millimeters or more are taken as the basis, whereas we take guns with a calibre of 75 millimeters or more and mortars with a calibre of 50 millimeters or more.

If we take only guns with a calibre of 100 millimeters or more we shall get a distorted picture, as they are all considered offensive weapons. The negotiators must have uniform criteria. Otherwise, they will be unable to make comparisons. We believe therefore that the question of initial data will be discussed separately at the 23-nation talks.

[Pogorzelsky] We have had the unfortunate experience of the 15-year talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The question of initial data were then an obstacle the negotiators were unable to overcome.

[Karpov] Indeed, we do not want the coming talks to get bogged down in sterile discussion. An exchange of initial data is needed as a point of departure. At the same time, it is necessary to discuss the various elements that will be needed in order to reach agreement. For instance, the parties will discuss initial data to ascertain the asymmetries and imbalances and, simultaneously, ceilings for a reduction of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO armaments and troops. They could also discuss, if necessary, the question of the verification of initial data, the process of reduction and, finally, the end result.

Parallel discussion could save time. There will be no need to wait for the question of initial data to be settled before starting the discussion of methods of reduction and verification. Everything should proceed simultaneously. Ad hoc groups could be set up for this purpose—each to be assigned a concrete task. They will submit the results of their work to the plenary meetings for the adoption of the appropriate decisions.

[Pogorzelsky] Is it necessary to verify the initial data and if so to what extent?

[Karpov] We should clearly be guided here by simple logic. If we, or NATO, have confidence that the data produced by the other side is correct, then there will perhaps be no need to verify it and it can be taken as a basis for further talks. Another question then arises. Is it necessary to verify cuts to the levels agreed by the

parties, or to the end result? This applies to weapons of all types and to the total strength of troops.

Preparing for the talks, we do not want to accept one or other method in advance. During the talks we should adopt the best decisions, proceeding from specific items on the agenda.

[Pogorzelsky] In other words, we are going to display maximum flexibility, something we lacked at many talks in the past.

[Karpov] Quite so. The Vienna talks on cuts in armaments and the armed forces in Central Europe were stalemated because the two sides, having taken rigid stands in 1973, did not budge an inch since then, unwilling to meet each other halfway. It should be said openly that all the proposals advanced by both sides over the last 15 years were in fact mere maneuvers, without the slightest real change in their positions. Talks should not be conducted in this way and, I think, neither NATO nor the Warsaw Treaty should repeat this mistake.

[Pogorzelsky] Even a cursory look at the tables shows that in the North Atlantic Alliance the troops and armaments are divided almost evenly among its member states, whereas in the Warsaw Treaty Organization the main burden is borne by the Soviet Union.

[Karpov] It so happened that the Soviet Union has assumed the main burden in the Warsaw Treaty Organization, both in armaments and armed forces. This fact should, of course, be taken into account in fixing the proportions and the sizes of cuts. One of the points at the talks will be, in our opinion, how the total ceilings to be set for the blocs will be distributed between the allied countries in NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The military and economic potential of each country should be taken into account so as not to diminish the security of either of the two blocs.

[Pogorzelsky] Can we then talk about a redistribution of the burden in the Warsaw Treaty Organization? In the past, we used the word with regard to NATO and in a pejorative sense.

[Karpov] Well, such a term can probably be used. The existing proportions in the Warsaw Treaty Organization have taken shape with regard to the economic potentials of our allies. There is no need to talk about increasing their share in the bloc, because the task facing us today is quite different.

The unilateral reduction of armed forces and armaments by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is meant to bring about detente in the military field, to demonstrate that a defensive doctrine is being put into effect, and, of course, to alleviate their economic difficulties.

[Pogorzelsky] It seems that the cuts being effected by allied socialist countries are a concerted action. What is its purpose?

[Karpov] Quite right. The Warsaw Treaty states, meeting in Berlin in May 1987, proclaimed the new defensive doctrine of the alliance. It was evident even then that the realization of this doctrine would take certain organizational efforts. The structure of the Warsaw Treaty armed forces that had formed by 1987 did not conform to the new doctrine. It was therefore clear from the outset that measures should be taken to change the structure of the armed forces, change the overall arms distribution pattern, and remove from service systems and types of weapon intended for offensive operations.

Measure of this kind were discussed in the Warsaw Treaty at various levels. As a result, at its meeting in Warsaw last year, the organization adopted recommendations for rebuilding the structure on the basis of the new doctrine. Our unilateral steps are a consequence of this restructuring. The same can also be said of the steps taken by Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and, earlier, Romania. I would like to stress that these steps lead not just to a reduction of armies and military expenditure. They are accompanied by measures for remodelling the structure of the armed forces.

[Pogorzelsky] There is a view in the West that the structure of the Warsaw Treaty Organization is not changing. Is such an opinion justified?

[Karpov] There are no grounds for it whatever. Here is just one concrete example. We are withdrawing six tank divisions from Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. They have close on 2,000 tanks. But we have decided to evacuate 5,300 tanks. The other tanks are being taken from the remaining divisions to reduce the proportion of tanks in them. The number of large-calibre guns is being similarly cut. We are pulling out pontoon crossing and assault landing units intended for offensive operations.

As a result, the structure of the group of Soviet troops in the German Democratic Republic, the southern group of troops in Hungary and the central group of troops in Czechoslovakia, and of the divisions remaining there, is changing. It will have a clearly defensive character in keeping with the concept of reasonable sufficiency. We would go farther if we could expect reciprocal steps by NATO. But we have approached a level where no further unilateral reductions can be made without reducing our security.

[Pogorzelsky] For 15 years the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO have been unable to reach agreement on Central Europe, and now they are going to discuss a reduction of troops and armaments in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. The new negotiations will perhaps be even more complicated. For even a cursory look at the alignment of forces and imbalances shows that considerable difficulties will have to be overcome.

[Karpov] The negotiations will be more complicated, of course. It will be necessary to analyze the situation over

a vast territory, taking many factors into account, and to adopt an approach combining the reduction of troops and armaments as a whole and in individual regions, and regional measures. Paradoxical as it may sound, the task is made easier precisely because the talks will cover the whole of Europe.

The situation in Central Europe has specific features arising from the historically-established deployment of NATO troops and those of Warsaw Treaty Organization. The region the talks centered upon was marked by certain imbalances either way. This created difficulties when it came to exchanging data or a reduction of troops and armaments. For political reasons that are well known we could not make our data public and, besides, our approach to arms and force cuts was entirely different from the West's. We did not want to recognize either that the Soviet Union had certain advantages. The futile and protracted argument over these issues has ultimately led to an impasse.

Speaking of the regional aspect, I would note the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO states. This area should be given priority attention, and special measures are necessary to increase confidence and reduce the danger of surprise attack there. The Soviet Union and its allies have several proposals regarding the line of contact area. Proposals on this question have been advanced by the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the governments of Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, by Milos Jakes and Wojciech Jaruzelski. Each of them has its specific features, and all of them make it possible to find a very constructive approach to the problem of lessening tension in the very heart of Europe.

[Pogorzelsky] The question of verification has more than once been an insurmountable obstacle in the past. To what extent are we ready to demonstrate openness here?

[Karpov] We are ready to accept revolutionary decisions. If the initial data and the process of reduction itself have to be verified, we are prepared to let in teams of inspectors. And no doubt the end results will have to be verified too. Both sides must have full confidence that the relevant agreements are being implemented.

[Pogorzelsky] Why will only carrier of tactical nuclear weapons, not warheads, be taken into account at the coming talks?

[Karpov] It should be said right away that this is our concession to the West. The Warsaw Treaty states, at their meeting in Budapest in 1986, called on NATO to reduce tactical nuclear weapons as well because they are included in the armaments of units and formations. By reducing only conventional arms we shall, as it were, increase the weight and importance of nuclear weapons. For that reason talks should also be held on tactical nuclear weapons in order to ensure stability at a lower level, with the absence of the offensive potential.

[Pogorzelsky] This means that tactical nuclear weapons are definitely offensive?

[Karpov] This has always been quite evident in NATO's plans. Since our partners are not yet ready to discuss nuclear weapon systems of this kind, we have decided to discuss only means of delivery at this stage, leaving warheads aside. But, I am sure, the time will come for substantive talks on this question too. In any case, we are ready to start negotiations at any moment in order to rid Europe of all tactical nuclear weapons.

[Pogorzelsky] There is much talk about the need for the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons in NATO, which for its part accuses the Soviet Union of carrying it out.

[Karpov] I must say that talk of this kind has no grounds whatever. Moscow has adopted a political decision not to replace tactical missiles.

Many people in the West receive arguments in favor of modernizing the NATO potential with increasing skepticism, mainly because the chief argument of the advocates of modernization is the Warsaw Treaty's superiority in conventional armaments. By reducing its armed forces stationed in Europe by 240,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces and 800 planes, the Soviet Union is depriving NATO of the argument by which it tried to prove the need for having tactical nuclear weapons.

Further cuts are expected to even out the conventional arms potentials at a lower level, thereby making pointless any emphasis on the need to keep tactical nuclear weapons. This explains the activity of those who would like to draw NATO to modernize. Incidentally, the six divisions being pulled out of the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are leaving these countries with all their armaments, tactical nuclear weapons included.

If the talks scheduled to begin in March proceed constructively, conditions will also be provided for a substantive dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons.

The main task now facing the negotiators in Vienna is to reduce the level of military confrontation, build confidence and, as further cuts are made, work out a new agreement on the Warsaw Treaty and NATO structures on the basis of reciprocity so that neither bloc will eventually be able to undertake offensive operations. That being the case, they will be simply unnecessary.

[Pogorzelsky] Thank you.

Detente Said To Require Openness on Military Data

AU2802121989 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 22 Feb 89 p 3

[NOVOSTI commentary 'specially for ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI' by Colonel Valeriy Borisenko: "Detente Needs Openness"]

[Text] On the basis of the mandate that was adopted after 2 years of Vienna talks, the 23 countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact and NATO will soon begin to discuss the consolidation of security measures in Europe, while maintaining the lowest possible level of conventional armed forces and armaments. An accord on this issue is an important stage on the way to achieving a certain military-strategic stability in Europe.

However, a constructive approach toward the problem of eliminating the objective asymmetries calls for a sober assessment of the military potentials of both sides.

The Warsaw Pact proposed an exchange of official numerical data on conventional armed forces and armaments as far back as March 1988, but NATO avoided a response and published data on the basis of an arbitrary, unilateral method of reckoning. This is not the first time that NATO has performed its calculations in its own way, and every time it does so, a "threat from the East" is confirmed. How could it be otherwise, when even Soviet generals have referred to Western sources in their speeches on the subject of the ratio of forces.

Up to now, the latest information on the numerical status of the USSR Armed Forces could be obtained from 1962 statistical annuals. However, such information as the number of Warsaw Pact tanks was kept secret. Now, at last, the number of tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and other types of armaments has been publicized. The data gives the size of each side's conventional forces and military personnel, in the eyes of Warsaw Pact experts. However, these figures do not have to be considered as the only accurate ones. The Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee statement says that the numerical data on armed forces and armaments in Europe and adjoining waters is not intended to serve as a point of departure for calculations, nor is it meant to replace negotiations.

There are major differences in the way in which the Warsaw Pact and NATO calculate their forces. This is quite natural, because each side's experts employ different methods of calculation. In order to establish a joint method of calculation, it will be necessary to carry out more complex comparisons, rather than just the traditional mathematical ones. For example, one may compare the NATO AH-1 combat helicopter with the Soviet T-62 tank. Western military experts believe that during a single flight, an AH-1 helicopter can wipe out two or three T-62 tanks, and the AH-64A helicopter can even wipe out six. However, both sides admit that even if each side calculates the size of forces in its own way, one

arrives at an approximate military parity in Europe that does not allow either side any real military superiority.

Open discussions about conventional military potentials is something that is new and unprecedented, but the danger of war to Europe and the whole of civilization is equally unprecedented. European security calls for urgent action to remove the existing asymmetries, reduce offensive weapons, and restructure both blocs and provide them with a strictly defensive character.

Western Critiques of Soviet 'Sincerity' on Troop, SNF Cuts Hit

AU0903090989 Warsaw *SLOWO POWSZECHNE*
in Polish 27 Feb 89 p 3

[NOVOSTI article "specially for SLOWO POWSZECHNE" by Spartak Beglov: "A Chain Reaction of Common Sense"]

[Text] The complex problems with which the East and West are going to have to deal during the life of the new Washington administration are marked by two circumstances.

First, Moscow's decision on a unilateral reduction of its Armed Forces and resources which, as Mikhail Gorbachev said recently, will lead to a one-eighth reduction in the numerical status of the USSR Armed Forces, a one-fifth reduction in weapons manufacture, and a one-seventh reduction in military expenditures.

It surprises me how some Western experts are quick to explain Moscow's broad publicity of these measures at the same time as the change in the White House tenancy as an attempt to place the new U.S. Government in a difficult situation and get rid of outdated armaments at the same time. However, the Soviet leader intercepted these dishonest assessments of the Soviet decisions, and said that over half of the 10,000 European tanks due to be withdrawn (and then destroyed) are the latest models. Nevertheless, the fact remains that someone very much wanted George Bush not to believe in the Soviet Union's sincerity.

The second circumstance is the Soviet decision to reduce an appropriate part of its tactical nuclear weaponry, again on a unilateral basis, at the same time as the conventional forces. Of course, this places those people in the West in favor of preserving and improving North Atlantic Pact nuclear arsenals in a difficult situation. This time, Washington, or, to be more exact, a representative of the outgoing government, reacted with a statement whereby this Soviet move should under no circumstances interfere with NATO plans to modernize its tactical nuclear resources. I think words like this are only making life difficult for Reagan's successors, because NATO attachment to tactical nuclear weapons is becoming a danger to U.S. security. The longer these weapons are kept and the greater the degree of computerized control over them, the greater the likelihood that the Americans will be drawn into a nuclear conflict, which may break out in Europe at any time.

At a time when the "Reagan era" is ending and the G. Bush administration is beginning, many observers (including a colleague of mine from IZVESTIYA) are pleased that the new president has presented himself as a "political pragmatist." I agree, but that is only one side of the coin. Experience shows that even avowed pragmatists find it very difficult to avoid being influenced by people who mistrust Soviet intentions.

One of the most frequent mistakes made by such advisers is that they see only one purpose in Soviet action: propaganda. Yet everything that is now happening in Soviet foreign policy is dictated by the irreversible processes occurring inside the country. A renewal of the whole of society and the whole of politics is taking place in the USSR. The alterations that the Kremlin wishes to make to its armaments plans by 1991 are only the beginning of a process leading to a further reshuffle of priorities in accordance with the doctrine of sensible sufficiency. As KOMMUNIST has recently said, it is time the Defense Ministry stopped treating its own tasks as aims in itself, and started to plan its expenditures as "projects of the century."

On 15 February, USSR and U.S. delegations are due to resume in Geneva work on an agreement to reduce strategic offensive weapons by 50 percent. Immediately after assuming office, President George Bush said that he will have to review all aspects of these talks before he states his own position. At the same time, it is difficult not to notice that, just like the Soviet Union, the United States cannot ignore domestic priorities. That means that the fate of the American "project of the century"—the SDI program—should depend not on military rivalry with the USSR, but on the American economy's ability to pay for this financially disastrous program. It is also no secret to anyone that success in reaching an accord on strategic offensive weapons depends to a major extent on whether or not weapons are spread to space.

At a time when the baton of power is being passed in Washington, there are many encouraging words on the subject of continuing the previous line of American foreign policy. Moscow is making it clear all the time that it views this continuation as a chain reaction of common sense and as a restructuring in the spirit of new thinking, which no state can do without today.

FRG Offer to Host Dialog on Military Doctrine Hailed

52000035 Moscow *SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA* in Russian
11 Mar 89 p 5

[M. Knyazkov article: "The West Answers Yes: Consultations Will Be Held in the FRG To Compare Warsaw Pact and NATO Military Doctrines"]

[Text] Speaking recently in Vienna, the head of the West German foreign policy department, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, announced a joint FRG-PPR initiative to carry out this summer a meeting of experts from the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, as well as from neutral and

nonaligned countries, to discuss their military doctrines and other questions of military strategy. "We invite diplomats, military men and scientists to meet in June of this year to exchange opinions on their concepts of security, strategy and military doctrine," emphasized H.-D. Genscher.

The place where this dialog will be held has already been selected—the West German town of Ebenhausen.

Let us recall that almost two years ago, in May of 1987, the Warsaw Pact's military doctrine was approved at a meeting of that alliance's Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. A doctrine with a fundamentally defensive character. At that time the members of the Warsaw Pact proposed to the member states of the North Atlantic alliance that they carry out consultations to compare the military doctrines of both alliances, to analyze their character, and to jointly consider the directions of their further development.

Such a meeting would help to remove the suspicion and mistrust which has accumulated over the years, to attain a better understanding of each others' intentions, and to assure that the concepts and doctrines of the military blocs and of their members are based on defensive premises. The socialist countries also considered that one subject of such consultations could be the imbalances and asymmetries which have taken shape in specific types of armaments and armed forces and the search for ways to remove them.

The leaders of the socialist states then came out in favor of holding such consultations in 1987. But it seemed that at that time the NATO countries were apparently not ready for this. Furthermore, the world was different then.

And now—a step forward. I

U.S. Radar in Norway Said To Violate ABM Treaty

AU0803104489 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
3 Mar 89 p 6

[Article by Lieutenant General Viktor Pavlov: "What Do You Know About Vardo?; The Opinion of an Expert"]

[Text] Moscow (APN)—At the most distant northeastern point in Norway, in the village of Vardo, almost on the border with the USSR, an American radar system, which few people know about, has appeared. They built it in 1986-87.

The radar station has an antenna and is covered by a large semi-spherical dome which emits radio waves. According to the type of radiation, this radar system can be classified among modern radar stations with phased antenna grids [fazovana antenova mrietzka]. It is precisely oriented toward Soviet territory. The most important characteristics (the frequency, length, and number of impulse repetitions, and other features) are very close to the characteristics of the American anti-missile

defense radar station of the STH type which originated within the framework of the "Side Defense" program and which was tested for the interception of Minuteman intercontinental missiles. The new American radar station in Norway can only be classified with difficulty among the devices of national technical control. First and foremost, it can belong to antimissile defense radar systems or, which is less probable, to radar systems for the instantaneous verification of the launching of ballistic missiles. If this supposition is confirmed, we are once more witnesses (after the radar station in Greenland and the construction of a radar station in England) to another violation of the ABM treaty by the United States. The treaty prohibits the siting of antimissile defense radar stations everywhere except in permitted deployment areas of limited antimissile defenses (the Grand Fox or Washington bases) or in antimissile defense firing ranges. If the new radar system belongs to radar stations which give advanced warning of a missile attack it can only be sited within U.S. national borders with an external orientation.

This radar station fits precisely into the monolithic block of the offensive space weapons system, of which it is the first line. It is directed at the destruction of ballistic missiles from a retaliatory strike by the other side (in the active section of their trajectory).

For the discussion of questions which arise in the sphere of observing the ABM treaty and other treaties on the limitation of strategic arms there exists in USSR-American relations a special permanent consultative committee (set up in 1972). Its regular meeting ended recently in Geneva. The short communique on its proceedings does not enable us to evaluate the results for the resolution of these questions. However, as far as we know, the Soviet side raised the question of the radar system in Vardo. At the same time, it was on the agenda for the second time. The American participants of the meeting preferred to keep silent. It is necessary to state here that ignoring the demands for an explanation from the other side is in itself a violation of the agreed procedure on the work of the committee.

When we want to discuss the substance of a developing problem the behavior of the American side gives its partner in the agreement, that is, the USSR, reason to assume the worst.

FRG Said To Develop Nuclear-Capable Enhanced-Range Missiles

52000034 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA
INDUSTRIYA in Russian 16 Mar 89 p 5

[TASS item: "Missile Being Developed"]

[Text] Bonn, 15 Mar—The Bundeswehr command, together with the military-industrial complex, is working out plans to develop [sozdaniye] new air-launched enhanced-range missiles [aviatsionnyye rakety povyshennoy dalnosti], which can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Reports of Possible Japanese CW Facility Viewed
18010381 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
10 Feb 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by APN commentator A. Lazarev "especially for KRSNAYA ZVEZDA": "The Secret of the Island of Okunoshima—Japan Does Not Reject Chemical Weapons Even Today"]

[Text] The small island of Okunoshima is lost among dozens of similar patches of dry land in the Setonaikai—the Japanese Inland Sea—dividing the islands of Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu. One can assert boldly that until recently there were few people in Japan who knew of the existence of this island. The fact is that the island, although its dimensions are not all that small, could not be found on even the most detailed map of Japan. In 1930 Japanese sailing directions indicated that the region was closed to navigation. Local fishermen also tried to keep far from its precipitous shore. Police patrols strictly saw to it that there was no one in the closed zone aside from local inhabitants. They lowered the blinds on trains passing through this area along the shore of the Setonaikai.

The island continued to be shrouded in secrecy for many years. Only quite recently has the name Okunoshima appeared in the pages of Japanese newspapers. This was caused by the fact that the first and only museum of chemical weaponry in Japan was opened on the island. As was related to me by its Director Mr. Murakami, the desire of the Japanese authorities to keep the existence of this corner of Japan secret was caused by the fact that in the 1930s and 1940s a secret plant for the production of chemical munitions was operating here.

In other words Japan, which signed the Geneva Protocol in 1925, was among the countries fighting for a ban on chemical weapons, while in deed, the Japanese militarists could not resist the temptation to have their own cheap but extremely "efficient" weapon. Up to 1,200 tons of lewisite, mustard gas and other poisonous combat substances were produced on Okunoshima.

The production of chemical weapons in and of itself was not a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. This international document, after all, banned only the use of poisonous combat substances. But Japan did violate the protocol. The Japanese Imperial Army actively tested chemical weapons on people and used them widely in combat operations. Some 26 experimental centers for studying the destructive power of chemical and bacteriological weapons staffed by over 10,000 people were spread across Manchuria and China. The atrocities of the Japanese "doctors" from Detachment 781 based near the Chinese city of Harbin have become widely known to world society. World society, but not Japanese society. The Japanese Ministry of Education still will not permit mentions of Detachment 781 and the plant on the island of Okunoshima in history textbooks under the pretext that these data are "not yet adequately proven." Japanese researchers meanwhile acknowledge that a

minimum of 2,000 people perished and 35,000 Chinese soldiers were seriously wounded as a result of the application of chemical munitions by the Imperial Army.

The reluctance of Japanese authorities to make public the documents on the scope of the application of chemical weapons by the Japanese Army on the eve of and during the war in the Pacific testifies more than a desire to conceal the dark pages of the history of the country. Scholars and journalists have repeatedly expressed the opinion that the list of violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is not exhausted by the history of Okunoshima.

The United States, as is well known, protected many Japanese war criminals, including some who were connected with the production and employment of chemical weapons, from their just retribution. They transferred all documentation on this type of weaponry to the Pentagon instead. Many Japanese chemists and bacteriologists moreover moved to the United States, where they continued to work "in their fields." This could probably be considered the first instance of the exchange of military technology between the United States and Japan.

Today the Pentagon and NDF (National Defense Forces) are conducting joint studies in the course of which they are developing various methods for handling poisonous substances. Two years ago the Japanese press (very timidly, it is true) acknowledged that the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" have included in their tactics operations under the conditions of the use of chemical weapons. The corresponding chemical subunits have been introduced into every Japanese division. Gas masks and special rubber capes have been issued to each soldier. The naval vessels of Japan have been equipped with special degassing and decontamination equipment since 1988. Matters are unfortunately not limited only to anti-chemical protection measures. At one time, referring to NDF sources, the newspaper MAINICHI wrote that toxic gases are considered by the military department to be an ideal weapon for use during the course of regional conflicts and that they are even considering the question of equipping the land, naval and air forces of the country with such weapons "as a countermeasure."

The same MAINICHI in September of 1988 quoted the statement of a Japanese writer and historian occupied with the World War II period, Hisashi Yamanaki, that "the possibility that this research (on the production and employment of chemical weapons) continues through the present and that the government of Japan is striving to keep it secret cannot be ruled out."

An international conference to reinforce the conditions of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on a ban on the use of chemical weapons was held in Paris on January 7-12. One would like to believe that the position of Japan, a representative of which also took part in this conference, will be more consistent in the future than it has been thus far.

American SLBM Tests at the Eastern Test Range Described

18010303n Moscow ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE in Russian No 10, Oct 88 (signed to press 10 Oct 88) pp 63-68

[Article by Captain 1st Rank V. Cherenkov]

[Text] The constant improvement of submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's] is evidence of the unceasing build-up in combat potential of American sea-based strategic nuclear forces. Over the almost 30-year period that nuclear-powered strategic missile submarines [SSBN's] have existed in the U.S. Navy their missile armament has undergone substantial quality changes.

The latest phase in this continuous process involves the adoption of a new generation of ballistic missiles, the Trident II (D-5). According to western press data, this three-stage missile will have a MIRV multiple re-entry vehicle (seven 600-KT or fourteen 150-KT warheads). The design range of fire of the Trident II SLBM is over 11,000 km and the circular error probable is around 100 m. In its characteristics, and chiefly its combat effectiveness, the new missile concedes nothing to modern land-based ICBM's.

The importance of improving SSBN missile armament and keeping it in a combat-ready status dictates the need for rigid monitoring of missile status. The most comprehensive form for checking them consists of missile firings during which missiles are launched with warheads having inert filling. In accordance with the set objectives, these launches can be for test, demonstration and shakedown, and operational training. They are conducted from ground launchers and from SSBN's at ranges, where the appropriate logistic and technical support facilities have been created and the organization for conducting and supporting missile firings has been worked out. Test launches of SLBM's from SSBN's pursue the objective of testing the missile and submarine missile system. Demonstration and shakedown launches of missiles from SSBN's—DASO (Demonstration and Shakedown Operations)—mean the testing of a missile system after completion of submarine construction, after major overhaul or after refitting with a new type of missile. Operational training launches—OT (Operational Tests)—are conducted from combat-ready SSBN's for an integrated check of their level of readiness to employ nuclear missile weapons.

In the United States SLBM launches are carried out at two missile ranges: the Western in the Pacific and the Eastern in the Atlantic. They belong to the American Air Force and are used for testing various missile weapons as well as for launching space objects in the interests of all branches of the Armed Forces and civilian departments.

The Eastern Test Range (sometimes called the John Kennedy Space Center, Fig. 1 [figure not reproduced]) is the most versatile from the standpoint of supporting

SLBM launches. All kinds of launches of any SLBM's are made here, above all test launches from ground launchers during SLBM design-flight tests (Fig. 2 [figure not reproduced]), while the Western Test Range presently supports DASO and OT launches only of Trident I missiles from "Ohio"-Class SSBN's based at the Bangor Naval Base.

Construction of the Eastern Test Range at Cape Canaveral (Florida Peninsula) concluded in 1956. The range's principal facilities take up almost 400 km² and the missile test course extending for around 20,000 km passes over the Atlantic and Indian oceans. There are over 25 fixed tracking stations along the course. Attendant range personnel number over 20,000.

According to foreign press reports, the first launch of a Polaris A-1 SLBM took place on the Eastern Test Range in 1958. Since then there were 42 Polaris A-1, 28 Polaris A-2, 55 Polaris A-3, 25 Poseidon C-3 and 25 Trident I SLBM launches conducted here under the SLBM design-flight test program. Missiles also were launched here from Royal Navy SSBN's.

It is planned to accomplish all 30 Trident II SLBM test launches envisaged by the design-flight test program at this range, including 20 from a ground launcher and 10 from SSBN 734 "Tennessee," the ninth "Ohio"-Class SSBN. Range modernization was completed in late 1986 to prepare it for design-flight tests of the Trident II SLBM. Trident II test launches have been conducted from a ground launcher since January 1987. It is planned to complete them and make the missile operational in 1989.

The basic components of the Eastern Test Range which serve to support SLBM launches are ground facilities on Cape Canaveral and on the east coast of the Florida Peninsula, missile flight tracking equipment (shore stations, ships and aircraft), as well as equipment along the range courses for determining the precise location of splashdown of individual components or fragments of the missile. A special naval detachment has been created at the range, the FBM OTSU-2 (Fleet Ballistic Missile Operations Test Support Unit), which engages in preparation and conduct of SLBM launches. Representatives of Lockheed (the main company for SLBM production) as well as specialists in control and guidance systems from General Electric and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology take a direct part in accomplishing this work and processing data collected during the tests.

The principal facilities on the east coast of the Florida Peninsula (south of Cape Canaveral) are consolidated in a specialized complex which includes a data processing center, missile assembly and checkout area, and Launch Complex No 46.

Various characteristics read out in all missile test stages—during the ground check, during launch, in flight and at the moment of splashdown—go to the data processing center for analysis. For safety reasons it is located 7 km from the launch complex. The missile

assembly and checkout area is for preparing SLBM's for launch. Two missiles can be assembled and one checked out simultaneously in this area's two special technical buildings.

Launch Complex No 46 was especially created for launching Trident II SLBM's (Fig. 3 [figure not reproduced]). It is located in the immediate vicinity of the Polaris A-3, Poseidon C-3 and Trident I missile launchers. The launch complex includes a launcher, a 20 m mobile service tower for access to the missile on the launch pad in order to check out its assemblies, a hoisting crane, and underground spaces with gear and auxiliary equipment. All launch complex facilities are connected with each other and with the missile assembly and checkout area by railroad tracks.

The FTSS-2 (Flight Test Support System) serves to read telemetry about operation of Trident II missile assemblies during flight tests. It is deployed 150 km south of the Trident II SLBM launch complex in the vicinity of Jonathan Dickinson National Park. Data on missile flight coordinates are issued with the help of the NAVSTAR satellite navigation system. This system also will be used for supporting subsequent OT and DASO launches of the Trident II SLBM. Launches of Trident I missiles were supported by the FTSS-1 system having a similar purpose, with its control center on Grand Bahama Island. It processed data on the status of missile systems and mechanisms in flight which were received from five ground stations located on the U.S. east coast and in the Bermuda, Bahama, and Greater and Lesser Antilles islands.

Missile flights are tracked with the help of technical equipment and if necessary also by visual monitoring from surface vessels and from aircraft assigned to the Eastern Test Range. During launch preparations they are in the missile launch area and at locations of the presumed impact of its individual components. Missile launches at the range are supported by two missile range instrumentation ships, the "Range Sentinel" (T-AGM-22) and "Redstone" (T-AGM-20), which have special equipment for receiving data from telemetric and optical equipment (Fig. 4 [figure not reproduced]). Both vessels are part of the U.S. Navy Military Sealift Command and are based at Everglades, Florida. Their characteristics are given in the table.

Principal Characteristics of Missile Range Instrumentation Ships

Characteristics	"Range Sentinel"	"Redstone"
Year built/refitted	1944/1969	1944/1966
Full displacement, tons	12,170	24,710
Principal dimensions, m:		
Length	138.7	181.4
beam	18.9	22.9
Draft	7.9	7.6
Speed, knots	17.7	14.0
Crew	81	165

In addition to the vessels, ballistic missile flights are observed from eight EC-135 ARIA (Advanced Range Instrumentation Aircraft) based at Patrick Air Force Base, Florida. According to foreign press data a new aircraft, the EC-18B ARIA, was developed in the United States based on the civilian Boeing 707-320 for missions of tracking various ballistic missile launches (Fig. 5 [figure not reproduced]). Special antennas are accommodated in its nose and wings and there is an on-board computer for processing data collected during the tests. It is also planned to install gear to accurately determine the location of splashdown of fragments and individual components of a missile using the SMILS (Sonobuoy Missile Impact Location System) sonobuoys. There is the capability of refueling the EC-18B ARIA aircraft in the air, which permits increasing its flight endurance. It is also planned to use the new aircraft for tracking unmanned spacecraft and the Shuttle manned spacecrafts. The first EC-18B ARIA aircraft began operating in the interests of the missile range in 1986, and in 1988 it is planned to replace four obsolete EC-135 ARIA's with them.

After planned missile launches from the ground launcher, the design-flight tests conclude with a series of missile firings from SSBN's. Subsequently, after the missiles have become operational, their reliability is checked out during periodic DASO and OT launches from missile submarines.

The submarine designated for conducting the launches is on the Eastern Test Range at the Port Canaveral temporary basing facility during the entire period of testing. Special berths have been prepared here for "Ohio"-Class and "Lafayette"-Class SSBN's.

Missile launches from SSBN's are directed from the range control center, and coordination of interworking of support facilities and the missile submarine is organized through the tracking vessel using special radio nets. The vessel also is assigned tasks of controlling the SSBN, monitoring her precise position at the moment of launch and ensuring navigation safety. On receiving data during a missile's flight about its deviation from the calculated trajectory and system malfunctions, a decision is made on destroying the SLBM by detonation. To conduct a missile launch the submarine arrives in an area 30-50 nm east of Cape Canaveral, accompanied by the tracking vessel. On taking up the desired position, the missile submarine submerges to the prescribed depth and launches the missiles on command from the range control center (Fig. 6 [figure not reproduced]). One missile is launched during each SSBN sortie during design-flight tests.

The preparedness of missile teams and SSBN crews as a whole for missile firings also is checked in the process of preparing and conducting the DASO launches. They may be conducted twice from one submarine (separately by each SSBN crew—"Blue" and "Gold") or once with the involvement of missile teams of both crews.

A missile submarine arrives at Port Canaveral for preparation for DASO firings. The actions of missile teams are checked and their teamwork in conducting missile launches is practiced during preliminary drills and local drills. SLBM launches are made from an area east of Cape Canaveral, as they are for missile design-flight tests. Range support facilities are activated in the usual manner. Throughout the year American SSBN's conduct 7-10 DASO missile launches.

The American press reports that an SSBN is assigned from the alert forces for OT launches. On command, the missile submarine departs the combat patrol area and arrives at the Port Canaveral temporary basing facility, where she replaces 2-4 missiles having nuclear warheads with missiles having warheads with an inert filling and fitted with telemetry equipment. With these missiles aboard, the SSBN puts to sea and after taking up the assigned range area she conducts missile firings on command. All range facilities are deployed to support them, as with test and DASO launches. During the year an average of 5-6 SSBN's conduct OT launches, with approximately 15 missiles expended.

Judging from statements by U.S. Navy command representatives, missile launches from combat-ready SSBN's are performed by operational alert teams under conditions of a situation that approximates combat to the maximum. The real performance characteristics of missiles and data collected here on reliability of functioning of the missile complex and the entire missile system as a whole are used by the U.S. Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Base in Nebraska for developing options for engaging targets in accordance with the SIOP, the integrated operations plan for conducting nuclear war.¹

A constant improvement in sea-based strategic missiles, in which the Eastern Test Range plays a significant role in their testing and in developing operational standards of combat employment, is clear evidence of the unceasing arms race on the part of U.S. militarist circles.

Footnotes

1. For more details on this see ZARUBEZHNOYE VOYENNOYE OBOZRENIYE, No 2, 1987, pp 7-14—Ed.

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U.S., NATO Opposition to Naval Arms Limitation Discussed

52000029 Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 3, Feb 89 pp 29-31

[Article by Captain 2nd Rank V. Myasnikov: "Observers on... the Horizon" or "Why the United States and NATO Are Reluctant to Make Naval Cutbacks"]

[Text] Looking through the eyepiece of the azimuth indicator, correspondent of the British newspaper THE

GUARDIAN, Jonathan Steel asked me: "Well, am I like an observer now?... We laughed heartily because Steel's question was a double entendre understood only by those aboard the hydrographic ship Vizir. Aircraft roared over our masts, just a few hundred meters to port the guns of the patrol escorts were thundering, and antiaircraft missiles criss-crossed the sky in ragged arcs, while off to starboard minesweepers plied back and forth in staggered column across the "mined" water. The Baltic Fleet exercises were in full swing and for the first time (as indeed in general for naval exercises) a group of journalists from the West was present.

However, Jonathan Steel was pointing the azimuth indicator not toward the Soviet ships but toward the far horizon. There.... But more this anon.

In general the naval command at the exercises in the Baltic was expecting not only the western press. For the first time the Soviet side had invited military observers from the United States and the NATO countries to the fleet maneuvers. This was a new step in the extension of confidence-building measures with regard to the activity of the armed forces, this time naval forces. However, those invited to the exercises had not arrived, and this could mean only one thing: it means that you Russians are not going to find out what happens on the bridges of our frigates. So the role of observers was being played only by journalists from Great Britain, the GDR, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the FRG accredited in Moscow. In this way the Soviet side was demonstrating yet again that it is ready for openness also in the field of naval activity. We are not about to start playing games with disarmament. If this process has been initiated on a mutual basis then we must go on to the end.

And the western journalists sensed this situation of trust. They photographed the map of the exercises—the only one of its kind because up to now similar maps have not existed unless stamped "Secret." They were able to ask any question of the headquarters staff aboard the Vizir, and the Baltic Fleet deputy commander for training, Vice Adm Ye. Chebanov. Whether their interest was in the tactical-technical features of the ships and aircraft and the various naval forces taking part in the exercises, or the biography of the Soviet admiral, they received exhaustive answers. The admiral himself was almost permanently surrounded by a ring of microphones and movie cameras.

Even yesterday we could not even imagine that this would be possible... But today it is possible. The time is now probably past when the conditions of interstate mutual relations, including military contacts, were dictated only by politicians and officials. Now life itself is dictating them. And so the stubborn resistance of the U.S. Administration to the start of a cutback, or at least a halt to the naval arms race, is the more unfortunate.

But why did the United States totally destroy an entire class of nuclear-missile weapons (medium-range and shorter-range missiles) but is reluctant even to talk about naval forces?

Back at Reykjavik the American side agreed that in a nuclear war there can be no winner. This means that relying on nuclear weapons as a strategy loses its meaning under present conditions. And the laws of arithmetic come into play. Under the treaty all medium-range and shorter-range missiles are being destroyed: in the USSR 826 medium-range missiles and 926 shorter-range missiles. The figures for the United States are 689 and 170 respectively... We shall not argue about who won here. Common sense won. But as far as the Americans are concerned, the main thing is that they did not lose.

And what if we now approach cutbacks in naval forces using the same yardsticks?... Comparative figures have been published in the press for the U.S. and Soviet navies (see AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA No 24, 1988). From the positions of the Americans ("we must retain our strength in those fields where we have traditionally been stronger") there can be no talk of naval cutbacks.

It was this same logic that dictated the U.S. decision to retain the naval base at Subic Bay and the air base at Clark Field in the Asia-Pacific region. Why, they argue in the Pentagon, should they change to become some kind of Cam Ranh, which cannot be called a naval base.

Remember that the number of ships based simultaneously at the Soviet material-technical supply point at Cam Ranh (in Vietnam) is 10 while at Subic Bay it is 35; the capacity of the oil stores is 7,000 tons and 400,000 tons respectively, and the capacity of the ammunition stores 150 tons and 50,000 tons respectively.

It is this same logic that explains U.S. reluctance to reduce its naval presence in the Mediterranean. Back in 1986 during a visit by the Algerian president to Moscow, M.S. Gorbachev announced that the USSR was ready to withdraw its ships from the Mediterranean in exchange for the same decision by the United States. In March 1988 during a visit to Yugoslavia the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary proposed that from 1 July that year the number of ships of both sides in the Mediterranean be frozen and then a limit set for them... And that proposal was rejected.

Remember that the Mediterranean U.S. 6th Fleet has up to 60 ships, including, as a rule, two aircraft carriers each with an average of 90 aircraft (of which half are nuclear-capable), 5 or 6 nuclear-powered submarines, and air-mobile forces including helicopters and assault ships with a reinforced marine battalion. Moreover, three or four nuclear-powered missile submarines are on constant combat patrol in the Mediterranean.

According to the USSR Navy commander in chief, as a rule one of our cruisers, 4 to 6 large antisubmarine ships or destroyers and up to 5 submarines (some of which are

diesel-powered and none of which carry ballistic missiles) and 10 to 12 support ships are in the Mediterranean.

And now what is perhaps the largest trump card in the hands of those who would like to pursue a "peace" policy from a position of strength. The sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles. It is precisely those missiles that must "equalize" the destruction of the medium-range and shorter-range missiles and the 50-percent cutback in strategic weapons (if such agreement is reached), which include ballistic missiles carried on submarines.

Remember that the Tomahawk in nuclear configuration is capable of delivering a highly accurate strike against 24 land targets at distances up to 2,600 kilometers and with virtually no opposition. [as published] Its onboard computers can guide the missile over such a low-angle trajectory and change its course and altitude so unexpectedly that the Tomahawk is almost invulnerable to radar and antimissile weapons. Sea-launched cruise missiles are already deployed on 30 U.S. nuclear submarines and 17 surface ships.

The mechanics here are simple. If as the result of the treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe no nuclear missiles remain that can reach Soviet territory, then all that needs to be done is bring cruise-missile ships beyond Cyprus (for example, the battleship Iowa alone carries 32 Tomahawks) and they can then strike not only bases of the Black Sea Fleet but all Soviet territory, including Moscow. Tomahawk missiles can be used just as effectively against land targets in the USSR from the Baltic and Barents Seas, the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Japan.

In the United States there is one main reservation, namely, sea-launched cruise missiles cannot be included in the mandate of negotiations to reduce arms since they are not amenable to technical verification (even though if confidence-building measures are extended to naval forces this problem would be eliminated). And the plans are quite large scale: by 1993 to have 4,000 Tomahawks, of which 1,000 will be deployed aboard ships... Where is the potential for "restraint"?

So what was it that had attracted the attention of the British journalist on the Baltic horizon? It turned out that the very observers who had refused to go up on the bridges of the Soviet ships had lost no time in arriving in the area of the exercises aboard the Danish frigate (Offert Fisher), the West German ships Out and (Nekkar) and the Swedish radio intelligence-gathering ship Orion. For example. The (Offert Fisher) came within two miles of us; it could get no closer because of Soviet territorial waters. It was precisely at that moment that I turned to the British GUARDIAN correspondent Jonathan Steel, a journalist from the FRG (Hans-Peter Riza) and reporter (Harald Hamrin) from the Swedish newspaper DAGENS NYHYTER and asked them all the same question: how

did they assess the refusal by observers from the United States and NATO to participate officially in the naval exercises?

(H-P. Riza): "The reason why no observers from western countries have come to these exercises is, I think, that agreements have not yet been fully worked out for observing exercises at sea. Perhaps the American side is not ready for this. But such agreement will be essential in the future. It is essential to pay more attention to each other, and to have better mutual understanding and better trust."

"Even quite recently I could not even dream that I would be meeting with Soviet admirals, even less observing naval maneuvers. I am satisfied at how the commander has shown the exercises, and although I am no expert it is very interesting for me. It would not be a bad thing if Soviet journalists attended our exercises. The mandate for the Geneva talks should include naval forces. I support your commander in this."

J. Steel: "The exchange of observers and journalists as a confidence-building measure seems important to me. It is important to have a special international agreement within the framework of the Stockholm Conference. For one refusal can lead to another. When agreements take effect the arrival of observers will be necessary."

"I think that confidence-building measures must exist not only on land, but also in the air and on the sea. The armed forces are to be found in all three spheres. And if confidence-building measures are not extended to one of those spheres then the feeling of trust in the other spheres will be lost."

(H. Hamrin) refrained from comment.

During the course of these exercises a new step, but not a complete step, was undoubtedly taken in the development of confidence-building measures for the two sides. However, the problem of reducing naval forces remains acute. What will the next step be?

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Recent Soviet Books Attacking SDI Reviewed
00010002k Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 9, Sep 88 (signed to press
29 Aug 88) pp 74-78

[The review, published under the heading "Criticism and Biography," by I.A. Panshin, doctor of technical sciences, professor, Capt 1st Rank L.D. Chernousko of recently published books on Star Wars and SDI: "Star Wars and SDI"; the books reviewed are listed in Footnotes 1-6 at the end of the article]

[Text] Mankind has expected a great deal from the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik. However, the Washington administration has refused to sign the nuclear disarmament treaty over fundamental differences on the "Strategic Defense Initiative" [SDI]. The

U.S. ruling circles have held tightly to the SDI, seeing in it a possibility of developing new plans for nuclear attack on the Soviet Union.

For many years now, both the Soviet and the foreign press has paid great attention to SDI which should provide a new powerful impetus for the strategic arms race, in sharply increasing the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. For this reason new books on this subject written by prominent Soviet scientists and writers are met with great interest by readers. In showing all the lethality for peace of developing the new base of aggression in space as conceived of by the imperialists, they name the possible measures for offsetting the space weapons.

The first book which we would like to present is "Zvezdnyye voyny—bezumiye i prestupleniye" [Star Wars—Folly and Crime], written by the winner of the USSR Lenin and State Prizes, Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy, and Candidate of Legal Sciences A.I. Rudnev.¹ The authors have paid special attention to the questions of the peaceful development of space and the importance of international collaboration in this area in the interests of all peoples. It is emphasized that millions of Soviet people feel practical benefit from the satellites which provide long-distance telephone and telegraph communications, the relaying of television programs and radio broadcasting. From the book we learn that information on remote earth sensing from space is received by more than 800 organizations in our nation. The national economic effect obtained in this has been assessed annually at hundreds of millions of rubles. Satellites helped, the book recalls, in precisely bringing the atomic icebreaker "Arktika" to the North Pole and due to them collaboration is developing successfully among the socialist nations under the Intercosmos Program.

The beneficial joint work of Soviet and American cosmonauts on the spacecraft Soyuz and Apollo was a good example of international collaboration in the peaceful development of space. However, due to the American side, the authors write, a large portion of points in the agreement reached in this area remains unrealized.

The title of the book indicates that Star Wars is a folly and a crime. Yes, precisely the crimes of the American military-industrial complex to all peoples, including its own, for preparing a worldwide thermonuclear fire. For now, the militarization of space brings unprecedentedly high profits for the U.S. capitalists and according to data in the foreign press, the SDI Program should cost from \$1.5 to \$2 trillion. The authors trace the prehistory of SDI the idea for which did not arise in a vacuum. A majority of the satellites launched in the United States are intelligence designed to collect espionage information about many countries. As is pointed out in the book, the Pentagon is planning to outfit the combat orbital stations with X-ray and chemical lasers, and with ray, microwave and other directed-action weapons which supposedly would be capable of hitting any targets on earth, in space and in the airspace.

For developing the various space weapons systems, the United States is intensely conducting nuclear explosions in Nevada. The foreign press has pointed out that at least a thousand nuclear tests should be carried out in the interests of the SDI Program. Washington intends to deploy the first stage of SDI at a forced pace by 1994 and this will include land- and space-based missiles capable of downing the enemy ICBM and warheads.

The authors of the reviewed work draw attention to one other important circumstance: the space weapons race can sharply increase the probability of nuclear war as a result of a "surprise intentional, unprovoked or random outbreak of it" (p. 112). The entire world knows of dangerous instances of disasters and accidents with American bombers carrying nuclear bombs on board, the nuclear submarines, the Titan-2 and Pershing-2 missiles, the Challenger spacecraft as well as numerous instances of false alerts due to technical malfunctions in the U.S. Air Defense System, when the strategic forces were brought to a high state of alert. The book's authors warn that since the space weapons systems are fully automated and the time for activating them is measured in seconds, the probability of the accidental outbreak of a war is sharply increased to extremely dangerous limits.

"The Pentagon is planning," the book points out, "that, having assumed dominant positions in space, the combat orbital stations, like aircraft carriers in the open sea, will become the base of space troops capable of conducting combat in space and from space" (p. 68). This is why in Reykjavik it was not possible to reach agreements on the questions of strategic weapons and medium-range missiles and which could become historic for the fate of mankind. The SDI has a strictly militaristic nature and is aimed at achieving military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The authors link the questions of preventing the militarization of space with the demands of international law and treaty obligations. At the end of the book, the reader will find the texts of the treaties concluded between the USSR and the United States on weapons systems, and in particular the antimissile defense which was a subject of sharp debate in Reykjavik and is presently being subjected to attacks and distorted interpretation by certain circles in Washington. Familiarization with the texts of the treaties convinces one that: "The sinister plans and real deeds of the U.S. ruling circles linked to the Star Wars Program either directly contradict the provisions of the international agreements on space or do not conform to their spirit and undermine the bases of the existing agreements" (p. 119).

In the book by V.S. Avduyevskiy and A.I. Rudnev the imperialist plans for the militarization of space are put in clear opposition to the Soviet program for the peaceful scientific and economic use of space. However, it poorly depicts the military-technical aspect of the problem and in the introduction the authors promise to show how the Pentagon intends to employ attack space weapons in

military actions as they are being developed for this medium. A major shortcoming is also that the book does not have illustrations.

To a significant degree these shortcomings have been eliminated in the book "Zvezdnyye voyny—illyuzii i opasnosti" [Star Wars—Illusions and Dangers].² It shows how the United States on a large scale is building up and improving its offensive nuclear potential. The American strategic forces are receiving qualitatively new weapons systems which have high aiming accuracy, maneuvering individually targeted nuclear warheads. In planning the first "disarming" strike overseas they are counting on a combination of attack space and strategic weapons. Here the clumsy fib is lofted that the USSR has supposedly been long at work on the militarization of space.

The book points out that the Pentagon from the very start of the space age has been viewing near space as a staging area for waging aggressive wars. Thus, the United States was the first nation to test in 1959 an antisatellite weapon: a missile launched from a B-47 bomber with the intercepting of the satellite Explorer-6. In the 1960s, on the Pacific islands, ground antisatellite systems were developed based on the Nike-Zeuz and Thor-Agena antimissile missiles. In 1984, two flight testings were conducted of the ASAT aviation missile system developed on the basis of the F-15 fighter. The use of manned spacecraft of the Shuttle type has also assumed an outright military purpose. The book is well illustrated with 12 colored drawings and diagrams. On a double-page spread, they show a version of the antimissile system being developed in the United States and this is a component part of the potential of a first nuclear strike.

The lessons of history teach that it is essential to struggle against a military threat before weapons are used. If the United States begins to militarize space and thereby sets out to undermine the existing military-strategic equilibrium, the Soviet Union will be left with no choice but to take measures in response (p. 54). The USSR has always found a proper response to any threat to its security. This was the case with nuclear weapons, intercontinental strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, multiple individually targetable warheads and, finally, long-range cruise missiles. Our nation possesses sufficient intellectual, scientific-technical and industrial potential for this.

For the meanwhile, official Washington is extolling the SDI which will supposedly protect the United States as a dependable "shield" against ballistic retaliatory missiles. The dialectics of the development of weapons systems shows that with the present-day level of technical progress, it is impossible to develop an "absolute weapon" which the SDI developers are dreaming of in accounting that they will make the "enemy ICBM unnecessary and senseless."

Let us now give the floor to the members of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War who have prepared the book

"Kosmicheskoye oruzhiye: dilemma bezopasnosti" [Space Weapons: The Dilemma of Security].³ This emphasizes "in order that the strategic forces of one of the sides could carry out the mission of causing unacceptable damage to the other side in a retaliatory strike, their effectiveness as measured by the ratio of the number of nuclear warheads reaching the designated targets to their initial number can be just 1 percent or even less" (p 137). The Pentagon "shield" on which so many hopes are being placed overseas could not repel 99 percent of the retaliatory strikes. Even 1 percent of lethal retaliation is sufficient for the aggressor.

American specialists have also pointed out possible shortcomings, failings and weak points in the system. Among these they mention first of all the great complexity in orbiting the combat spacecraft and there should be from several hundred to several-score thousand of them and in contrast the comparative simplicity of determining the trajectories and their location. The Americans themselves recognize that the electronic "nervous system" of the SDI is very vulnerable and even at present it is not hard to find active devices for its disruption or complete disabling. Foreign specialists feel that it would be possible to develop devices for the direct hitting and neutralization of the SDI component elements. A system of spacecraft, the book emphasizes, would be very vulnerable in terms of different types of weapons. For example, there could be various-based small missiles, a ground laser weapon, specially launched clouds of space "shrapnel" as well as satellite "mines" guided to the combat spacecraft.

In the reviewed books, the conclusion is drawn that the SDI Program is an equation with many scientific-technical and military-political unknowns. However, even now it is clear that the continuation of this program will involve the world in an unprecedented arms race and destabilize the strategic situation and substantially impede the talks between the USSR and the United States. Washington has already involved in its "starry" adventure its NATO allies of England, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and West Germany as well as Japan and Israel with the intention of making maximum use of the scientific and technical potential of these countries.

The Soviet and American leaders have proclaimed that in a nuclear war there can be no victors! For this reason, it is essential to work to eliminate nuclear weapons. The Soviet-American meeting in Reykjavik showed a real opportunity to reach agreement in this area. The Washington administration, as is emphasized in the reviewed books, must show a new, constructive approach to the question in which all mankind is interested in an affirmative solution.

In 1987, the collection was published "SOI—amerikanskaya programma 'zvezdnykh voyn'" [SDI—The American Star Wars Program]⁴ prepared by the collective of Soviet scientists from the United States and Canada Institute as well as the Space Research Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences. The authors of the

collective—Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, Doctor of Historical Sciences A.A. Kokoshin, Candidates of Sciences A.A. Vasilyev, M.I. Gerashev, S.A. Kulik and S.N. Rodionov—have done great work in reviewing and analyzing around 200 U.S. official documents, monographs and articles by foreign authors devoted to the history of SDI.

In analyzing the course of development of various weapons under the SDI Program, the authors of the collection have pointed out: "The technical level of development in all these weapons over the near future remains clearly insufficient for carrying out the task posed by the U.S. administration of developing an absolutely dependable antimissile defense for the territory of the United States" (p 110). The American specialists themselves recognize that even major achievements in any technical area will scarcely provide any substantial change in the current situation.

In considering all the arguments by the overseas supporters and opponents of SDI, the collection concludes that with the aid of this program Washington is endeavoring to resolve the political problems of relations with the USSR as was clearly confirmed by the summit meeting in Reykjavik. At the same time, the Soviet Union proposes to follow a path of lessening tension and confrontation between the two countries and to set out on a policy of limiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, strengthening mutual security and abandoning the militarization of space.

In taking up the possible consequences of developing SDI for U.S. relations with its NATO allies, the authors point out: "The arguments about an American (NATO) 'shield' covering Western Europe are groundless. There is every reason to assume that the real plan of the American strategists is, under conditions of a crisis situation, to cover the United States against a retaliatory strike by using the 'shield' while Europe is to be employed as an arena for conducting military operations" (p 321).

From the materials of the collection it becomes clear that the SDI System is not of a defensive but rather offensive nature. Combined with the strategic triad, it is designed for an aggressive first strike against the Soviet Union.

From the day of the announcing of the SDI Program, the Washington administration has steadily asserted that finally a universal means has been found for saving the world from nuclear war and that in the not distant future weapons of mass destruction will become senseless. The campaign to extol the SDI has involved highly-placed officials, representatives of the military-industrial complex and the Pentagon as well as journalists.

However, in the United States and Western Europe, there are also other people who honestly warn about the danger of shifting the arms race into space and who realize the adventurism of the new militaristic venture in the aims of "absolute" military superiority. This question is the subject of the book by the international

journalist A.A. Shalnev entitled "Zvezdnyye voyny: chto dumayut amerikantsy" [Star Wars: What the Americans Think].⁵

The author has worked for a long time in the United States as a TASS correspondent and a special correspondent for IZVESTIYA and knows well what is being written overseas about SDI and how. Thus, the leader of the American Committee for East-West Accord E. Salk feels that the Star Wars Program is "purest folly" (p 56). The militarization of space opens up a new terrible page in the arms race, it complicates completely the international situation and strengthens the threat of global nuclear confrontation. One must also recognize the logic of Congressman E. Markey who commented: "The SDI is designed not at all to protect the population but rather for protecting American ballistic missiles" (p 63).

"The SDI is a deception of mankind and an abuse of scientific forces," was how the West German natural scientists put it. "Absolute protection against nuclear weapons cannot be realized technically and on this we are in complete agreement with numerous specialists from the United States and the Soviet Union. Defense against nuclear weapons is impossible. Only disarmament in the nuclear area can provide effective defense" (p 73). It would be possible to give many such clear-headed arguments which have appeared on both sides of the Atlantic.

Even such figures as the former President J. Carter and the former Secretaries of Defense C. Clifford and R. MacNamara have ended up in opposition to the Reagan program for the militarization of space (pp 103, 114, 206), as well as many American scientists who have refused to participate in the implementation of SDI, considering it harmful for the cause of peace and disarmament.

Mankind breathed easier learning about the signing of the Treaty on Medium- and Shorter-Range Missiles between the United States and USSR. For the first time, the question has been resolved not to increase but rather to reduce nuclear missile weapons. A real prerequisite has been established for an important agreement to halve strategic offensive weapons. Seemingly, in the spirit of the new thinking, Washington must now close down its SDI Program. Certainly if things are leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, then why build a grandiose defense against them? However, the overseas militarists have their own plans. These have been described in the book "Kosmicheskaya ruletka Pentagona" [The Pentagon's Space Roulette]⁶ written by Candidate of Technical Sciences, Maj Gen V.S. Belous. This book examines the true goals of SDI and the plans of the U.S. military-industrial complex to develop an arms race of unprecedented scope on the earth and extend this into space.

The book emphasizes: "The desire to establish superiority in space is closely linked to the American 'doctrine of neoglobalism'" (p 59). But SDI is directed primarily

against the USSR. This is happening at a time when the Soviet Union is putting forward one peace initiative after another and proposing a step-by-step plan for eliminating all types of weapons of mass destruction and completely eliminating the threat of nuclear war by the year 2000. Finally, in the course of the Soviet-American summit in Washington, a treaty was signed between the USSR and the United States to eliminate medium- and shorter-range missiles. Seemingly one could expect a policy of mutual disarmament. The book persuasively shows that the Pentagon continues feverishly to develop the SDI components and is conducting various experiments. It is pointed out that certain foreign specialists are hopeful that an X-ray laser can be added to a number of strategic systems. Chemical lasers placed in space on platforms can be used for destroying missiles and for hitting various targets in the atmosphere or on the earth's surface.

"U.S. military experts have estimated," we read in the book, "that the energy supply of one space-based laser is completely sufficient to create around 10,000 fires. If one considers that there will be hundreds of such units in space, one can imagine the scope of the threat hanging over mankind" (p 73).

Under the conditions of the work initiated by the Pentagon on the SDI, the Soviet Union will be forced to undertake retaliatory measures to ensure international security and peace in our world. "If the United States does not abandon the SDI, we do not intend to make it easier for it," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, M.S. Gorbachev. "Our response will be effective, dependable and economic. We have plans on how to neutralize the SDI without spending on this those colossal amounts which the United States has needed to develop it. Let the Americans think again, is it worth exhausting themselves with the SDI. In any event it will not provide a reliable defense."⁷

Footnotes

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CANADA

New Cruise Missile Permission Stirs Controversy

Editorial Calls Testing 'Too Risky'

52200004 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
24 Jan 89 p A14

[Editorial: "The Stealth Cruise Too Risky To Take"]

[Text] Today's scheduled U.S. cruise missile test in Canada sends a bad enough message to a world yearning for peace.

But what message will Canada send if it agrees to test the new and far deadlier generation of American air-launched cruise missiles now lurking over the development horizon?

Unlike the model being tested today—whose lack of speed and limited range supposedly rule out as a first-strike weapon—the advanced cruise model (AGM-129) has characteristics that make it a weapon of surprise attack.

Military analysts point to its radar-evading "stealth" technology, longer range, and ability to penetrate air defences with bursts of high speed as hallmarks of a first-strike attack weapon.

If the Americans put in a formal request to test this advanced model, will Ottawa say yes?

The question is worth asking now, because the stealth model has moved off the drawing boards and into the air. Some initial testing—the U.S. Strategic Air Command refuses to say how much—already has taken place over Nevada.

In the office of Defence Minister Perrin Beatty, all lips are sealed. His staff refused to say even what model of cruise would be tested today although an aide to External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said it's "just a garden variety" cruise, the same model tested several times before in Canada.

When asked if the Americans already have sought permission to test the advanced model in Canada, a spokesperson for Beatty simply read a statement:

"The Canadian government is discussing future cruise missile testing with the United States. If and when there are any decisions or agreements, an announcement will be made at that time," she said.

External Affairs officials acknowledge the differences between the old and new cruise models, but say Ottawa won't decide where it stands until Washington formally asks for tests in Canada. U.S. Embassy officials in Ottawa declined to comment.

Would the American ever try to test the stealth model surreptitiously in Canada? "I think they won't try to

sneak one in," says one External official, agreeing that such skulduggery, if exposed, would embarrass Ottawa.

Rather than leave other nations to wonder where arms control stands as a Canadian priority, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney ought to say no to testing of these aggressive new weapons over Canadian soil.

Coalition of Groups Oppose Testing

52200004 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
2 Feb 89 pp A1, A2

[Article by Tim Harper]

[Text] Ottawa—The Progressive Conservative government has been accused of forfeiting Canadian sovereignty and blocking the path to global disarmament by allowing the United States to test its advanced cruise missile in Canadian skies.

Howls of outrage came from all parts of the country yesterday following the announcement here by new Defence Minister Bill McKnight.

Critics accused Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's government of being out of step with the rest of the world on defence policy.

And they condemned the government for the lack of public debate before the decision was made to allow the testing at Tuesday's meeting of cabinet's priorities and planning committee.

There were signs that Canada's peace movement, which in recent years had grudgingly come to accept the testing of the conventional cruise missile in this country, would be jolted to action by the testing of the highly sophisticated radar-evading "stealth" missile. The missiles won't be armed during the tests.

A coalition organized by the Toronto Disarmament Network delivered an open letter to Mulroney at Tory headquarters in Toronto yesterday. Groups ranging from Greenpeace to the Canadian Peace Pledge Campaign were plotting moves which include a return to active protest at test sites in Alberta.

Strong Disapproval

Even those who supported the original testing of the conventional cruise missile, such as the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, have registered their strong disapproval of the most recent move.

But both McKnight and External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said the government was simply allowing the logical technical progression of testing under the existing 1983 Canada-U.S. agreement, which permits such tests in Canadian airspace.

Clark reminded reporters that, despite encouraging progress on disarmament between the two superpowers,

the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks allow for improved cruise missiles in future arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The Soviets have already tested and launched their version, he said.

Clark said the stealth cruise, known officially as the AGM-129A, is a defensive weapon and said Canada, with its climate and terrain, is the only place it can be tested.

The tests will be carried out before the end of March, and in its initial run it will be nestled under the wing of a B-52 bomber. It is expected to follow the test run of the conventional cruise, which was flown over the Beaufort Sea along the Mackenzie Valley and across northwestern British Columbia and into Alberta.

"It's a contribution we can make to creating a climate which will lead to balanced arms controls," Clark said.

That's how some nuclear weapons have been eliminated, and it's that lesson which Canada is applying in allowing the advanced cruise testing, he said.

'Hawkish' Ally

McKnight called the testing an "important Canadian contribution" to nuclear deterrent.

"At the same time, we support the pursuit of mutual arms reduction, a process that can only move ahead effectively if both sides are dealing from equivalent positions."

Opposition politicians and peace groups took Ottawa's action as a sign the government was fighting a phantom Cold War—one that only the Conservatives seem to think exists.

"Brian Mulroney has now replaced Margaret Thatcher as the most hawkish ally of the United States," said Liberal external affairs critic Andre Ouellet, who was a cabinet minister when the previous Liberal government first approved the U.S. cruise tests.

"Canada should come forward, within NATO, and play a positive role in disarmament, not constantly being a carbon copy and convenient ally to the Americans," Ouellet said.

"We can only lose by helping escalate the arms race," said Toronto New Democrat Dan Heap.

Sheena Lambert of the Canadian Peace Pledge Campaign called yesterday's move a "slap in the face" to the Canadian peace movement.

"Once you say yes once, and you continue to say yes, you forget how to say no," she said. "If we are a sovereign nation, we should be able to assess what is right for our nation and relearn how to say no."

"This government is more concerned about the reaction of the Pentagon than the reaction of Canadian people."

Arms Escalation

In its letter to Mulroney, the Toronto Disarmament Network asks the Prime Minister what has happened to Canada's traditional role of leadership in resolving international tensions.

"Why is that that Canada now seems on the brink of becoming a major part of the international military problem instead of the solution?" the letter asks.

Operation Dismantle, which led the fight against cruise testing in Canada almost five years ago, called the stealth tests an "unacceptable escalation of the arms race."

"This isn't the technology of preventing World War III, it's the technology of fighting it," said network president Ish Theilheimer.

In Whitehorse, Yukon Government Leader Tony Penikett said yesterday he sent a protest letter to McKnight saying the test "completely disregards the interests of the people of the Yukon," Canadian Press reports.

While the current est route doesn't fall over the Yukon, Penikett, campaigning for the Feb 20 territorial election, complained that "we have not even been informed, much less seriously consulted."

'Deterrent to Nuclear War' Seen

52200004 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL
in English 3 Feb 89 p A6

[Editorial: "Cruise Control"]

[Text] Cruise missile testing has enraged some Canadians and made many more desperately anxious about life in the nuclear age. Though the missiles speed unarmed to barren sites, each flight enacts a charade of Armageddon. Our north becomes a practice range for the war of the end of the world.

The debate over Canada's 1983 agreement with the United States to allow the testing of cruise missiles has flared and cooled, and flared again, without leading to a national consensus. Negotiated by a Liberal government headed by Pierre Trudeau, a passionate crusader for disarmament, it is now condemned by opposition Liberals and New Democrats.

Throughout this period, the Canadian government has argued that it permits the testing because cruise missiles are a deterrent to nuclear warfare. Canada is under no obligation to allow these flights, beyond the understanding that all those countries that are sheltered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella owe a debt that must somehow be discharged.

The cruise missiles that have been tested until now in Canada are subsonic weapons that can be mounted on bomber aircraft. Their voyage of destruction is measured

in hours rather than minutes, and for that reason they are regarded as retaliatory rather than a first-strike weapon. Their advantage lies in the fact that they can be borne aloft as soon as incoming missiles are sighted, unlike silo-bound intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can cross half the earth in 30 minutes once they are in flight but take hours to get started. Cruise missiles ensure that nuclear war will be unwinnable; they will survive a surprise attack and rain horror down upon the aggressor.

The United States now wants Canada to allow it to test what it calls the next generation of cruise missiles. The AGM-129A incorporates new Stealth design technology that makes the missiles more difficult to detect by radar. The U.S. request went to the first meeting of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney's new cabinet and received immediate assent.

The decision has reanimated the cruise missile debate. Critics argue that the Stealth cruise missile, unlike its predecessor, is a first-strike weapon, an aggressor's tool that will escalate tensions. This view is founded on the belief that Stealth technology will allow undetectable attack. Opponents of the weapon, and the testing, say this new capacity will dangerously alter the balance of terror.

Others argue that the Canadian cabinet should pause longer over such an important request. Many Canadians have been impressed by the initiatives Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has taken to advance the cause of peace and bring an end to an anxious era of suspicion and hostility. They ask that their country too show its commitment to peace.

Canadian government officials reply that the Stealth cruise missile remains a retaliatory weapon, a little more credible against ever-imposing Soviet defences, but unable to deceive the radar during the entire course of its sluggardly five-hour flight across the steppes. The Soviets are said to have developed a supersonic cruise missile, not so deceptive as the Stealth cruise but much faster.

Vigorous debate about how best to maintain peace and avoid Armageddon is vital, healthy and sane. But there is no reason to suspect that the United States has abandoned its vow never to initiate hostilities. Canada and its allies remain committed to a policy of pursuing technological advances which ensure the power of deterrence, while negotiating to remove those terrible weapons from the earth. Strategic arms reduction talks resume Feb. 15.

'Sneaky' Decision Called 'Outrage'

52200004 Toronto THE TORONTO STAR in English
3 Feb 89 p A26

[Editorial: Canada to U.S.: Ready, Aye Ready"]

[Text] Now we know. Just three days before leaving the White House, U.S. President Ronald Reagan made one final request of his old pal, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney.

On Jan 17, he formally asked for permission to test the Pentagon's latest wonder weapon, the stealth cruise missile, in Canadian skies. Only 16 days later, Ottawa had a formal reply for Reagan's successor, George Bush.

It was "Ready, aye ready."

So, with Parliament in a deep winter's slumber, American bombers next month are scheduled to make two test flights with this new weapon that, unlike its predecessors, is capable of surprise nuclear strikes.

The sneaky way in which Ottawa made the decision is, quite frankly, an outrage. Evidently, the Prime Minister felt no need to consult Canadians—or Parliament—before hastily committing them to this decision.

Nor was it helpful for one External Affairs Official to compare the secret dolphin-shaped missile to a "1989 model of a 1983 Chevrolet." People have more intelligence than to fall for that kind of bafflegab.

Mulroney's acquiescence in the development of this radar-evading missile is exactly the wrong foreign policy signal from Canada. It's a disturbing reaction to the announced 10 percent cut in Soviet armed forces and the removal of six tank divisions from Europe.

Indeed, many Canadians may find it astonishing that Ottawa continues to cling to the Cold War mentality that permeated former defence minister Perrin Beatty's 1987 defence white paper. Here's how he portrayed East-West relations:

"It is a fact, not a matter of interpretation, that the West is faced with an ideological, political and economic adversary whose explicit long-term aim is to mold the world in its own image. That adversary has at its disposal massive military forces and a proven willingness to use force, both at home and abroad, to achieve political objectives."

Contrast that bleak outlook with this analysis by Geoffrey Pearson, former Canadian ambassador to Moscow, in his final report as head of the government-funded Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.

"East-West relations continued to improve in 1988, aided in large part by Soviet actions as well as words. There can now be little doubt that, whatever the reasons, Soviet 'new thinking' about foreign policy is genuine."

Elsewhere, Pearson calls for a reconsideration of Western defence policies, Ottawa's included. He says that "Canada is in a good position to press the view that future security is more likely to be found in co-operative measures to deal with global problems."

Saying yes to Reagan's last request is the wrong kind of co-operation.

Payoff for Acid Rain Reduction Seen

52200004 Vancouver *THE SUN* in English
3 Feb 89 p A14

[Editorial: "Stealth Indeed"]

[Text] It looks as if President George Bush will bear glad tidings for Prime Minister Brian Mulroney when he visits Ottawa next week. His nominee for head of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, William Reilly, has put a program to reduce acid rain at the top of his list of priorities.

Mr. Reilly says he's preparing a bill to strengthen the Clean Air Act that will include a specific goal for reduced pollution, something Mr. Mulroney's government has long sought but the Reagan administration would never agree to.

The question now is, what will President Bush ask in return? Well, perhaps he has already received it. The Canadian government agreed a little too readily to a U.S. request to test a "stealth" model of the cruise missile in Canada. The pollution of Canadian skies by the products of American industry is not limited to acid rain.

Soviet Embassy Spokesman Cited

52200004 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
3 Feb 89 p A11

[Article by Tim Harper: "Soviets Attack Decision To Allow New Cruise Tests"]

[Text] Ottawa—The Soviet Union believes Canada's decision to allow testing over its territory of an advanced American cruise missile is illogical and "a fossil from the Cold War" era, an embassy spokesman says.

Igor Lobanov said the embassy expressed its dissatisfaction with external affairs officials Wednesday, soon after Defence Minister Bill McKnight announced Canada would allow the testing of the so-called stealth cruise missile.

"This move by Canada is unprovoked and unnecessary," Lobanov said yesterday.

He also joined opposition politicians and peace activists in claiming the government of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney is moving away from world thinking on disarmament.

"I think it is correct to say Canada is out of step with today's attitudes in the world. This reflects old thinking on arms control. This thinking that strength is the only deterrent is illogical and this policy is outdated."

Out of Step

Lobanov said he was speaking out because External Affairs Minister Joe Clark specifically mentioned Moscow when he was explaining to reporters Wednesday how long it would take the advanced cruise to reach a target from North America.

Although Lobanov said he didn't want to overly dramatize the U.S.-S.R.'s reaction, he was blunt in his appraisal of the Canadian move.

"This kind of decision does not further develop our relations," he said. "It doesn't help the world find a solution in arms control.... But we realize the new (Soviet) mentality here has a long way to go to be recognized."

He said Canada's previous position on arms control has been devalued.

Canadian officials have tried to portray the advanced cruise, known as the AGM-129A, as a simple update of the cruise missile that has been tested in Canada since a 1983 treaty between the two countries first allowed such testing.

They also say the advanced cruise is not a first-strike weapon—that is, one used aggressively to prevent an opponent from mounting a counterattack—but defence analysts dispute that.

Analysts agree with defence officials who say it would take five to six hours for the advanced cruise to reach Moscow from North America, but say it could be used as first-strike because, as the name "stealth" implies, it would be undetectable by radar for most of that time.

Elude Radar

Lobanov said his country is "very clear and open" in its policy toward its own cruise missiles. He said the Soviets have invited close verification of its testing, but Moscow favors a ban on the missiles as a further step toward arms reduction.

Clark reminded reporters Wednesday that despite encouraging progress on disarmament between the two superpowers, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks allows for improved cruise missiles in future arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Also yesterday, the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament said the government should press Washington and Moscow to negotiate limits on the modernization of cruise missiles, Canadian Press reports.

This should be done instead of allowing the U.S. to test an improved missile over Canada, the centre said.

Serious Problem

The centre noted that the government was told many times over the last two years that cruise missile modernization is regarded as a serious arms control problem by many informed Canadians.

"What is needed is a forthright statement by the external affairs minister setting out Canada's position on the modernization of cruise technology and indicating how far the government is prepared to go in permitting U.S. cruise missile tests in Canada," the centre said.

It also called for a comprehensive review of Canadian defence and arms control policies that would include hearings across the country to listen to a full range of views from Canadians.

EDMONTON JOURNAL Urges Public Debate

52200005 Toronto *THE SUNDAY STAR* in English
12 Feb 89 p B2

[Text] The following is excerpted from an editorial that appeared in EDMONTON JOURNAL on 3 February.

It is wrong of Canada to agree to new cruise missile tests without a substantial public debate.

The long-advanced rationale for testing the cruise is that it is part of our collective defence obligation, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

The superpowers have a treaty in place to withdraw cruise and similar missiles from Europe, where their use had been envisioned. Is the cruise missile still important to NATO? Or is the new round of testing simply a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States? If it is the latter, the Canadian decision is nothing more than a present to new U.S. President George Bush.

The question Canadians must consider is whether our country is in any way obligated to test the cruise, if it is not part of our NATO commitment. We like to project the image of a peacemaker and conciliator in international affairs. But developing and testing a new generation of the nuclear-warhead carrier could be taken as an escalation of the nuclear arms race.

For that reason alone, the swift approval of the testing is suspect. There was no time for public input, no chance for a parliamentary discussion.

The very purpose of cruise missiles is to deliver a nuclear weapon that is difficult to detect, because it hugs the ground. Stealth capability would enable it to hide from radar.

If a cruise is not something "that would come by surprise," why are hundreds of millions of dollars being spent to produce the weapons?

Editorial Hits 'Doublespeak in Ottawa'

52200005 Toronto *THE TORONTO STAR* in English
14 Feb 89 p A14

[Text] More doublespeak in Ottawa.

Early this month, the Progressive Conservatives hastily agreed to let U.S. Air Force bombers test the advanced stealth cruise missile in our northwestern skies.

But in public statements and press releases they don't call it a stealth missile, even though the term is routinely used by U.S. military analysts, commentators and publications such as CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY.

Apparently trying to downplay Canada's association with this quantum leap in U.S. weapons technology, federal officials have compared the stealth, a nuclear-capable missile with surprise attack capability, to a 1989 update of a 1983 Chevrolet.

Some Chev!

But now, recently-appointed Defence Minister Bill McKnight has carried this silliness a step too far. In a letter to MPs, he insists that "it is by no means a 'stealth' cruise missile" that will be tested in Canada.

He says the radar-evading American missile, to be tested twice next month in our airspace, is just an improved model that "looks very similar to its predecessor," the AGM-86B.

If that's so, why won't Ottawa, or the Pentagon for that matter, publish a photograph of the stealth missile, which is a "black" or secret program—to prove McKnight's point?

Ironically, McKnight also tells MPs that "in the past, inaccurate and incomplete information caused a prolonged and rather sterile national debate" over cruise missile testing.

It would seem he's doing his best to keep the stealth debate as sterile as possible.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Gorbachev Murmansk Initiative on Arctic Security Analyzed

52002416 Hamburg *AUSSENPOLITIK* in German
Jan 89 pp 59-69

[Article by Falk Bomsdorf, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Ebenhausen: "On the Northern Initiative of the Soviet Union"; first paragraph is AUSSENPOLITIK introduction]

[Text] For Dr Falk Bomsdorf from the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [Science and Politics Foundation] in Ebenhausen, the northern initiative of the Soviet Union, that is, the speech of General Secretary Gorbachev in Murmansk and the subsequent statements from Premier

Ryzhkov in Stockholm and Oslo, are examples of how old and new elements are mixing in the current foreign and security policy of the Soviet Union. The civilian part of the initiative aimed at comprehensive cooperation with the northern states and the adjoining areas of the Arctic does indeed bear witness to new thinking. The dominant security-policy part, on the other hand, speaks more for the continuity of old notions in Soviet security policy. Thus, a major part of the proposals for maritime arms control contained in the northern initiative appears to be offensive with respect to the effects of the proposals: Their realization would break open the maritime defense of the Western alliance. The alliance can find an answer to the northern initiative that meets the Soviet proposals objectively and constructively and that is convincing for its own public above all when it goes beyond slogans and agrees to a differentiated approach to maritime arms control, thereby overcoming an aversion in this respect. One can conceive of maritime confidence-building measures that strengthen stability in the north and simultaneously consolidate the unity of the alliance and leave access of Western naval forces to northern waters untouched. In any case, it would be meaningful if it were generally recognized that West and East have substantial security interests in these waters and if this fact were applied in practical politics. The author gives his personal opinion.

I. The Murmansk Program of Action and Its Materialization

General Secretary Gorbachev has applied the new thinking, that is, the new philosophy of the Soviet foreign and security policy, in regional strategic initiatives in three major speeches: in Vladivostok (1986), Murmansk (1987), and Belgrad (1988). The Murmansk speech and the statements by Prime Minister Ryzhkov in Stockholm and Oslo based on this speech are of special importance for Western Europe: The West European states have substantial security and economic interests in the north, the addressee of the Soviet initiative.¹

Gorbachev's Murmansk speech² includes a determination of the content and objectives of future Soviet northern policy as a regional strategic application of the New Thinking to be understood as a program: It is the Soviet Union's "action program"³ for the north of Europe. In this region, Gorbachev sees a looming militarization of a threatening nature, a development that—in his eyes—the West has set into motion. With this background, the Soviet general secretary advocates "the drastic reduction of the level of military confrontation" and "of the dimensions of the military activities in the north as a whole" and presents a specific program for negotiations. It contains first of all security-policy proposals: establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the north, limitation and regulation of maritime activities in northern waters, especially extension of confidence-building measures to the north, and the prohibition of naval activities in zones of internationally used straits and intensively used shipping lanes to be agreed upon. In addition, Gorbachev's program for

negotiations presents proposals involving the economy, environmental protection, commerce and research: agreement on a uniform energy program for northern Europe, cooperation in the development and utilization of resources in the northern shelf of the Soviet Union as well as the Kola Peninsula itself, coordination in the exploration of the Arctic, cooperation in environmental protection in the north, and opening of the northern sea lane for foreign ships.

The application of the Murmansk program of action in Prime Minister Ryzhkov's visits to Sweden and Norway brought, on the one hand, the settlement of the old Soviet-Swedish dispute about the delimitation of the economic zones in the Baltic Sea. On the other hand, they were not successful in resolving the question of demarcation in the Barents Sea, which has likewise long been a matter of dispute between Norway and the Soviet Union. The Soviet side showed no willingness to divide the disputed sea area by way of compromise; instead, referring to what it views as a general "lack of trust" in the North, it proposed the establishment of a "special zone of confidence and of equal partnership" in the disputed sea area, in which Norway and the Soviet Union could work together. The Norwegian side rejected this proposal as unacceptable.

The actual focal point of Prime Minister's Ryzhkov's appearance in Stockholm and Oslo was the "materialization of the Murmansk program."⁴ With this objective, Ryzhkov made specific proposals that in part involved economic cooperation, but primarily questions of security. He began by announcing that in 1988 the Soviet Union will invite observers from the northern countries to one of its maneuvers and put the question of a radical reduction of the military confrontation in the north on the agenda of the second phase of the CSCE. In accordance with a wish of the northern Europeans, one is thereby prepared to include the Barents Sea in the "Zone of Confidence-Building Measures," namely, the Greenland Sea, the North and Baltic seas, and the Norwegian Sea. Beyond that, Prime Minister Ryzhkov repeated the proposal already made in Murmansk by General Secretary Gorbachev for the corresponding consultation between representatives of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and for a preparatory meeting of military experts. At these conferences [he said], the Soviet Union is prepared to enter into agreements on the following proposals:

- Limitation of the number of large maneuvers of naval and air forces in the sea regions in question to one every 2 years,
- Establishment of zones in the western and North Atlantic where the use of antisubmarine forces and resources by NATO and the Warsaw Pact should be prohibited,
- Renunciation of exercises of naval forces in regions through which the important routes of commercial shipping pass as well as in regions that are used intensively for seasonal fishing.

- Prohibition of still to be determined groupings of naval forces in international straits and in their approaches.
- Inclusion of the Baltic approaches (Belte, Sund, and Skagerrak), the English Channel and the waters between Greenland, Iceland, the Faeroes, and Scandinavia in this limiting zone.

II. New Aspects of Soviet Northern Policy

The Soviet northern initiative reveals numerous new aspects in comparison with the previous Soviet attitude toward the northern nations. Heretofore the north was, if anything, neglected by the Soviet Union. With the exception of Finland, high-ranking visitors from the Soviet Union were infrequent; Soviet diplomacy limited itself to making comments and issuing admonitions. Norway and Denmark were constantly denounced for their security policy; Sweden as well was often rebuked for what the Soviets viewed as its inadequate nonalliance policy; and the Soviet leadership sometimes even pointed out the proper political line to Finland, even though it recommended to the northern states that they emulate Finnish policy. The Soviet side is now indicating that in the future it wants to pay more attention to the northern nations and take a pragmatic position relative to the north. This is in line with the fact that in his Murmansk speech Gorbachev expressly praised the contribution that the five northern nations have made to the development of the process of detente in Europe and especially the Danish and Norwegian self-restrictions in the question of the stationing of foreign military forces and the acceptance of nuclear weapons.

In general, the new Soviet leadership seems to be more receptive, as it puts it, to the social climate in the northern states for its new political thinking.⁵ The broad base of the new Soviet northern policy is evidence of this. It is no longer primarily the constant promotion of the thought of a zone free of nuclear weapons that is on the Soviet agenda for the north, as was the case heretofore, but is a comprehensive cooperation in practically all areas of importance. They are thereby appealing not only to the northern states individually or collectively, in accordance with the previous Soviet concept of taking a bilateral or regional approach to disputed questions so as to bring to bear its own superior power. Rather there is an appeal to "all interested states," negotiations are encouraged directly between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in matters relevant to security, and the United States and Canada are being involved in the problems of the north.

In these aspects, it can be said the Soviet northern policy is indeed an expression of the New Thinking in Soviet foreign policy. Establishment of comprehensive security, that is, inclusion of the economy, commerce, the environment, and research; no linkage between broad cooperation and previous resolution of problems in security

policy⁶, avoidance of political and military confrontation; protection of the environment as one of the essential tasks of the future; settlement of disputes through compromise—these demands of the "new philosophy" of Soviet foreign policy are largely met in the northern policy of the current Soviet leadership.

III. Old Thinking: One-Sided Application of the Soviet Proposals

Nevertheless, Soviet proposals show characteristics that raise doubts as to whether the Murmansk action program and the subsequent Soviet proposals are, as Soviet analysts say, really "new political thinking with respect to the problems of security and cooperation in the north."⁷ To articulate these doubts not only corresponds with the common interests in the East and West in the preservation or restoration of the state of low tension in the north; it also corresponds with the express call of the Soviet side to make "any other ideas and counterproposals"⁸ and, in accordance with another demand of the New Thinking, to enter into dialogue.⁹

An essentially characteristic feature of the new Soviet northern policy that gives reason for further critical inquiries on the part of the West is the dominance of the security problems in the current Soviet initiative, as seen in particular in the form that the Soviet proposals for maritime arms control have taken. Expressed cautiously, these proposals are one-sided and indicate not only a defensive direction but also an orientation that ultimately presents itself as offensive.

For the Soviet side, there are obviously only Western naval forces, especially those of the United States, in the northeast Atlantic. One hears nothing of the Soviet Northern Fleet and its large numbers of surface warships and submarines as well as its strong air components and the huge complex of bases on Kola Peninsula. Accordingly, only the Soviet Union has security interests in this region, which, says the Soviet leadership, must protect itself against the "polar strategy" of the United States.

This attitude is also seen in the arms control measures proposed by the Soviet leadership. This is not so much a matter of the obvious Soviet intention of preventing the realization of the American Maritime Strategy. In this respect, one can view the Soviet proposals as a defensive reaction to the American plans, under which American naval forces are to be stationed well forward even in periods of tension so as to engage the Soviet fleet in the event of war right before their door, so to speak, and thereby move against their bases on Kola Peninsula as well. What is meant, rather, is that the Soviet proposals, seen objectively, are also to be evaluated as offensively oriented. Their realization would prevent NATO from fulfilling the minimum requirements for a maritime defense, namely the prevention of an advance of the Soviet naval forces into the Atlantic through the interdiction of the waters between Greenland, Iceland, and Norway as well as the Baltic Sea. This would put the Atlantic sea communications lines—the life line of the

alliance—in extreme danger. Beyond that, the inclusion of the English Channel in a future limiting zone as proposed by the Soviets would make the defense of the access lanes to the western Atlantic ports difficult or impossible. And the establishment of sanctuaries for strategic submarines, as reasonable as this might be with a view to strategic stability, would—in the event that the other measures are implemented—free the Soviet Union's attack submarines for offensive tasks, submarines that otherwise would have to be held back to protect the Soviet nuclear second-strike potential. Furthermore, and most serious for the NATO member, Norway, the Soviet proposals amount to making the Norwegian Sea if not a *mare sovieticum* then in any case a sea region in which the naval forces of the NATO states would hardly be present. A strengthening of Norway by sea, indispensable for the country's defense, would thereby be made even more difficult than is already the case. Finally, the specific form of the proposals does not restrict the Soviet maritime offensive capability in any way: To be sure, the Barents Sea is included in the scope of the zone for maritime confidence-building measures; but neither it nor its outlets, that is, the passage between North Cape and Spitzbergen or Bear Island, is included in the list of waters in which concentrations of fleet groupings are supposed to be forbidden. That is understandable, for here the Soviet Union must defend itself against potential attacks. On the other hand, however, NATO is supposed to be forbidden to develop a sea defense in the corresponding key maritime regions.

In this last point, one sees a general characteristic of the Soviet proposals: Formally they are designed symmetrically, that is, they apply to both sides equally; in material terms, however, their effects are asymmetrical, that is, they effect the two sides unequally. In crisis situations, NATO would be prohibited from occupying its maritime defensive lines in adequate strength. In contrast, the Soviet Union could concentrate its Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea and send its submarines to the Atlantic, whose approaches could be defended only inadequately by NATO because of the arms control agreements. With this background, the Western alliance would be left with nothing more to do in a crisis than to violate the corresponding agreements at an early point in time. The maritime arms control measures proposed by the Soviet Union thus act not only asymmetrically in that they reduce the West's defensive capability and increase the Soviet offensive capability; more than that, they impair stability in a crisis in that they make it necessary to take early military action instead of strengthening the possibilities for military restraint.

There is no need for exhaustive analyses to determine that the security part of the Soviet northern initiative has little to do with the postulates of the New Thinking. It is neither clear how, in accordance with a fundamental principle of the New Thinking, security can be established primarily through political means nor is there any talk of mutual security, as called for by the New Thinking; in this connection, one searches in vain for a

consideration of the security interests of the northern states or of NATO.¹⁰ Thus there is a clear discrepancy between the civilian and military part of the Soviet thrust and one asks what motives induced the Soviet leadership to take such an unbalanced initiative.

IV. Motives and Objectives of the Soviet Northern Initiative

The twofold nature of the Soviet initiative appears to correspond with a double motivation of the Soviet leadership: The Soviet Union was obviously induced by security concerns and economic and technological necessities to make its thrust. With respect to security policy, the main motive involves fears that the American Maritime Strategy evokes for the Soviet leadership. In the late 1980's, the Soviet Union sees itself confronted with a situation that it finds new as well as disturbing. The United States, the principle antagonist and potential enemy in a regional as well as global conflict, has adopted and—through the corresponding shipbuilding program—implemented a maritime strategy that is declared to be offensive and essentially is just that. Thus, *mutatis mutandis*, the USSR finds itself in a situation with which the West European NATO states have long been familiar, namely, being adjacent to a state whose military posture is offensive. The fact that in the case of Western Europe the Soviet Union declares that its posture is no threat, because its military doctrine is defensive, is no more reassuring to the West European NATO states than the assurance of the United States that its Maritime Strategy serves defense only. With this background, the Soviet leadership obviously feels that the United States wanted to reopen a classical attack route and put the greatest strategic assets of the USSR under a conventional as well as nuclear risk.

The Soviet leadership's interest in the transfer of technology and know-how from the West seems to be decisive for the civilian part of the Soviet northern initiative. Through cooperation with Western enterprises, their own economy is supposed to acquire capabilities that are one of the preconditions for the success of the economic *perestroika*. Beyond that, the Soviet Union seems to be interested in the rapid development of energy resources in the Barents Sea. To be sure, there is currently a great deal of uncertainty about the underlying economic conditions; but quite against the logic under which the Western oil companies operate, the prospects of further-falling or stagnant oil prices may well induce the Soviet leadership to look for new production areas: Only through increased deliveries of oil to the West can the Soviet Union meet its large and still-growing need for foreign exchange.¹¹ With these prospects, the Barents Sea may well play an important role in the Soviet plans.

In its overall orientation, the northern initiative takes into account the complex Soviet motives. Moreover, its military part is so structured that—as one can so often ascertain in Soviet military thrusts—it simultaneously serves other foreign and security-policy objectives of the Soviet Union.

The main objective of the USSR is to prevent the United States and the Western alliance from utilizing the north and its waters for offensive purposes but, at the same time, to reserve for itself, in turn, the possibility of pushing forward from the northern waters to the south into the Atlantic. Overall, then, the Oslo and Murmansk proposals are an expression of the old Soviet strategy, which heretofore has been to deny the other side the maritime advance into its own vital waters as well as into the heart of its own territory while simultaneously opening for itself access to the world ocean from a maritime border area.¹² In this respect, the current Soviet northern policy fits perfectly into the diplomacy of peace zones and sanctuaries that the Soviet Union has promoted heretofore and that General Secretary Gorbachev is continuing to pursue—this is shown by the Vladivostok and Belgrade initiatives that are to be seen as related to the Murmansk initiative—although a great deal more seriously than his predecessors. Secondary operational and tactical objectives of the Soviet northern initiative are subordinate to this main strategic objective. The public in the West is supposed to sense “the ice-cold breath of the Pentagon’s ‘polar strategy’” (Gorbachev) and be shown through broad proposals that it is a matter of comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union in the north. At the same time, the intention is to prevent NATO, as the Soviet side fears, from compensating for the loss of land-based nuclear intermediate-range systems through the supplemental stationing of the appropriate systems in the North Atlantic.¹³ Beyond that, the USSR is interested in softening up NATO’s negative attitude toward maritime arms control indirectly through the north, where, to a certain extent, there is an inclination to accept such measures. In addition, the Soviet Union appears to want to establish a negotiating position with its northern initiative; with a view to the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, one is seeing in the Soviet military leadership the tendency to present what the Soviets view as the greatly superior naval forces of NATO as a quantity that the USSR should have a right to compensate.¹⁴ Finally, it also appears that a specific negotiation context includes the accommodation of the English Channel and possibly the Baltic Sea approaches in the zone where the concentration of naval forces is supposed to be forbidden. Both positions, unacceptable to the West, can be abandoned in specific negotiations or in their formation phase in order, as it appears, to secure the actual objective of the USSR: no inclusion of the northeastern access to the Norwegian Sea (waters between Spitzbergen and northern Norway) in the forbidden zone and prohibition of the concentration of naval forces with an offensive capability in the strait between Greenland, Iceland, and Scandinavia.

Beyond these objectives, is the northern initiative supposed to be a political signal to the West by the Soviet leadership? Is the West supposed to be given to understand that in the future, in the scope of a general reorientation of the Soviet naval forces¹⁵, the Soviet Northern Fleet will also be dedicated to defensive tasks

alone? In this case, the northern initiative would be the cryptic notification of the Soviet intention to withdraw the Northern Fleet to the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, with the equally cryptic message to the Western alliance that it should not advance but withdraw its maritime defense. A signal of this content would show the one-sidedness of the northern initiative in a somewhat different light (without eliminating it, however); such a message would also be in line with the security policy advocated by the current Soviet leadership. In this respect, however, one can do no more than speculate: The northern initiative of the Soviet Union is too vague for it to allow clear statements on the possible changes in Soviet naval strategy indicated here.

V. On a Western Response to the Northern Initiative

What might a Western response to the northern initiative look like? As for the civilian area, it should not be difficult to find an answer. Economic cooperation, especially the joint development of the northern energy resources and raw materials of the USSR, could definitely be of interest for the West. The same thing is true for the opening of the north-east passage. In cooperation in the scientific exploration of the Arctic, the West can profit from the rich experience and the high level of the Soviet arctic research. The proposals for environmental protection are doubtless also of interest for the northern nations and beyond: Environmentally harmful emissions emanate from Kola Peninsula on a large scale; in addition, a nuclear power plant of the Chernobyl type is located there.

It is more difficult to answer the question of a Western response to the northern initiative with respect to its dominant security part. On the one hand, the one-sidedness of the proposals makes a constructive approach to the Soviet thrust difficult. On the other hand, if the initiative were to be interpreted as the political declaration of a changed and merely defensive orientation of the Soviet naval forces, the consequences of such an attitude for the Western alliance and especially its member Norway would not be easy to assess. The Norwegian Sea would—this in any case would be in line with the Soviet northern initiative—become a kind of maritime buffer zone between the alliances: with a negligible presence of naval forces, with only one major maneuver every 2 years, but also with the possibility of quickly occupying the Norwegian Sea and especially its northeastern part in the event of crisis or war, a possibility that exists for both sides but that works out to the disadvantage of the alliance. Finally, the fact that NATO and especially its leading power, the United States, have a pronounced aversion to maritime arms control stands in the way of an agreement on the themes expressed in the northern initiative.¹⁶ According to the brief justification generally given, maritime arms control would weaken conventional deterrence, restrict the indispensable freedom of the seas and create insurmountable verification problems. In addition, NATO is dependent upon the sea for

its defense but the Soviet Union can "reach its territorial targets in the event of war without being dependent upon the seas."¹⁷

The official position on maritime arms control, as justified as its basic arguments may be,¹⁸ has meant that NATO does not have a differentiated approach to maritime arms control.¹⁹ It is precisely this fact that makes it so difficult for the alliance to respond convincingly to the Soviet northern initiative. With this background, the West should overcome its apprehension about maritime arms control and establish the preconditions so that it can hold its own in a dialogue with the Soviet Union in this field as well. Such a dialogue can do more good than harm, provided that it is structured sensibly and that the West's own population is well informed about security policy.

It is true that maritime arms control is a double-edged undertaking, in which it is difficult to determine unequivocally when security and stability are promoted and when they are not. Nevertheless, one might ask whether there are not also arms-control solutions for naval forces as well that serve the defensive capability of the Western alliance and simultaneously improve stability in the bordering seas of Europe and thereby in the North Atlantic in particular. These questions should be asked precisely by those in the alliance who are justifiably concerned about the growing capabilities of the Soviet naval forces and the more and more offensive nature of their naval maneuvers in the first half of the 1980's.²⁰ They should ask themselves whether one cannot also turn around the official logic and state that maritime arms control can be in the interests of the Western alliance precisely because it depends upon naval forces for the realization of its strategy.²¹

In the elaboration of an approach to maritime arms control, it would be reasonable for one to remember the fact that arms control was originally designed as a unilateral process, in which the respective planned military measures were to be examined under the criterion of stability. The maritime strategy of the United States, which, to be sure, is valid worldwide but also is an American response to the build-up of the Soviet fleet in the north, does not necessarily indicate such a position. In the future, it would be a matter of modifying this strategy in such a way that its positively evaluated basic objectives—establishment of deterrence with conventional means, defense of Norway and maintenance of the Atlantic sea lanes—can be achieved without the greatest strategic assets of the Soviet Union being threatened in such a way that involves the danger of an escalation.²² Beyond that, it would be useful if one could bring himself to show political sensibility and verbal reserve in his strategic considerations instead of accompanying them with a martial rhetoric that only be counterproductive.²³ Finally, one should take advantage of Norway's perceptions as the country with the longest experience of all with confidence-building measures in relation to the Soviet Union: if one follows the catalog of criteria developed by the Norwegian side,²⁴ then it should be

possible to conceive of confidence-building measures that do not restrict the access of Western naval forces to northern waters, that document the unity of the alliance and that strengthen stability in the north as a whole.

The impression remains that the Soviet Union's northern initiative in its security-policy part is hardly characterized by the New Thinking of the Soviet foreign and security policy. Just as in the case of the continuing Soviet refusal to come to an agreement with Norway on the demarcation of the disputed waters in the Barents Sea, it appears, rather, to be an example for a far-reaching continuation of the previous Soviet northern policy. The reason for this continuity and the concomitant one-sidedness may be a Soviet perception of Western behavior as it appears to be at this time: The Western alliance is trying to dissuade the Soviet Union from its offensive land capability in central Europe; at the same time, the United States, with a view to northern waters, is stressing the necessity of an offensive capability at sea. The result of this perception, the Soviet northern initiative in the case at hand, then leads to a corresponding viewpoint of the alliance: the Soviet proposals appear as an attempt to create protective zones for the Northern and Baltic fleets and thus to strengthen the maritime offensive capability, while at the same time only verbal curtailments are being made in the offensive capability of the Soviet land forces. Under the current basic political conditions, it should be possible to unravel this mesh of interdependent perceptions, to define one's own interests and to find ways to more stability in the sense of new thinking on both sides. It may be that for the time being precisely talks between the military leadership of both sides are useful in this respect. The beginning was made in July 1988 with the meeting of the highest military representatives of the United States and the USSR.²⁵

Footnotes

1. For an analysis of the interests, compare Heinz Schnepfen: "Die politische Dimension der Arktis" in *EUROPA-ARCHIV*, No 2, 1988, pp 49-58.

2. The speech of General Secretary Gorbachev is printed in *PRAVDA*, 2 October 1987. German [version] in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, 2 October 1987. The speech and its fulfillment through the visits of Prime Minister Ryzhkov in Stockholm and Oslo have heretofore received relatively little attention in Western public opinion—with the exception, of course, of the northern European countries. The only analysis so far in the FRG is the work of Helmut Hubel ("Die sowjetische Politik im hohen Norden" [Soviet Policy in the Far North], *BIOST/DGAP*, Cologne/Bonn 1988). In northern Europe, Arne Olav Brundland has presented the most comprehensive analysis so far ("Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikken og mulige norske svar" [The New Soviet Northern Policy and Conceivable Norwegian Responses] in *INTERNASJONAL POLITIKK*, Nos 2-3, 1988, pp 95-140.

3. According to Prime Minister Ryzhkov, NEUE ZEIT, No 2, 1988, p 11.

4. According to Prime Minister Ryzhkov in his Oslo speech, PRAVDA, 16 January 1988.

5. According to General Secretary Gorbachev in Murmansk.

6. Such linkage can be found neither in the Murmansk speech of General Secretary Gorbachev nor in the Oslo and Stockholm statements of Prime Minister Ryzhkov. So also in Brundtland: "Den nye sovjetiske nordpolitikk," p 104.

7. According to the formulation of J. Deryabin: "Murmanskij rezonans" in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 5, 1988, p 40.

8. According to General Secretary Gorbachev in his Murmansk speech.

9. According to Deryabin in "Murmanskij rezonans," p 49.

10. This statement is also valid for Soviet commentators of the northern initiative. One of the infrequent exceptions is A. Polyukhov, "The Six-Point Program" in NEUE ZEIT, No 41, 1987, p 9: "A disentanglement of the naval forces of the East and West would make it possible to reduce both the fears of NATO with respect to the reliability of the transport of reinforcements from the United States to Western Europe and the concern of the USSR about the fact that the strike units of the U.S. Navy and its allies are cruising in the immediate vicinity of the strategically important Kola Peninsula and densely populated Soviet Baltic republics." Deryabin ("Murmanskijrezonans," p 41), on the other hand, does assert that with the northern initiative the security interests of the northern Europeans are taken into account but he gives no proof of this. For him, the interests of NATO are taken into account through the fact that the Soviet proposals preserve the principle of "equality and equal security." Meanwhile, Marshal Akhromeyev, then Soviet Chief of General Staff, declared that the Soviet Union's proposals do not have the purpose of impairing the security interests of the United States and NATO. No one [he said] is demanding of the United States that it leave its sea lanes unprotected. Compare PRAVDA, 5 September 1988. And Andrey Kozyrev, staff member of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, states in a recent fundamental article that to create a "balance of interests" one must take into account diverse asymmetries. Among the asymmetries is the fact that the United States, in contrast to the USSR, is separated from its vital economic and political partners by the seas. One must therefore take into account the U.S. interest in secure sea routes. Compare Andrey Kozyrev, "Doveriye i balans interesov" [Trust and the Balance of Interests] in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 10, 1988, pp 3-12 (10). These remarkable statements should possibly be seen as a kind of improvement of the Soviet northern

initiative. It thereby remains to be seen how the present acknowledgement of Western security interests will work out specifically.

11. According to Helge Ole Bergesen, Arild Moe and Willy Oestrem, "Soviet Oil and Security Interests in the Barents Sea," London, 1987, pp 9, 103. Arild Moe: "Barentshavet i sovjetisk energipolitikk" in INTERNASJONAL POLITIKK, Nos 2-3, 1988, pp 135-154, especially p 151 and following pages, still assumes, on the other hand, that the Soviet Union is in no hurry to develop the Barents Sea because of the good prospects for Soviet oil production and the falling prices.

12. In this connection, Heinz Schneppen: "Die politische Dimension der Arktis," p 27.

13. This connection is clearly expressed by A. Anatolyev/Ye. Naderhdin: "Sever Yevropy: priglaseniye k dialogu" (The North of Europe: An Invitation to Dialogue) in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, No 11, 1987, p 110: "The Murmansk initiatives are directly linked with the agreement on intermediate-range weapons and with the proposals on the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals. If progress is being made there, then one should allow no concentration of the nuclear danger in northern Europe. The choice of the time for the presentation of the new Soviet proposals is also explained by this linkage."

14. Compare the article of Minister of Defense Yasov in PRAVDA, 8 February 1988. To be sure, Defense Minister Yasov does not always argue in strict agreement with his own logic. Thus, in accordance with the prevailing opinion of Soviet military leaders, he characterizes the balance of land forces in Europe as in equilibrium overall. At the same time, he declares that the NATO naval forces have a significant superiority over the Warsaw Pact. Altogether this must lead to a superiority of NATO. The result of the comprehensive comparison of forces by Defense Minister Yasov is, however, a "general military equilibrium." In accordance with his own logic, he can reach this conclusion only if he either ascribes no importance to the "significant superiority" of NATO in naval forces or sees it as compensated by an equally "significant superiority" of the Warsaw Pact in land forces.

15. There are numerous signs of such a reorientation. Thus the Soviet Union now appears to be sending fewer ships to distant waters, to be carrying out fewer forward sea maneuvers and, in general, to be sending fewer ships to sea than before. In this connection, compare INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 18 July 1988. The program for the construction of offensive aircraft carriers has obviously been abandoned as well. In any case, the carrier "Leonid Brezhnev" conceived for this purpose has been degraded to a "jump deck" carrier. Compare MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, No 12, 1987, p 83 and following pages. It is unclear what these and other changes stand for. There is a tendency in American

defense circles to view them as merely an expression of financial stringency. In Europe, this is likewise seen as a possible reason but they go beyond this and view a changed assessment of the Soviet strategic requirements or a rethinking of the political value of maritime power projection as possible reasons for the observed change.

16. Compare J. Borawski/E. Whitlow: "A Nordic Zone of Peace?" in *NAVAL FORCES*, Vol 8, No 6, 1987, p 12.

17. According to the American Admiral Trost, *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE*, 5 May 1988.

18. Even politicians who do not necessarily share NATO's aversion and consider maritime arms control per se to be sensible warn of a premature inclusion of the naval forces of the superpowers in the negotiations on conventional stability in Europe, because this may just encumber the talks. Compare, for example, the view of Egon Bahr, *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG*, 18 March 1988.

19. According to Borawski/Whitlow: "A Nordic Zone of Peace," p 12.

20. Also according to Borawski/Whitlow, *ibid.*, p 11.

21. Such considerations (and not just financial concerns) may have induced Defense Minister Scholz to express himself positively on maritime disarmament in his first visit to the Federal German Navy. Compare *DIE WELT*, 21 July 1988.

22. There are more and more indications of such an attitude in the American discussion, without however, there being an focus on arms control considerations or even an assumption of the northern security philosophy, that is, the linking of deterrence and appeasement. Compare, for example, William S. Lind: "The Maritime Strategy 1988, Bad Strategy?" in *PROCEEDINGS U.S. NAVAL INSTITUTE*, February 1988, pp 54-61; D.J. Pav: "The U.S. Navy and the Defence of Europe" in *NAVAL FORCES*, Vol 9, No 1 (1988), pp 28-35. Compare also the critical comments of John Erickson: "The Northern Theater of War and the Soviet Options" in *DEUTSCHES MARINE INSTITUT* (publisher): "Norddeuropa—Ausfalltor der Sowjetunion zu den Weltmeeren" [Northern Europe—The Soviet Union's Access to the World Seas], 1985, p 48 and following pages.

23. This rhetoric can be found above all in the United States but sometimes in Western Europe as well.

24. Compare Johan Holst: "Norwegian Defence Policies for the 1990's: A Conceptual Framework," speech in Copenhagen on 21 March 1988, in: *CURRENT DEFENCE ISSUES*, MOD Norway, No 488, p 11 and following pages.

25. It thereby appears, however, that the showing of the aircraft carrier "Theodore Roosevelt" and its aircraft during this visit merely strengthened the conviction of then Soviet Chief of General Staff Akhromeyev that aircraft carriers are an effective means of the maritime

offensive, this being quite contrary to the intentions of the Pentagon. In any case, the view of Admiral Crowe, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, that aircraft carriers have only a limited offensive capability was clearly not shared by Marshal Akhromeyev. Compare *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE*, 26 July 1988. The profound impression that the demonstration left with Akhromeyev comes out very clearly in his statements in *PRAVDA* on 5 September 1988.

CSU's Waigel: France Expects FRG Decision on SNF Modernization 'Soon'

AU1003110489 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 10 Mar p 2

["vm" report: "Waigel in Paris"]

[Text] Paris, 9 Mar—At political talks in Paris, Theo Waigel, secretary general of the Christian Social Union [CSU], has gained the impression that the French side expects the FRG Government to make a clear decision on the issue of modernizing short-range weapons soon. This topic will be broached during the next German-French consultations. State President Mitterrand, with whom Waigel met for half an hour, expressed the view that if the East modernizes, the West is also permitted to modernize, with the date of modernization at its own discretion. During his first trip abroad as the new CSU secretary general, Waigel also had talks with Foreign Minister Dumas and Defense Minister Chevenement in Paris.

MBB Plan To Produce New Air-Launched Nuclear-Capable Missile Alleged

LD1403142789 Hamburg DPA in German 1323 GMT 14 Mar 89

[Text] Baden-Baden (DPA)—According to the First German Television news magazine program 'Report', the KOLAS missile project is not the only carrier system with nuclear capacity in the Federal Army's plans. As the magazine reports on First German Television this evening (Tuesday), confidential documents belonging to the aeronautics and astronautics company MBB and correspondent planning documents of the Bonn Defense Ministry show that a further missile project with nuclear capacity is being planned.

In this case, it is an air-based long-range stand-off weapon designed as part of the armory of the German Tornado, it is reported from Baden-Baden. According to 'Report's' research, Tornado aircraft with nuclear functions are to be deployed in the German military airfields Buechel, Noervenich, and Memmingen. According to the program, a Defense Ministry paper has stated: "It is established that the FRG will continue to make its appropriate contribution to nuclear deterrence within the Alliance and to make available carriers for nuclear weapons."

'Report' quotes confidential documents as saying MBB will initially be producing 2,000 to 3,000 conventional

stand-off weapons of various ranges for the German Air Force. The same stand-off weapon should, however, also be able to carry nuclear warheads. The project would cost about DM10 billion. According to the Television program, the Defense Ministry describes the plans as "The Air Force's most important air-to-ground weapons project".

SWEDEN

Editorial on Meaning Of Vienna CSCE Agreement For Sweden

52002413a Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
17 Jan 89 p 2

[Editorial: "Vienna Dancing And Smiling"]

[Text] To be sure, there may be setbacks after a remarkable 1988, but from the standpoint of reduced tensions the new year has at least begun well, with support for a CSCE agreement in Vienna.

Now that, according to all indications, only a series of formal concluding speeches remains, it is clear that a number of commitments and obligations will complement and expand previous attempts to strengthen security and cooperation in the old European zone of conflict. Another important step has been taken for which Sweden, in particular, has worked hard. Of course, without the active participation of the power blocs nothing could have been accomplished, but without the initiative and mediating role of the non-aligned group, the results could have been worse and would have taken longer.

With the reservation that, so far, the progress is limited to declarations, possible advances in the area of human rights may give rise to the greatest optimism. The original and still fundamental Helsinki Document has been given a concrete interpretation that supports the right of the individual to leave his country and for families to be reunited. For the first time, the procedure is stated for how this is to occur. The rights of national minorities and religious believers have been written down.

It is particularly significant and encouraging that a mechanism has been created for giving individuals the right to monitor compliance with the new Vienna Document. National committees that have formed at their own initiative to enforce the original Helsinki Document will now have an international agreement to stand on for monitoring compliance in the East—where the major problem has been.

It is understandable that there is a bit of a "Vienna Dancing and Smiling" attitude over results that, on paper, are better than what many initially thought possible.

The enthusiasm should probably be more restrained with regard to what, in practice, was the second main

theme of the conference—the beginning of negotiations on conventional disarmament and the balance of power in Europe.

Of course, no one can deny the importance of having representatives from both power blocs sit down and discuss more defensive and less frightening defense systems, whether these negotiations are called NAFE (Negotiations on Armed Forces in Europe) or CAST (Conventional Stability Talks). Of course, it is important that the sides agreed in advance what would be discussed, such as artillery and aircraft, intended for either conventional or nuclear weapons.

We can only hope that the beginning in March will be more successful than was the case with the pathetic troop discussions in the past, MBFR, which now after 15 years are being put to rest. The fact that, so far, all the decisive steps in the negotiations on arms reduction have been taken by the superpowers in their dialogue must dampen expectations for a forum in which not everyone is allowed to participate and in which equality within the CSCE has been broken.

For Sweden, the most important task has been to link these bloc negotiations with a continuation, including in Vienna, of the discussions in Stockholm on confidence-building measures. For a long time, Sweden has demanded that all European nations, including the non-aligned states, have insight into negotiations that affect military conditions in this part of the world. Now that this is being done to a good degree, it is understandable that the Swedish delegation is satisfied with what is being done in this regard in Vienna.

Of course, we must ask whether we have a tendency to congratulate ourselves for a little too much. After all, it was clear from the beginning that the entire CSCE process would not be allowed to break down. And Gorbachev's "new thinking" has guaranteed that the Soviet Union would endure the strong criticism of the West against human rights abuses in the East that were forthcoming in Vienna, as they were previously in Belgrade in 1977-78 and in Madrid in 1980-83. But negotiations in the Austrian capital have been difficult even during the more favorable political climate between the major powers in recent years.

At times, the procedure of military inspections during maneuvers that resulted from the Stockholm Conference is a cause of discord: representatives of the East feel they are being shuttled around on endless trips and those from the West believe they are being shown nothing but drills. When, during the last weekend of negotiations, demonstrators were arrested in Prag, Leipzig in East Germany, and Romania, and these countries declared themselves to be unrestricted by the decisions in Vienna, it may seem that the negotiators in the ballrooms of Vienna have a poor grip on reality.

All the same, the Soviet Union must live up to a conference on human rights in 1991. The CSCE process is making demands—and it is making participation a matter of equality.

Foreign Ministry's Schori Optimistic On Prospects For Arms Control

52002413b Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
30 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Bengt Falkkloo: "Signs Of Detente"; first paragraph is DAGENS NYHETER introduction]

[Text] Storlien—There will be no immediate disarmament in Europe. The major powers still possess enormous quantities of arms. But despite this, a clear trend toward disarmament may be seen, and last year can be seen as a year in which the previous trend was broken.

This was stated by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Pierre Schori when he spoke at the People and Defense Conference in Storlien, which began on Sunday.

"We must listen to what Gorbachev says in his speeches," Schori continued.

"The restructuring that has begun in the Soviet Union holds promises for the future, but we cannot take detente as a given. If they reduce their conventional forces, then this must affect the Swedish military, as well, it has been said in the debate. The money is needed elsewhere, they say."

But Pierre Schori does not believe that this would be particularly useful. According to him, there is no reason to "lower our guard" at present. Sweden must hold its present course.

Strong Defense

"But of course we must keep these new events in mind and try to contribute actively to further the process of detente."

According to the Foreign Ministry, Sweden now has a strong defense and it will not be eroded. Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson put it as follows:

"We have a strong defense, but with certain shortcomings."

If the Swedish military does not hold the line, then it could be seen abroad as indicating that Sweden's belief in neutrality is no longer as strong as it was before.

Schori does not believe there will be a surprise attack against Sweden alone, but since Sweden is located right between the major power blocs, there is always the risk that we could be attacked or drawn into a conflict.

And despite the reduction in tension that has taken place and agreements on the Baltic Sea between Sweden and other countries, intense reconnaissance and intelligence activities still seem to be occurring under water.

Important Talks

Last March disarmament negotiations involving 23 nations began in Vienna and, according to Schori, the prospects are good for halting weapons of mass destruction.

"Of course, much remains to be done, but something important has happened and expectations are high."

We should still be cautious towards the changes in the Soviet Union.

"We should evaluate them vigilantly and without illusions, but at the same time we have reason to take the reforms seriously."

Pierre Schori also criticized those who want to keep the crisis, war, and tension mentality alive at all costs. He said that for some writers and newspapers, such as SVENSK TIDSKRIFT, the picture of a menacing enemy is their bread and butter.

Export Controls on Missile, CW Technology Considered

36500065 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
17 Feb 89 p 6

[Article by Bo G. Andersson]

[Text] The Swedish Government is considering the introduction of a number of control measures to prevent exports of chemicals and related technical apparatus that can be used to produce chemical weapons.

New legislation banning exports of missile engines and other technology for nuclear delivery systems is also currently in preparation at the Government Office.

This has been confirmed to DAGENS NYHETER by War Materiel Inspector Sven Hirdman, who is something of a key man in the preparatory work involved.

Secretiveness

The new export controls have been thrashed out within a restricted circle at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Research Institute, the War Materiel Inspectorate, and the Customs Service. There has been very considerable secretiveness.

"We have no indications that Swedish industry has been exporting chemicals to chemical weapon plants abroad along the lines of the West German deliveries to Libya."

"What we have done is conduct an unprejudiced study of Swedish industry's production capacity with respect to both raw materials and technical apparatus that can be used to produce chemical weapons. We have a very competent industry, and we want to gather information on exports," Sven Hirdman told DAGENS NYHETER.

The work began long before the disclosure that West German firms had supplied a factory just south of Tripoli with equipment for producing chemical weapons.

From the Swedish standpoint, the big problem is that many of the chemicals used in nerve and mustard gases, for example, also have civilian uses, primarily as components of various insecticides.

Quick Action

Since chemical raw materials have that twofold application, it is not possible to control exports under current war materiel legislation. For a product to be classified as war materiel, it must be usable exclusively for military purposes.

DAGENS NYHETER has learned that very soon—within just a few weeks—the government will propose various measures for controlling exports of chemicals that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The same applies, for example, to the boilers, distillation equipment, and filtering apparatus that are needed to produce the substances in question.

"Sweden is concerned by the spread of chemical weapons to the Third World, especially to areas of conflict such as Iran-Iraq. We, therefore, want to do our bit," says Sven Hirdman, who, in his capacity as head of the War Materiel Inspectorate, is ultimately responsible to Minister of Defense Sten Andersson.

Another area regarded by the Swedish Government as requiring very urgent attention is that of missile delivery systems and the related technology. Here, too, new legislative measures are expected in the very near future to gain control over Swedish exports.

Joint Action

In April 1987, seven Western powers—the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada—joined together in introducing export controls on missile delivery systems and similar systems capable of delivering nuclear warheads, chemical weapons, and conventional high-explosive charges.

That joint action by the seven states was directed against countries which have the capability for producing nuclear and chemical weapons but which may not have

all the know-how required for producing delivery systems. This applies, for example, to India, Pakistan, Libya, Iraq, South Africa, Egypt, Argentina, and Brazil. Israel is also on the list, but that country is considered to have its own capability thanks to the Jericho missile system that has been produced in recent years.

The list of products covered by the export controls introduced by the seven Western powers is a very long one. It covers everything from complete rocket systems to various fuels and, for example, the software used in navigation systems.

Space Technology

Many of those products are related to space technology and are manufactured by such Swedish firms as Saab, the Volvo Aircraft Engine Company, and the Swedish Space Corporation. Those firms will be affected by the legislation now being considered by the Government Office.

It is natural that Sweden should follow the Western powers and introduce similar control regulations. It can be viewed as a continuation of the many years of Swedish disarmament work in the area of nuclear weapons. But DAGENS NYHETER has learned that there are also other reasons why Swedish measures are urgent.

The firms in Sweden which manufacture products of this kind are dependent upon imports of certain key components from the United States and several of the other Western countries in that group of seven states. DAGENS NYHETER has been told by several sources that those deliveries will be in the danger zone if Sweden does not institute better controls over its own exports.

No Choice

The seven Western powers may halt sales to Sweden if they do not get guarantees from the Swedish Government that it is doing everything it can to gain control over its own exports. The government therefore has no choice, according to those sources.

DAGENS NYHETER has learned that the control measures will also be directed at brokers and other middlemen dealing in chemicals, missile delivery technology, and so on. The government is considering the possibility of doing exactly as it does in the case of exports of ordinary war material and requiring so-called end user certificates from the states buying these products from Sweden.

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